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In this dissertation I examine the proposals of Schubert Ogden in 
favor of the view that theology is an integral part of metaphysics. My 
construction of his system yields two arguments designed to demonstrate 
this view of the relationship between theology and philosophy. What is 
unique to Ogden1s specific position is his use of an existentialist 
epistemology and anthropology derived from Heidegger and Bultmann as a 
basis for a process metaphysics influenced by Hartshorne and Whitehead. 
Ogden1s first argument involves the main components of his epistemology. 
I summarize it in the following propositions. 
(a) A proper theology conforms to two criteria: it is adequate to 
its origination tradition and intelligible to contemporary secular 
man. 
(b) The starting point of all thought is subjectivist, that is about 
the self. 
(c) Theology is therefore possible only as existentialist analysis. 
(d) Theology cannot use objectifying language, either in relation to 
the self or to God. 
(e) There can therefore be no objective historical events that provide 
differentiating content for theology. 
(f) Theology then falls within the scope of philosophy as al general 
analysis of existence. 
Ogden's second argument is formulated within his metaphysics. I 
summarize it thus: 
(a) Faith in meaning (e.g. in science, ethics, and religion) is 
unavoidable. 
(b) Unavoidable faith implies a real God. 
(c) An existentialist epistemology is compatible with a process 
metaphysics. 
(d) A process metaphysics leads to a panentheistic view of God and 
the world. 
(e) The panentheistic principle that God is the paramount example 
of metaphysical categories dictates that God is to be understood 
by analogy with the self. 
(f) The world is then, by analogy, to be understood as God's body. 
(g) It follows that every real world act and event are, in part, 
God's action. 
(h) As with every self, some of God's actions are more characteristic 
than others. 
(i) I can determine that those events and actions are characteristic 
of God to which I respond by realizing authentic human existence. 
(j) By this criterion, the life of Jesus most fully represents God's 
character. 
(k) Therefore, Christian theology, i.e., the understanding of exis-
tence based on Jesus' life, is also the right philosophical 
understanding of man and God in general. 
I contend that both of these lines of argument fail. The first 
depends on an inconsistency within Ogden's system. Ogden appears to 
affirm but also deny the concrete activity of God in history. Ogden's 
epistemology, particularly as it is applied to theological language in 
the project of demythologizing, explicityly forbids the use of objectifying 
language in reference to God. God is always subject, not object. 
Events characteristic of God are recognized only by a criterion of 
subjective response. Nevertheless, it is clear that Ogden's panentheism 
requires the general truth that all events are, in part, God's actions 
in history, 
truly his. 
Indeed, some events adequately represent God and are thus 
I show that there is a fundamental tension between the sub-
jective base of his existentialist epistemology and the objective base of 
his process metaphysics. 
I contend that Ogden's second argument fails to establish a workable 
criterion for the identity of theology and philosophy at any level. 
Most importantly, his metaphysics fails to derive from his epistemological 
base any justification for his use of analogy. Again the split between 
the existential epistemology and the process metaphysics invalidates 
Ogden's system. 
I argue, in conclusion, that Ogden's attempts to prove that theology 
is an integral part of metaphysics miss the true issue. He does not con-
front the possibility of distinguishing theology from philosophy by the 
source of its content, but deals only with the issue of unique items of 
content. 
PREFACE 
Statement of purpose.- The purpose of this dissertation 
is to critically examine the relationship between philosophy 
and theology in the system of Schubert Ogden. Current 
discussion of this relationship has taken a new direction 
because of the influence of the recent revival of Whitehead 
by philosophers such as Wm. Christian, L. Ford, O. Griffin 
and others, and the specific application of his process 
philosophy to theological doctrines by D.O. Williams, 
C. Williamson, N. Pettenger and many more. 
Schubert Ogden and John Cobb stand out as the most 
prominent 1 of those dealing with the general application 
of process categories, the latter due to his concern for 
a systematic, Whiteheadian natural theology, and Ogden, 
especially since the late nineteen-sixties, because of 
his discussions of method and definition in philosophy and 
theology. 
The primary catalyst and partial source in this 
revival, as in former ones, has continued to be Charles 
Hartshorne. Although I agree with Sessions 2 and others 
that his philosophy developed in part independently of 
Whitehead, it is clear that they can be grouped together 
a Slip roc e s Slip h i los 0 P her s . But w her e \~ hit e h e a d 1 eft 
most of the details of a philosophy of God undeveloped, 
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Hartshorne has spent virtually all of his philosophical 
career carefully working out a process doctrine of God 
in several major books and many articles. 
Hartshorne's God-concept, and process metaphysics 
in general, have attracted many theologians since they 
seem to eliminate many of the difficulties of traditional, 
IIclassicalll theism, in particular the problem of relatedness 
of man and God. Ogden is certainly to be numbered among 
these theologians and has written a number of essays on 
the doctrine of God, as well as on eschatology and Christo-
logy. As indicated, however, his primary concern has been 
to trace the boundaries of philosophy and theology, when 
both are conceived in process terms. 
Why should process thought have brought about a new 
phase in the negotiation between Athens and Jerusalem? 
In brief, Ogden contends that the isolation of theology 
has been due to the inability of classical metaphysics to 
adquately account for an incursion of an absolute God 
into ordinary human history. t'Iith a IIneo-classicalll meta-
physic based on event rather than substance categories, it 
is, according to Ogden, possible to relate general 
cosmology and history and thus to include theology as a 
specialization within metaphysics--and yet to identify 
distinct, particular theologies. 
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Whether or not Ogden does, in fact, make his case will 
be the subject of the pages that follow. Clearly, if he 
does, then we will have made a significant contribution 
to a new synthesis of theology and philosophy. It ought 
to be noted, in conclusion, that I am not concerned with 
the truth of process thought per ~, but only with the 
coherence of Ogdenls specific proposal concerning theology 
and philosophy. 
1My own judgment is confi rmed by G. Reeves and D. Brown 
in liThe Development of Process Theology" in Process 
Philosophy and Christian Thought (Indianapolis: Bobb-
~1errill, 19m and also Bernard Meland in liThe Empirical 
Tradition in Theology at Chicago" in The Future 2i. 
Empirical Theology (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1969), 
p. 51. 
2 See Esp. Hi 1 1 i am L. S e s s ion s I II H art s h 0 r n e I sEa r 1 y 
Philosophy", chapter II in Two Process Philosophers, 
e d. \:! m. S e s s ion s (A A R Stu dies-i n R eli 9 ion # 5, 1 9 7 3 ) . 
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That there are still unsolved problems in the philo-
sophy of religion is more than an overstatement. They 
hardly need listing. One of them, however, has plagued 
us since the very beginning of ancient philosophy: that 
of the specific relationship between philosophy and theo-
logy. 
The problem has been aggravated by many factors, not 
the least of which has been the persistent lack of unani-
mity concerning the definitions of both disciplines. 
A survey of the options shows at least the following 
broad categories of solutions. 
Reductionist views: Such views deal with the problem 
by considering the language~game of one discipline as 
another, howbeit inferior, anachronistic, or mythological 
way of saying what the other discipline says accurately, 
pur ely 0 r d ire c t 1 y . F r i t z Bur i 's \I d eke ry g mat i z a t ion II 0 f 
theology in favor of (Jasper's) existentialismand Hegel's 
demythologizing in favor of pure conceptual philosophy 
would be cases in point. Braithwaite and Kant l are examples 
of a reduction of theological to ethical language. The 
reduction may occur, of course, in either direction. 
Eliminationist views~ In these positions either 
philosophy or theology is entirely eliminated in favor of 
the other. Occasionally, eliminating one discipline has 
3 
the effect of also substantially reducing the scope of 
the other, as, for example, in logical positivism. Some 
extreme versions of Calvinist theologians are elimination-
ist in favor of revelational theology. 
Subordinationist views: In such views one discipline 
is regarded as logically subservient to the other, but 
nevertheless as a proper enterprise in its own right. 
Thomas· view of philosophy as preparation and clarification 
of theology is subordinationist in one direction. Though 
less explicit the subordination also can occur in the other 
direction in such views as Toulmin·s where theology serves 
to introduce and clarify philosophical problems. 
Coordinationist views: Here, both philosophy and 
theology are considered as separate but equal disciplines. 
This coordination of disciplines can be conceived in many 
different ways, in some cases as the results of two entirely 
distinct ways of knowing. 
Containment views: Views in this category conceive 
of theology or philosophy as a part or segment of the 
other. The set of propositions of one are really a subset 
of the propositions of the other. 
What is unique about the last category is that it is 
really the only one in which philosophy and theology are 
not regarded as competitive in any sense. In addition it 
4 
avoids all of the difficulties of having two distinct 
modes of knowing' which a~e frequently present in subo~~ 
~ 
dinationist or coordinationist views. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to present sys-
tematically the arguments of one recent version of a 
containment view: that of Schubert Ogden. For Ogden, 
theology is to be understood as a specification within 
philosophy, with the same subject matter and epistemo-
logy. This position deserves careful presentation simply 
for its uniqueness among contemporary models. It is 
important that three limitations on the discussion be 
noted from the outset. First, though a great deal will 
be said about the general content of Ogden's system, that 
is not the central topic. My interest is only in the 
structure of that system and the specific topic of the 
relation of theology and philosophy. 
Second, I am limiting my scope to a particular tradi-
tion of discussion, namely that of Christian theology. 
Cobb, Hartsho~ne and other process thinkers have occasion-
ally discussed non-christian traditions, but Ogden has 
not. 
Third, I shall evaluate only Ogden's position. Natur-
ally, other related positions will be touched on, and the 
concluding chapter will of necessity contain my own present 
evaluation of the issues. 
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The historical problem. - It remains in this section 
to isolate and more clearly identify the specific issue 
on which Ogden's position can be brought to bear. Thus 
far I have simply spoken of the problem of the status and 
value of philosophy and theology in relation to each other. 
I must now be more specific. 
Historically, attempts to justify the possibility 
of theology, or the separate status of theology and philo-
sophy, have almost invariably been based on the question 
of their respective sources. In other words, they have 
generally tried to establish a unique source for theology, 
in some way clearly distinguishable from human reason, 
observation, speculation, analysis, or whatever else one 
might hold to be the source of philosophy. Ordinarily 
this unique source is referred to as IIrevelationll, or its 
response, IIfaith ll , depending on whether one is more inter-
ested in the divine or the human aspect, the objective or 
the subjective. Where revelation is seen as illusory or 
purely human and less reliable than reason--superstition, 
for example--theology is eliminated. Some examples of the 
distinction in sources will be helpful here. 
Thomas Aquinas wrote: 
... It was necessary for man's salvation that 
there should be a knowledge revealed by God, 
besides the philosophical sciences investigated 
by human reason .... 
6 
Sciences are diversified according to the diverse 
nat u reo f the irk now a b 1 e 0 b j e c t s . . . . t Tfh ere i s 
no reason why those things which are treated by the 
philosophical sciences, so far as they can be known 
by the light of natural reason, may not also be 
treated by another science so far as they are known 
by the light of divine revelation. Hence the 
theology included in sacred doctrine differs in 
genus from that theology which is part of philosophy.2 
Second, John Locke: 
Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to 
faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty 
or Probability of such propositions or truths, which 
the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, 
which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; 
viz.by sensation or reflection. 
Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any 
proposition, not thus made out by the deductions 
of reason, but upon the credit df the proposer, 
as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of 
communication. This wa Y30f discovering truths to men, we call revelation. 
Locke, in other places, continues this line of reasoning 
to say that revelation is the unique source of theology. 
Third, we ought to note S~ren Kierkegaard. Although he 
is otherwise known as the father of the subjective, existen-
tialist approach to direct knowledge of God, it is also true 
that he rejected the negative evaluation of Scripture and 
attempted to base true religion on revelation. Note the fol-
lowing from Philosophical Fragments in the context of a dis-
cussion of contemporaneity with Christ: 
If we wish to express the relation subsisting 
between the contemporary and his successor in 
the briefest possible compass, but without sac-
rificing accuracy to brevity, we may say: The 
7 
successor believed by means of (he expresses the 
occasional) the testimony of the contemporary, in 
virtue of the condition he himself receives from 
God.4 
What is unique, then, about theology as derived from 
revelation, as seen by most traditional positions, is its 
ultimately divine source. In some, God's Hrevelation" is 
interpreted as being extraordinary human insights for which 
God is responsible only in whatever sense he may be held 
to be the originator of any and all events. A case in" point 
would be Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
Within the extremely complex epistemology of Schleier~ 
macher's Dialectic every experience is made up of varying 
proportions of "feeling" of dependence and of freedom. The 
limiting case at one end of the spectrum is the common experi~ 
ence or feeling of absolute dependence. Its "otherness" 
demands the reality of its object. Although it is at the 
very boundary of experience, it is still capable of being 
investigated. Thus, in Schleiermacher's epistemology, religious 
knowledge still has a uniquely identifiable, though n~tural 
source. While it is undoubtedly true that other factors might 
be suggested as distinguishing characteristics between dis~ 
ciplines, Ogden recognizes that that of source is central 
and historically most frequent, I turn then to the develop~ 
ment of Ogden's view. 
o 9 den and the pre sen t sit u a t 10 n .,.. Let me b r i e fly? a. n d 
without any substantive demonstration, trace what I take to 
8 
be the development of thought that has led to a strange 
reversal of position; that is, whereas at one time theology 
was queen and one could at least reasonably question whether 
philosophy was of any ultimate value, today philosophy, at 
least in some of its roles, is thoroughly entrenched and 
it is theology that often appears as meaningless or anach-
ronistic. 5 
There are many reasons why theologians in the early 
nineteenth century began to give up their confidence in 
Christian revelation, that is, in a unique and supernatural 
source. Kant and Lessing, the Enlightenment worship of 
reason, the development of the natural sciences, theories 
of IIhigher criticism ll , along with many others, have all 
been assigned the blame. In any case, the rise of IIliberal ll 
theology was essentially a turn from objective Propositional 
revelation to internal universal revelation. Religion 
sought its source in feeling and personal religious exper-
ience. 
It may have appeared, for a time, that neo-orthodoxy 
heralded a return to Scripture as an ultimate source, but 
the IIdialectical ll character of Barth's theology in the end 
left only the possibility of an lIencounterll revelation. 
Witness, for example, the following from John Baillie, one 
of Barth's disciples: 
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The Bible does indeed speak of saving knowledge, 
but this is no mere knowledge that, and no mere 
knowledge about: it is a knowledge of. It is 
what our epistemologists call knowledge by 
acquaintance as distinct from merely conceptual 
knowledge. God does not give us information 
by com~uni6ation. He gives us Himself in 
communlon. 
It was, however, the influence of Rudolf Bultmann in 
Europe and Paul Tillich in America that shaped to a great 
extent our present situation. The application of existen-
tialist categories to revelation produced a theory of internal 
and individual revelation, that is, theology as an analysis 
of human faith, not needing any outside revelatory source. 
Thus, what was once considered the objective revelation 
of God's truth to all men has now become, in Bultmann, the 
records of human mythologies: misguided attempts to objectify 
divine reality. Faith appears primarily on the level of 
subjective individual experience. In this situation what 
could be more suitable in providing a rational, universal, 
and objective framework than philosophy? And so, if theo-
logy was once queen of the sciences, philosophy has now 
become king. 
Ogden, I shall indicate, is of extreme importance in 
developing this latest position for theology. More explicitly 
than most of his contemporaries, he has brought philosophical 
categories into theological thinking. And yet he maintains 
that theology has retained its identity contained with 
philosophy. How he accomplishes this, and whether or not 
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he is truly successful, is the topic of this dissertation. 
Let me then summarize the issue. If one can identify 
and justify some objective, divine revelation as unique 
source of knowledge of God, then theology is clearly distin-
guishable as a theoretic discipline with an appropriate 
hermeneutical method. Philosophy, then, is distinguished 
from it as simply human wisdom. Their contents may well 
overlap; they will still be separate disciplines, and re-
quire different methods: one interpretative, the other 
speculative. Ogden, however, gives strong reasons to think 
that such unique revelation neither is nor could, be avail-
able, thus eliminating what would appear to be the most 
viable criterion for distinguishing the disciplines. 
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B. The Context of Discussion 
Introduction. - In the remainder of this chapter I 
shall be concerned with the sequential development of 
Ogden's thought. In this section the topic is the back-
ground of his position, the influences and mentors to which 
he has paid attention,land whose concepts he put to use in 
his own system. In the concluding section of the chapter 
I shall briefly outline the chronology of Ogden's develop-
ment of an understanding of what theology and philosophy 
are, focusing on his books and major articles. 
It is oversimplified but reasonably accurate to charac-
terize Ogden's position as a confluence of two trends in 
contemporary philosophical theology. John MacQuarrie has 
argued that there have been two major opposing lines of 
thought stretching from the nineteenth into the twentieth 
century: that of Hegel, Marx and Bloch and that of Kierke-
gaard, Heidegger, and Bultmann. 7 It is the latter tradition 
in which Ogden clearly stands; it has provided him with a 
method and with basic goals. Much of the content, however, 
has been derived from a school of thought indigenous to our 
own century, beginning with A.N. Whitehead and C. Hartshorne, 
which has usually been labelled as "process~ coalesce in 
Ogden to form a unique contribution to the problem of relating 
philosophy and theology. 
12 
Format. - A discussion tif the influences on Ogden 
might easily get out of hand. It would involve a rather 
lengthy and careful investigation of Heidegger, Whitehead, 
Hartshorne, Toulmin and other philosophers, Barth, Bult-
mann, Macquarrie, Buri and numerous other theologians. 
Such a discussion is beyond my scope here. I shall 
confine myself to brief discussions of Ogden's most import-
ant acknowledged sources. In doing so, I shall view each 
through Ogden's own eyes, with his estimation of what is 
central to each position and, of course, of what has been 
adaptable to his own pattern of thought. I shall not be 
concerned in this chapter to fit these various strains of 
thought into any systematic order, but will discuss them 
in historical sequence, by tradition. Later chapters will 
demonstrate their systematic fit. 
1. The Existentialist Tradition in Theology 
a. Barth and Liberalism: Bultmann's Theological Roots 
Ogden has frequently agreed with Karl Barth that the 
paramount problem facing theology throughout the entire modern 
period is that of IIfinding the 'right' conceptuality for this 
situation. IIS In part quoting Barth, Ogden has said that, 
Theology cannot consist merely lIin ascertaining 
and communicating results already obtained in 
some classical period,1I but must consist rather 
lIin a reflection that is constantly renewed II 
and therefore must IIbe undertaken again and 
again in complete seriousness and ~ ove. 1I9 
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Liberalism in the nineteenth century was just such an 
attempt to do theology while accepting the anti-supernatura-
lism and critical outlook of its day.l0 It attempted a purely 
natural theology. 
During the nineteen-thirties came the rejection of 
liberalism--as well as of orthodoxy, its great foe--associated 
with Karl Barth and first publicized by his commentary on 
Romans. His earlier writings are marked by their dialectical 
thesis which divides the provinces of science and revelation 
by affirming the "totally other" nature of God, the "infinite 
qualitative difference" between the natural world of time and 
space and the eternal being of God. 
In his later works, however, Barth turned to a truly 
"neo-orthodox" position as indicated by his return to a 
strong emphasis on biblical authority and a denial of the 
1 t " t " 11 apo oge lC en erprlse. It is this situation, due in part 
to the Nazi development of "German Christianity "12, that 
led to Barth's strong opposition to any form of natural theo-
logy, that is, to any attempt to mix the results of philoso-
h " 1 1· "th Ch"" 1" 13 P lca specu atlon Wl' rlstlan reve atlon. 
While Ogden does not specifically acknowledge any depen-
dence on Barth, apart from his conception of the general 
obligation of theology, it will become quite clear as the 
discussion progresses in following chapters, that his philo-
sophy of history and the presuppositions that help formulate 
14 
his doctrine of God are clearly dialectical in character. 
God's actions are not ordinary history. 
It is in opposition to the later Barth--but in agree-
ment with his earlier purely dialectical position--that 
Rudolf Bultmann developed his theology, using the categor-
ies of Heideggerian e~istentialism. We turn to Heidegger 
as the first major influence on Ogden. 
b. Heidegger: Bultmann's Philosophical Roots 
Ogden views Heidegger primarily through Bultmann's eyes, 
so that direct links are not always evident. However, as 
Bultmann's chief philosophical source, he is crucial for 
an understanding of Ogden. 
Ogden does agree with Bultmann's assessment of Heidegger, 
namely that Being and Time provides the most adequate concep-
tual system for understanding the message of the Christian 
tradition as embodied in the New Testament, although indirectly. 
That is, he accepts Bultmann's conceptualizations and acknow-
ledges Bultmann's dependence on Heidegger. The closest one 
can find is the following: 
Indeed, we must insist that what Bultmann himself 
means by lIexi stential interpretation ll can be properly 
carried out only when Heidegger's analysis of human 
existence is viewed in the perspective of the general 
ontology it seems to imply and in which divine 
existence also is appropriately analyzed and con-
ceptualized. 14 
15 
This same claim, that the best categories for con-
ceptualizing the New Testament are those of Being and 
Time supplemented by its theological corollary. the pro-
cess theism of Hartshorne, is the thesis of numerous 
essays, especially IIBultmann 1s Demythologizing and Harts-
horne1s Dipolar Theism ll (1964). Ogden, however, seems 
generally content to read Heidegger through Bultmann. 
In the following, I shall identify, with little 
exposition, three well-known aspects of Heidegger1s 
thought which, however indirectly, are of particular sign-
ificance to Ogden1s system. 
Self ~ primary category. - In Heidegger, philosophy 
is the formal ontological analysis of the meaning of Being, 
Sein, as such. It is directed primarily toward the self 
since human Being has a unique ontic status. It is this 
orientation away from the world of objects toward the Being 
of selfhood that led Heidegger to reject substance as the 
primary category in favor of self as the primal ground of 
the world. 15 
Self not objectifiable. -
Heidegger distinguishes between the lIexistentialist ll 
(existenzial) understanding that is the proper 
business of philosophy and the lIexistential ll 
(existenziell) understanding that iSl~niquelY 
the concern of each existing person. 
It is only the essential structure, or the formal rather 
than material or concrete existence of man 17 that is subject 
16 
to analysis. The self, since it is not an object, can 
never be captured by objectifying conceptualizations or 
language but is only ever the subject of experience. 
God not objectifiable. - The final result of Heidegger's 
conception of philosophy's task and limitations that is 
crucial for both Bultmann and Ogden is that, analogously 
to the self, God also could never be the "abstract object 
of conceptual thinking, but only a concrete subject of 
existential encounter." ld 
It is true that Heidegger does seem to allow for the 
possibility of an existenzial understanding of God as the 
subject of encounter but this project is never carried out. 
All that Ogden can find is a footnote in Being and Time: 
It requires no extensive discussion to show that 
the traditional concept of eternity, in the sense 
of the 'stationary now l (nunc stans), is drawn 
from the vulgar understanding of time and is 
limited by an orientation to the idea of Iconstant l 
presence-on-hand. If the eternity of God would 
admit of being 'construed ' philosophically, then 
it could be understood only as a more primal and 
'infinite ' temporality. Whether the via 
negationis ~ eminentiae could offer a-p£~sible 
way to this goal would remain uncertain. 
Bultmann's position also lacks a developed decline of God 
based on existenzial understanding. The possibility is, 
however, open and Ogden will use it. 
These basic principles of Heidegger are adopted by 
Bultmann to whom we must now turn as a major influence on 
Ogden. We will find their indirect influence quite clearly 
17 
in later discussions of Ogden's definition of philosophy 
and of the analogical approach to knowledge of God. 
c. Rudolf Bultmann 
There is no doubt but that Ogden considers Bultmann 
to be his most important initial partner in dialogue. 
Writing in 1962, he said: 
Thus one can say that the deeper the reason for 
Bultmann's present theological importance is that 
he is the contemporary theologian par excellence. 
In a way that distinguishes him from-almost all his 
contemporaries, he has profoundly involved himself 
in the present historical situation of Protestant 
Christianity in the West and has endeavored to 
work out a new theological synthesis within the 
limits and the opportunities of that situation. 20 
Later in the same essay, Ogden makes it clear that Bultmann's 
most important contribution in general, and most profound 
influence on himself, is in two areas: first, that of 
clarifying the present situation which theology must con-
front, and second, developing a specific methodology to be 
used in this confrontation. 
This acknowledgement has been one of the constants in 
Ogden's writing. The theme of his first published essay, 
"Bultmann's Project of Demythologization and the Problem 
of Theology and Philosophy" (1957), as well as the recent 
liOn Revelation" (1975), and of numerous essays in between, 
has been the same: although we must reject the specific 
content of Bultmann's Christocentric theology, his analysis 
of contemporary man's existential situation, and his argument 
18 
for the method of demythologization--the elimination of 
myth--and existential reinterpretation--interpretation in 
terms of man's potential--must be accepted. Two further 
quotes will help to make the point. 
There is the need to find an appropriate way of 
thinking and speaking which can also be genuinely 
understood by men whose possibilities for under-
standing are limited by their acceptance of the 
scientific picture of the world ..... 1 do believe 
that it is Bultmann, more than anyone else, who has 
laid down the lines along which the achievement of 
this part of our task has to be sought. 21 
And in reference to the specific methodology of such a 
solution Ogden writes: 
The first principle of such a solution is that the 
demand for demythologization that arises with 
necessity from the situation of modern man must be 
accepted wlthOur-Gondition. That the assumption-of 
this pfinciple is not gratuitous, but fully 
warranted, seems to us to have been demonstrated by 
Bultmann and to require little additional confirma-
tion. 22 
There is little need for me to discuss Bultmann's 
contributions to Ogden's methodology here; they will detain 
us at length in the following chapter. There is, however, 
one particular area of content which forms an important 
part of Ogden's system, although he nowhere treats it at 
any length: namely, the doctrines of man and soteriology. 
It is precisely on these topics that Bultmann himself is 
heavily indebted to Heidegger, although primarily for term-
inology and basic conceptualizations, and less for content. 23 
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Says Ogden: 
For what has been provided, Bultmann believes, 
especially by the philosophical work of Martin 
Heidegger, is nothing less than a comprehensive 
phenomenology of man's personal and inter-
personal life and a scientific terminology .... 
Therefore, the interpreter has available to him 
a precise conceptuality in which the fundamental 
intention of the New Testament to speak to 
existence may be realized .... 24 
It will be extremely important to be aware of Ogden's 
acceptance of Bultmannian-Heideggerian views of man and the 
nature of his need. This dissertation will be concerned 
only with faith as an intellectual function and thus not 
touch on the existential doctrine of salvation in any detail. 
The later is, however, an important aspect of faith, and 
therefore a helpful basis for the discussion in the following 
chapters 25 as to the nature of existence. 
Surprisingly, Ogden is curiously vague about salvation 
and is content to simply state his acceptance of the Bult-
mannian doctrine. Even in Christ without ~ one looks 
in vain for any serious treatment. What one does find is 
a statement of Heidegger's position2~ and of Bultmann's 
restatement of it. It appears to be taken for granted 
that this view is shared by Ogden. In fact at one point, 
having summarized authentic existence as living "in radical 
dependence on God's grace, and so in freedom from the past 
and openness to the future, .. 27 Ogden adds: 
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That these remarks say nothing different from 
what can easily be found in the New Testament 
may be so ob~~ous that our making them seems 
unnecessary. 
What precisely is this Il obvious ll view? It is based 
on Bultmann1s understanding 29 of Il ex istence ll as such which 
Ogden sees as having three characteristics. First, exis-
tence is a being-in-relation-to-itself. What a man is, is 
not given. but is established by free decisions. 30 Man is 
concerned with his existence, not indifferent as are animals. 
Second, existence is individual. Ogden summarizes Bultmann1s 
position as follows: 
Only in the act of existing itself can the 
existentiell question be answered. Only the 
individual man in his own unique existence can 
decide who he is to be. 31 
Finally, existence is both act and understanding. To 
quote Ogden: liTo exist and to have an understanding of one-
self in relation to others and the world are one and the 
same thing. 1l32 This does not necessarily mean that our self-
understanding is conscious, but only that it always moves 
us. 33 
To summarize Ogden1s position based on Bultmann: 
For man to Il ex ist ll , in the technical sense that 
Bultmann presupposes, means he is being who 
must continually face and answer the question of 
what it is to be a man. It means, in a word, that 
he is ~ moral ~ religious being, one who has 
always to deal with the problem of what he ought 
to be. What he is to be is never already deter-
mined, but, rather, is something he himself is re-
quired to decide freely and responsibly by his 
existentiell understanding of himself in his world. 34 
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What is important in this view is that man has, in 
reality, only two directions in which he can determine his 
existence: he can exist either authentically or inauthen-
tically. Authentic existence Bultmann regards as precisely 
what the New Testament means by faith. We can, therefore, 
ask for the characteristics of the life of faith. 
Ogden's presentation of Bultmann in Christ without Myth 
suggests the following. Faith is, first of all, the location 
of ultimacy in the future, understood as God's grace, rather 
than in the objective and visible. This is Bultmann's re-
wording of the New Testament distinction between life in 
the IIflesh ll and life in the IIS pirit. llj5 Faith is lithe confi-
dence that the unknown and unmanageable transcendent confronts 
man as a holy love which gives him his future and so releases 
him from his past. 1I36 
But secondly, faith is true freedom. It is, as mentioned 
above, freedom from the world and the past, but it is also 
freedom from the dominion of self, and "for a life of self-
giving in faith and 10ve." 37 Thus Bultmann reinterprets the 
concept of sin and forgiveness. 
Bultmann, however, holds that this freeing from self 
has become a possibility-in-fact only as a result of God's 
act in the Christ occurrence. As we shall see, it is at 
this point that Ogden parts company with Bultmann. For the 
latter, God has acted where man was completely powerless. 
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Salvation is part of human potential, but not actually 
possible without God's decisive act. For Ogden such a 
view is contradictory, unbiblical, and unnecessary. Much 
more will have to be said on this later. 
As I have said, Ogden himself is not concerned to spell 
out this Bultmannian version of salvation, but he clearly 
assumes it as the completion of his view of the intel-
lectual aspect of faith. We shall see that the existen-
tialist tradition strongly molds Ogden's epistemology. 
But thus far I have wanted to show that Ogden is clearly 
a part of this tradition by assuming two of its central 
tenets. First, we shall find that Ogden's system depends 
on a concept of God that makes any use of observational, 
or "objectifying", language in reference to him impossible. 
This is, of course, a notion shared by much of contemporary 
theology. God is not to be understood as simply an object 
among objects. Certainly Tillich's insistence that God 
is not subject to the categories of existence but is rather 
the very ground of existence has been of great influence. 
Despite many differences, Tillich agrees with the line of 
thought from Heidegger to Bultmann, and finally to Ogden 
on the point of methodology. That is, that philosophical 
analysis begins with self-analysis, as opposed for instance 
to Barth, that this method always involves consciousness 
23 
of subject and never object, and that this analysis leads 
to a ground of being (though Heidegger would not equate this 
with the Christian God). Though Ogden will find this basis 
insufficient and supplement it with Whiteheadian concepts 
(a transition similar to Reinhold Nelbuhr's), it is never-
theless an essential assumption. 
The second influence of the existentialist tradition 
on Ogden, as we have seen, is its view of faith as a gaining 
of a new "way of seeing". It is not the solution to personal 
sin against the holiness of God, but the overcoming of 
ignorance related to one's own possibilities. It is the 
discovery of meaning which makes one's life authentic. 
We shall see both of these factors worked out in Ogden's 
system in following chapters. I must now turn to the second 
major line of influence on Ogden's thinking: that of White-
head, Hartshorne, and other contemporary process thinkers. 
2. The Process Tradition in Philosophy 
a. Alfred North Whitehead 
There is no doubt but that in more recent years Ogden's 
principal goal has been the utilization of Whiteheadian and 
Hartshornian concepts in formulating a general theology as 
well as in working out various problems in the relationship 
of theology to philosophy. It is difficult to specify par-
ticulars in Whitehead~ metaphys~cswhich have influenced 
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Ogden. Ogden attributes his doctrine of God to process 
categories in general. I shall discuss this in chapter 
four. There is, however, one area of Ogden's thought 
which demonstrates clearly his acceptance of the whole 
scheme of Whitehead's metaphysics. Since Ogden nowhere 
acknowledges the details of this dependence it will be 
simpler in this case to outline Ogden's doctrine of escha-
tology and then indicate its source. Following that I 
shall discuss the influence of Whitehead's epistemology. 
Two of Ogden's essays have been devoted specifically 
to eschatology: liThe Promise of Faith" (1966)38 and liThe 
Meaning of Christian Hope" (1975)39. 
Ogden begins by claiming it to be necessary that we 
avoid two pitfalls in interpreting the concept of resurrec-
tion. The first, into which he claims many disciples of 
Bultmann to have fallen, is that of reducing the meaning 
of resurrection to a purely existential level, that is, as 
equivalent to finding true or real life or going from inauth-
entic to authentic life. 40 Although this grasps the motive 
of ultimacy in the New Testament it does not exhaust the 
concept. On the other hand one could fall into the trap 
of incomplete demythologization by regarding the resurrection 
of Christ as an actual historic event separate from the 
. f" 41 crUCl lXlon. What then is the meaning of the resurrection 
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as a symbol of our resurrection? It is summarized in the 
following: 
Because God1s love of others is lite-rally 
boundless, whatever comes to be is fully 
embraced by his life, where it is retained 
forever without any loss of vividness. Such 
value as it has, whether positive or negative, 
becomes an integral part of his own divine life, 
and thus is in the st rict sense immortal or 
of everlasting significance .... For God ... 
everything always counts for exactly what it 
;s and never cease~2to make just its own 
unique difference. 
It is true that the above quotation and, in fact, the 
whole of liThe Meaning of Christian Hope ll makes no reference 
at all to Whitehead or his explication of IIperpetual perishingll 
and eternal objectivity as potential. However, parallel 
passages 43 in other essays do make reference to him, and it 
is evident from Ogden1s acknowledgements that, it is Process and 
Reality from which he has taken much of the metaphysical 
outline of his system. 44 
The epistemological principle in Ogden1s system which 
is explicitly Whiteheadian, and which I shall mention here 
without much comment, since it will detain us in the next 
chapter, is the II re formed subjectivist principle. 1I As Ogden 
expresses it: 
The primary object of philosophical reflection is 
my own existence as an experiencing self and ... 
philosophy1s only proper task and method is 
integral reflective self-understanding. 45 
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Ogden seems to view Whitehead's epistemology as his 
most significant contribution, primarily because of his 
consistent application of this principle. It must lead, 
Ogden thinks, to a much broader form of empiricism than 
that of both traditional and contemporary sensationalists. 
Of such an open experientialism Ogden remarks: 
I wish ... to point to the one philosophy where I 
find such an empiricism most fully elaborated -
namely, Whitehead's. . .. His contribution to 
theological reflection may well lie less in the 
conceptuality provided by his imposing metaphysical 
system than in the understanding of exper!gnce of 
which that system is but the explication. 
As mentioned above, we shall examine the "reformed 
subjectivist principle" and its function in Ogden's system, 
in the next chapter. 
b. Charles Hartshorne 
Hartshorne has been such a major catalyst for Ogden 
that it is impossible to assess his influence within the 
scope of a few brief pages. In particular, his concept of 
analogy, his neo-classical theism, and his definition of 
metaphysics will have to be considered at length below in 
their relations to Ogden's views. Therefore, rather than 
mention any matters of content in this section I will simply 
summarize Ogden's own statements as to the extent of Hart-
shorne's influence. 
Ogden's acquaintance with Hartshorne is first-hand: 
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Ogden was a student of his at the University of Chicago 
Divinity School during Hartshorne's final teaching years 
at that institution. After his return there, this time 
as University Professor, Ogden's opening remarks in a 
seminar on "Christian Faith and Process Philosophy" in 1969 
were printed by Criterion, the Divinity School's journal: 
Through the work especially of those who have been 
called "philosophers of process," there has at 
last emerged the possibility of a radically new 
philosophical outlook, which, while comprehensive 
in scope, is in some respects as different from 
the traditional system of metaphysics as from the 
non-metaphysical philosophies that have so widely 
displaced them. One way of describing this new 
possibility is to speak with Charles Hartshorne of 
"neo-classical metaphysics." 
In any case, the purpose of the present inquiry, 
as of all my current endeavor, is to prove this 
conviction by actually trying to answer the 
question in terms of this new resource. 47 
The question to which he here refers is specifically that of 
the relation between theology and philosophy. 
In relation specifically to the concept of God's nature, 
Ogden remarked in a 1963 essay that his views were primarily 
the result of Hartshorne's influence and added: 
I can claim no originality for this conception 
but frankly acknowledge my dependence on Harts-
horne, whose writings fully develoP4~he kind of 
position I am concerned to present. 
Finally, in relation to the question of the choice of 
the "right philosophy", that is, the appropriate metaphysical 
system for theology, Ogden has said the following concerning 
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both Hartshorne and Whitehead in an essay that first appeared 
in 1963 and was included in his 1966 collection. 
But if an integral metaphysics in some form is a 
theological necessity ... then, I ask, what metaphysics 
has more claim on one's attention as a Protestant 
theologian today than that represented by Whitehead 
and Hartshorne? .. I am prepared to argue, therefore, 
that if any contemporary philosophy can be regarded 
historically as a "secularized" Protestant theology 
it is far less likely to be the philosophy of 
Heidegger or existentialism generally than the 
philosophy of process in its most mature and fully 
developed forms. 49 
This, then, is the second major line of influence on 
Ogden's thought. While Heidegger and Bultmann have played 
major roles for Ogden ih defining philosophical method and, 
with that, a view of God as ground of being rather than ~ 
being, much of the central content of Ogden's metaphysics 
has come out of his dialogue with process philosphers and 
theologians. We shall see these influences worked out in 
detail as we examine Ogden's system, beginning in chapter 
two. The two most prominent aspects of process philosophy 
which have attracted Ogden are, first, the negation of a 
"substance" metaphysic in favor of an "event" metaphysic, 
and, second, the subjectivist starting point for epistemo~ 
logy. The former Ogden holds to be parallel to the existen-
tialist denial of an objectifying treatment of the self and 
God, the latter to what he sees as the existentialist insis-
tence on self-analysis as the starting point for all thought. 
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3. Concluding Remarks 
It is clear that Ogden's position has been influenced 
by a number of varied sources. I have mentioned those which 
I, and Ogden himself, feel are most important. One of the 
strengths of Ogden's thought is just this factor, that it 
has grown, not in isolation, but along with its unique crea-
tivity within a broad context of contemporary philosophy 
and theology. 
Nothing has been said in this section concerning Ogden 
and analytic philosophy. It, too, has been an influence as 
can be seen in the development of his position on the relation 
of empirical science and religion in IIFalsification and Belief ll 
(1974), intended in part as a response to A. MacKinnon's 
book of the same title,50 and the interaction with the non-
cognitivism of R. Hare, R. Braithwaite, and P. Van Buren in 
"Theology and Objectivity.1I51 He has also written a lengthy 
essay in response to A. Flew's God and Philosophy as part 
of an exchange of reviews and discussion in the Journal of 
Religion. 52 
Most important in this regard is his use of some of 
S. Toulmin's theses in the argument for God's existence in 
liThe Reality of God" (1966)53 and elsewhere, but I shall 
examine that in chapter Itl, 
Having said all of this~ it is necessary to indicate 
two facts which, though not central, will be shown by this 
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dissertation. The first is that Ogden is not a haphazard 
syncretist. Though he has drawn much from his contempor-
aries it has been carefully shaped and remolded into a 
systematic view. But I hope to show, secondly, that much 
of Ogden's mature position is unique, original, and worthy 
of consideration by theologians as well as philosophers. 
In particular it is his working out of the relationship 
of theology and philosophy that distinguishes his system 
and I shall choose to view the total construct from just 
that prospective. 
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C. An Historical Outline of Ogden1s Works 
Introduction. - The remainder of this dissertation 
will be largely systematic in nature. However, it is 
clearly the case that Ogden1s position has developed over 
a period of time, and with a succession of partners in 
dialogue. Thus it is appropriate to provid~ first an over-
view of the chronology of Ogden1s works in order to better 
understand the logic of the system. Let me emphasize that 
my concern in this chapter is to identify certain central 
themes as they appear in Ogden1s essays, not to develop 
systematically any position. 
1. Early Essays: 1957-1962 
During the years between the writing of Ogden1s dis-
sertation and its publication in 1961, as well as several 
articles published in 1962, his concern is with Rudolf Bult-
mann. 
A number of themes are touched on. IIBultmannls Project 
of Demythologizing and the Problem of Theology and Philo-
sophyll (1957) is largely a restatement of the central conten-
tion of his dissertation: that Bultmann1s system contains 
a basic contradiction between the demand for the universality 
of the possibility of authentication and the uniqueness and 
necessity of the revelation of God in Christ. His liThe Debate 
on Demythologizingll (1959) attacks the same question concerning 
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the consistency of Bultmann's proposal, although the argu-
ment here is historical rather than internal, attempting 
to show a basic instability in any dialectical theology 
which wants to clearly separate faith and history, and 
yet maintain that the central event in redemption is an 
event in history.54 
liThe Significance of Rudolf Bultmann" (1962) is pri-
marily concerned with showing the consistency of Bultmann's 
definition of myth, while "Bultmann and the 'New Quest lll 
(1962) and "Wie neu ist die 'Neue Frage nach dem historis-
chen Jesus?11I argue that his position on the availability 
of biographical material on the historical Christ has not 
changed over the years. 
While these early essays quickly established Ogden as 
one of the foremost commentators on Bultmann, as did his 
edition and translating of the latter's Existence and Faith 
(1960)55, what was to become Ogden's central problem already 
shows through: the problem of the relation between philo-
sophy and theology. In fact, his first two published essays 
make significant statements which reappear in later writings. 
liThe Concern of the Theologian" (1958) contains the following 
definition of theology: 
The task of theology is that of the adequate 
conceptual statement in a given historical 
situation of the existential understanding of 
God, the world, and man, which is given in and 
with faith in the kersgma or proclamation of 
the Christian church. 
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The Bultmannian influence is quite strong in this 
statement--it will be supplemented in later essays--as 
is evident from three key words. Theology is, first of 
all adequate, in the sense that there is a tradition of 
wjtness 57 to which each new statement must in some sense 
conform and thus essentially be always a restatement. 
Secondly, however, theological statements involve a concep-
tual scheme which channels them and limits their possibi-
lities of understanding. This is philosophy's foot~in~the 
door. 
Now we have set the stage for tension in Ogden's theory 
of philosophy and theology, namely that between an intransi-
gent content core and the necessities of historically shifting 
philosophical concepts and languages. The third key word, 
existential, indicates another tension. While theology is, 
virtually by definition, talk about God, it always arises out 
of, and is directed toward, the individual's own situation 
in life. 
These emphases appear in the above-mentioned 1957 essay 
on Bultmann as well. Although the constructive proposals 
at the conclusion of the essay are brief--less than two pages--
Ogden states his program quite clearly. 
The only alternative, then, which is really open 
to contemporary theology is to abandon completely 
the attempt to distinguish itself in any final 
way from philosophy.58 
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As long as the understanding of theology hinges on a 
particular historical event, as it does for Bultmann, 
then the "right" philosophy can only parallel or generalize 
it. Since, however, Ogden insists on the complete existen-
tialization of theology's meaning, its differentia specifica 
disappears and with it the tensions between disciplines. 
They quickly reappear, however, as internal tensions as 
indicated in the above definition. 
It may be simplistic, but it is not mistaken to under-
stand Ogden's subsequent writing as a working out of the 
program of the 1957 essay, and, in effect, of his disserta-
tion. We must, however, make brief mention of one other 
early essay before turning to the published version of Christ 
without Myth, namely "The Lordship of Jesus Christ: The 
Meaning of Our Affirmation" (1960). 
This is an important essay in that it provides a crucial 
piece of the constructive puzzle only briefly indicated in 
Christ without Myth. It is here that Ogden provides an 
explanation of how the special revelation of the Christ-event 
can be understood as significant and decisive without falling 
into the Bultmannian incoherence of regarding it as unique 
and necessary. 
Commenting on a statement of Paul, Ogden summarizes: 
Still, in his view, the reality signified by the 
words "God our Father," is, in the last analysis, 
one and the same with the reality designated as 
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1I 0ur Lord Jesus Christ ll - or, better expressed, 
what it means to have God as our Father is 
existentially the same as having Jesus Christ as 
our Lord. 59 
To affirm Christ1s lordship is to say that it is in his 
life that God gives a IIfinal revelation ll60 of the truth 
that has always confronted man concerning the authentic 
fulfillment that was always open to him. It is to say, 
not that he was God, but that his human word had, and has, 
d i v i n e aut h 0 r i t yon 0 u r u 1 tim ate all e g ian c e . ilL 0 r d s hip ,II 
then, does not indicate uniqueness, but the authority of 
Christ1s message. Ogden here uses the term IIre-presentsll61 
to signify Christ1s function; a word that will frequently 
reappear in other essays. 
This argument is significant in that, while it, in 
fact, employs totally Bultmannian categories, it is never-
theless open to a IIprocess ll interpretation as well, and 
Ogden will later give it just that. 
2. Christ without Myth: 1961 
Christ without Myth, a revision of Ogden1s disserta-
tion was published in 1961. 
. , It finally provided an extended 
treatment in print of Ogden1s thesis on Bultmann1s inconsis-
tency which had previously been argued in brief versions in 
lectures and essays. Most of the major themes of the book, 
relating to the nature of philosophy and theology, will be 
discussed extensively in the following chapters. Within 
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this section, therefore, I shall limit the discussion to 
a summary of the line of argument. 
Ogden begins by stating the criteria that face the 
theologian who attempts positive construction. We find the 
de fin i t ion s i mil art 0 t hat i n II The Con c ern 0 f the The 0 log ian II 
although the notion of adequacy is here more carefully 
explained. 
Anyone who would attempt to pursue the theologian1s 
vocation in the present situation is faced with a 
specific constructive task. He must by all means 
do his work in obedience to the New Testament 
proclamation and with a critical loyalty to the 
entire theological tradition; and yet he can do 
this responsibly only by also embracing the criti-
cism of that tradition which arises with necessity 
out of6~odern man1s picture of himself and his 
world. 
The remainder of the book, except for brief constructive 
remarks in conclusion, is an attempt to measure Bultmann 
to these as well as the general standards of logic, i.e. 
internal consistency.63 
In chapter II, Ogden presents Bultmann's theology as 
an attempt to do three things. It is, first of all, neces-
sary to eliminate from the Christian message the mythology 
of the New Testament. Myth, for Bultmann, is any attempt 
to translate the truth about the ultimate and non-empirical 
into objective, worldly terms. It is, of course, true that 
the particular world-view that forms the backdrop to the 
New Testament is hopelessly outdated, unscientific, and 
37 
unintelligible to modern man, but these are not its most 
serious faults. The root problem is its objectifying ten-
dency, and it is thus necessary to "demythologize" the 
New Testament. 
Secondly, however, there is a positive side to Bult-
mann Ogden argues. Bultmann wants to interpret the myth 
existentially, that is, to put it into language and concepts 
understandable to modern man, but without objectifying it. 
It is here that Heideggerian categories are seen as helpful. 
This process is justified because it is the intention of 
myth to require such interpretation. 64 
Whether a work be literary, philosophical, or 
religious, it basically intends to express some 
understanding of the meaning of human existences. 65 
For faith requires !Q ~ freed from every world-
picture sketched by objectifying thinking, whether 
it be that of myth or that of science. The conflict 
between science and myth indicates that faith has 
not yet found its really adequate form of expression .... 
The criticism of the Bible's mythological world-
picture and of the church's traditional proclamation 
arising from the modern picture of the world performs 
the great service for faith of calling 'it back to 
a radical reflection on its own true nature. 66 
Bultmann's third objective is to carry out both demytho-
logization and existential interpretation while preserving 
the message of the New Testament, especially its kerygmatic 
character. 67 
It is Bultmann's adherence to this third standard that 
allows him to distinguish between theology and philosophy 
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by insisting on the historical reality of the Christ-
occurrence. 
The New Testament asserts that without the saving 
act of God, the human situation is one of utter 
despair. For philosophy, on the other hand, man's 
situation neither is nor can be as desp~rate as 
theology is wont to portray it. 
The reason for this difference is that a~though 
theology and philosophy both recognize that man can 
only become what in some sense he already is, they 
make very different judgments whether man as he 
actually exists already stands in his essential 
nature.o 8 
The New Testament's unique message is the doctrine 
of the fall of man's inability to free himself, and of 
Jesus' death to save him! What philosophy knows as a 
p 0 s sib i 1 i t Y - - man's sal vat ion - -0 n 1 y the New T est a men t can 
realize. 69 
Now, however, we can see what Ogden refers to as "the 
structural inconsistency of Bultmann's solution."?O He 
summarizes it by claiming that Bultmann holds the following 
two tenets: 
(1) Christian faith is to be interpreted exhaustively 
and without remainder as man's original possibility 
of authentic historical (geschichtlich) existence 
as this is more o~ less adequately clarified and 
conceptualized by an appropriate philosophical 
analysis. (2) Christian faith is actually realizable, 
or i sa" p0 s sib i 1 i t yin fa c t ," 0 n 1 y be c au s e 0 f the 
particular historical (historisch)event Jesus of 
Nazareth, which is the originative event ~f the church 
and its distinctive word and sacraments.? 
These two elements of Bultmann's theology can be reduced, 
Ogden holds, to an explicit logical self-contradiction since 
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the first affirms, while the second denies, that Christian 
existence is open and possible to man as such.72 
There are only two alternatives to Bultmann; that 
represented by the right (e.g. Barth, "Conservatives") 
which rejects the need or possibility of demythologization, 
and that of the left (e.g. Buri) which carries out a total 
demythologization. 73 The former is quickly rejected as an 
attempt to hide from modern man's picture of himself and his 
world 74 and any attempt to avoid the latter involves either 
a contradiction such as Bultmann's or some form of special 
pleading as in John MacQuarrie's position. 75 
We are left then with a position that essentially main-
tains Bultmann's first tenet 76 but rejects the second in 
favor of one that, while admitting the decisive manifestation 
of God's love in the Christ-event, nevertheless holds that 
"Christian faith is always a 'possibility in facti because 
of the unconditioned gift and demand of God's 10ve." 77 
Ogden provided only the briefest sketch of problems 
thatwill need to be dealt with in order to work out such 
a position. One such problem is that we will need to go 
beyond Bultmann and develop a theology,i.e. an adequate 
means of speaking of God. Ogden indicates without elabora-
tion that Hartshorne's doctrine of analogy provides the 
answer. 7'd 
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A further problem is that of adequately expressing the 
Christ-event as decisive but not necessary. An answer is 
given in a discussion that goes beyond that of the 1960 
essay but is still sketchy. Ogden attempts to argue that 
Christ1s revelation is objective and is an indication of 
what is always possible for man as authentic existence, but 
the philosophical justification for the view is lacking. 79 
A full solution awaits the adoption of process categories 
in later essays. 
3. Initial Explorations into Process Concepts: 1963-1969 
Having worked through Bultmann1s position, the years 
following Christ without Myth provided the first attempts to 
decisively engage Hartshorne in dialogue in order to supple-
ment his anthropology and christology with an adequate theology 
proper. This is an area in which Ogden finds Bultmann, despite 
his doctrine of analogy, rather deficient. These attempts 
are collected in his The Reality Qf God and other Essays, 
the title essay of which is something of a programatic 
essay: it has even the flavor of a manifesto. 
Its importance for an understanding of Ogden1s develop-
ment lies in the fact that it brings together the basic themes 
of his writings in the mid- and late sixties. There is, 
first of all, the integration of Hartshornian and Whiteheadian 
motives and concepts into Ogden1s thought. 
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It is interesting that in a brief note on contemporary 
resources in theology, "Sys tematic Theology" (1959), Ogden 
speaks of Reinhold Niebuhr, Tillich, and particularly Bult-
mann. Hartshorne is mentioned only in a footnote, even then 
in a parenthesis: 
In the broad ... sense in which I am using the 
term here, "existentialist philosophy" would 
comprise considerably more than it is ordinarily 
understood to include (e.g., the "process" or 
"ac tualist" philosophy of thinkers like A.N. 
Whitehead and, among philosophical theologians, 
Charles Harshorne).80 
In essays in 1961,81 1962,82 and 1963 83 he is briefly 
mentioned without elaboration, but the first serious use 
of his concepts by Ogden is in "What Sense Does It Make 
to Say, 'God Acts in History'?" (1963). It is here that 
he notes Bultmann's reluctance to speak directly of God 
and the fragmentary nature of his doctrine of analogy,84 
but then goes on to remark how easily Hartshorne's proposals 
can be fitted into or a 1 ():o g Side of existentialist anthro-
pology. 85 In Hartshorne, God is to be conceived "in strict 
analogy to the human self, 1186 or as Whitehead expresses it, 
he is to be understood not as the exception but as the chief 
exemplification of metaphysical principles. a7 The remainder 
of this essay is an attempt to elaborate on the Hartshornian 
analogy, important because it provides a backdrop for solving 
the problem of God's revelatory action in Christ. aa 
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The problem of Hartshorne's compatibility with Heideg-
gerian-Bultmannian thought is faced head-on in "Bultmann's 
Demythologizing and Hartshorne's Dipolar Theism" (1964).89 
The main point of the argument, which I shall examine closely 
in the next chapter, is Ogden's thesis that Heidegger's exis-
tentiell and existential is exactly parallel to Hartshorne's 
concrete and abstract poles. The great value of Hartshorne's 
analysis, however, is that it has been applied to God as 
well as man. 
"Theology and Philosophy: A New Phase in the Discussion" 
(1964) is primarily a review of Hartshorne's The Logic Qf 
Perfection. 90 It is Ogden's first use of the !ontological 
argument to show the impossibility of unbelief, a theme that 
is developed at length in the argument of liThe Reality of 
God," and in dialogue with Sartre in liThe Strange Witness 
of Unbelief" (1966). The negative thesis, that atheism is 
attributable to the classical version of theism, is argued 
in liThe Christian Proclamation of God to Men of the So-Called 
'Atheistic Age 'll (1966). 
A second theme of these essays that reaches a high point 
in liThe Reality of God" is Ogden's conceptualization of the 
doctrine of God. The above-mentioned essays of 1963 and 
1964 express Ogden's dissatisfaction with Bultmann on this 
point and his use of process concepts, particularly his dipolar 
nature and his analogy with the human self. Throughout the 
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sixties, Ogden continued to develop his doctrine of God. 
IIBeyond Supernaturalism ll (1963) is ostensibly a reaction 
to J.A.T. Robinson1s Honest lQ God 91 but winds up as a dia-
logue between Tillich and Hartshorne on the possibility of 
God1s real relation to the world. 
In liThe Temporal ity of God ll (1964) Ogden comments on 
a footnote in Being and Time which briefly refers to God 
and attempts to show that if Heidegger had in fact developed 
a doctrine of God it would have paralleled the process con-
ception. 
Aside from liThe Reality of God ll , Ogden1s major essay 
on this topic is IILove Unbounded: The Doctrine of God ll (1966) 
and the revision IIToward a New Theism ll (1971). This is pri-
marily an attempt to show that proper theological themes, 
as elaborated for instance by John Wesley, are not only expres-
sible but in fact are better expressed in the language of 
process metaphysics than in that of its classical and tradi-
tional counterpart. 
IIHow Does God Function in Human Life ll (1967) picks up 
the recurring theme of God1s relation to his creation, part-
icularly man. Ogden1s point here is to show how process 
metaphysics provides a clear conception of this relation that 
allows life to have true meaning. 
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The third theme of Ogden's work during 1963-69 is one 
that has been prevalent throughout his publishing years, 
namely questions concerning the nature and definition of 
theology and philosophy. 
liThe Understanding of Theology in Ott and Bultmann" 
(1963) is an attempt to evaluate the potential of using 
lithe later Heidegger" for theological concepts, in particular 
the relationship between "primal thinking"' and faith. Perhaps 
the most important duscussion for our purposes here is Ogden's 
contention that, with Ott, theology and philosophy are to 
be identified, nevertheless, with Bultmann, they differ in 
their intentions. Theology's purpose is to "facilitate 
existential encounter," philosophy's is to communicate informa-
tion. 92 
Although it is quite brief, liThe Possibility and Task 
of Philosophical Theology" (1965) is extremely important in 
understanding Ogden's position. This article appeared in 
the Union Seminary Quarterly Review 93 along with Bultmann's 
liOn the Question of a Philosophical Theology" and Hartshorne's 
"Abstract and Concrete Approaches to Deity." Here, and in 
an extended treatment, "Theology and Objectivity" (1965), 
Ogden deals with the question of God and epistemology: in 
what sense is it proper and possible to speak of knowing God, 
particularly given the view that God is not an object among 
objects capable of scientific examination. This immediately 
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rules out any view of theology as directly verifiable, even 
in an eschatological sense. 94 
Particularly in liThe Possibility and Task of Philosophical 
Theology" Ogden develops his original position that consistent 
demythologization requires the identity of philosophy and 
theology. Now, however, the content of such a philosophical 
theology can be specified as a process neo-classical metaphy-
sics, just as Heideggerian existentialism made possible a 
philosophical anthropology. Thus, after the long night of neo~ 
orthodoxy we can again speak of " na tural theology" understood 
simply as the analysis of man's experience and expression of 
the God he encounters as the ground of all encounters. 95 
It remains, however, to specify an appropriate means 
of knowing God. As will be developed in the next thapter, 
Ogden holds that theology is a case of existentialist analysis, 
a way of knowing that lies on the continuum between purely 
objective external perception and existential self-awareness 96 
and has something of the qualities of both. The statements 
of metaphysics are logically of the same class but can be 
distinguished by their greater generality.97 
This position is extended in two directions in "Present 
Prospects for Empirical Theology" (1969). First, Ogden 
argues that such a revised empirical theology, that is, based 
on existentialist rather than objectifying knowledge, is in 
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line with Christian tradition, particularly Scripture itself. 98 
But most important, for present purposes at least, Ogden finds 
this view of metaphysics to be identical with Whitehead's 
epistemology, particularly his concept of perception in the 
mode of causal efficacy.99 A similar approach is used against 
A. Flew in "God and Philosophy: A Discussion with Antony Flew" 
(1968). 
Thus Ogden has developed during these years a specific 
epistemology for theology and metaphysics, expressibl.e in 
both existentialist as well as Whiteheadian terminology, that 
sees both types of statements as being of the same logical 
type, although there are some hints of hesitation at simply 
identifying the two. 
Mention must be made of two shorter essays before turning 
to liThe Reality of God." "Theology and Metaphysics" (1968) 
explicitly states a theme of numerous other essays that is 
crucial to our understanding of Ogden's solution to the philo-
sophy-theology problem. That is, traditional answers to the 
problem have proved fruitless precisely because of the type 
of philosophy one was attempting to relate to theology, i.e. 
one based on classical metaphysics, especially the Aristotelian-
Thomistic variety. What makes a solution possible is not an 
ingenious new argument but the advent of a neo-classical 
metaphysics. lOO 
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Finally, liThe Challenge to Protestant Thought" repeats 
this theme. (liMy conviction ... is that the characteristic 
positions of Thomistic metaphysics have been shown to be 
sufficiently problematic that they can no longer serve either 
as an adequate philosophy or as an appropriate conceptuality 
for interpreting the Christian faith" 101 ). Ogden adds, however, 
that the impact of transcendental Thomism has been positive 
for contemporary Protestantism by reviving an understanding 
of the need for metaphysics in an adequate theology. 
As intimated, the importance of liThe Reality of God" 
is to have brought together these three major themes of Ogden's 
thought into a careful argument for a new theism. It would 
obviously be superfluous at this point to outline the argument 
of the essay as a whole. I want only to mention the crucial 
argument for God's existence which is, at least in elaborated 
form, unique to this essay and which has provoked most of 
the response to it. 102 Various interpretations have been 
offered, but I think that it is best understood as a version 
of the teleological argument. 103 In essence, Ogden argues 
for the necessity of a ground of meaning from the existence 
of meaning in human affiars, that is, he sees faith as unavoid-
able at its baiic level. From this, Ogden argues, follows 
that atheism is ultimately not only impossible, but actually 
non-existent. 
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This argument is of particular interest to the question 
of the relation between philosophy and theology, since it 
is precisely the analysis of this IIfaithll that forms the con-
tent of both. An examination of it will thus form the bulk 
of chapter three. 
I have, in one context or another, already discussed 
the other essays which make up the book, The Reality Qf God, 
with the exception of one, IIMyth and Truthll (1965). Not 
surprisingly, this is Ogden's discussion of the sense in which 
myth can be true. The answer is already familiar: myth is 
an objectifying account of that which can be expressed pro-
perly only in existentialist analysis, namely the content of 
faith. Thus it is true only as translated and then in the 
sense that all theological and metaphysical statements may 
be said to be true. 104 
4. Recent Essays: 1970-1976 
Ogden has continued his prolific writing in this decade; 
every year except 1973 he has published a major essay, three 
in 1975. What is significant is that, with only a few excep-
tions, his writing has focused on the definition of theology 
and its relation to metaphysics, particularly epistemological 
questions concerning the source and the truth of theological 
statements. 
The first major statement of these years 105 is liThe 
Task of Philosophical Theologyll (1971). This is Ogden's 
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explicit attempt to define philosophy and theology in relation 
to each other. He does so by means of increasing specializa-
tion so that the definitions are IIconcentric. 1I The broadest 
concept is that of faith as the unjustifiable ground of all 
rational knowledge. The IIfully reflective understanding ll106 
of faith is philosophy. The central task of philosophy is 
metaphysics, which has, in turn, philosophical theology as its 
most important specialty. Finally, Christian theology is 
the reflective understanding of a specific conceptualization 
of faith: 
Just as philosophy is the fully reflective understanding 
of our common faith simply as selves, so Christian 
theology, say, is the attempt to become fully self-
conscious about specifically Christian faith. 107 
1972 saw the publication of IIWhat is Theology?1I108 
In many ways this is simply an extension of the aforementioned 
essay. Ogden here amplifies, by stating and elaborating on 
twelve theses,the meaning of theology, specifically Christian 
theology. These theses deal with its source, its criteria of 
adequacy, its component disciplines and their unity, its pur-
pose, and its possibility of truth. But all of these are 
based on the understanding of theology as the analysis of 
faith. 
liOn Revelation ll (1975) continued this series of defini-
tional essays, bringing up to date Ogden's earliest theses 
regarding the universality--and the reality--of the possibility 
of authentic faith which played such a central role in the 
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critique of Bultmann, What is crucial to the topic of this 
dissertation is that Ogden argues here more fully than any-
where else that although the Christian revelation is 
necessary to Christianity, it is not necessary to authentic 
human existence. 
I am convinced that none of the rationalizations 
of Christian revelation as necessary even to the 
possibility of man's authenticity can continue to 
be maintained - and that, not because they all 
fail to meet certain criteria of meaning and 
truth but because ... they do not pass the 
primary test of agreeing with the scriptural 
witness. 109 
That is, the only knowledge necessary to authentic existence, 
even according to Scripture, is that original revelation 
of God to all men everywhere. 
The next link in this chain of definitional essays 
is liThe Authority of Scripture for Theology" (1976). Ogden 
argues here for a number of theses concerning the nature 
and extent of theological authority, but particularly con~ 
cerning the location of that authority in the apostolic witness 
itself. Most important, this authority is solely in terms 
of "determining the appropriateness of theological assertions"11 0 
and not in relation to questions of the truth and meaning 
of such statements. 111 
Ogden's most recent essay, his presidential address 
to the American Academy of Religion, is entitled, "Theology 
and Religious Studies; Their Difference and the Difference 
It Makes." 112 There is little new to be found here, 
although it is helpful in summarizing Ogden's major themes. 
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In addition to these strictly definitional essays, 
Ogden has also devoted some effort toward clarifying epis-
temological issues. Both the lengthy "Falsification and 
Belief" (1974) and the very brief liThe Criterion of Meta-
physical Truth and the Senses of 'lvJetaphysics 'li (1975) are 
devoted to the topic of truth-criteria for metaphysical, 
including theological, statements. In the former, Ogden's 
primary concern is to argue for the distinction between 
strict empirical and existential verification l13 . This is 
used as a solution to the conflict between science and 
religion. 
Though brief, the latter article contains important 
definitions. The criterion of truth is stated as follows: 
I submit that it is the criterion of unavoidable 
belief or necessary application through experience. 
Those statements are true metaphysically which 
I could not avoid believing to be tr~e ... state-
ments which would necessarily apply through any 
f . 114 o my experlences .... 
In "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle" (1971), 
Ogden accepts and comments on Whitehead's "reformed subjecti-
vist principle." 115 In particular he argues that much of 
modern philosophy has become problematic just because, from 
Descartes on, it has accepted the priority of the subjective 
and ,[yet has often deri ved its phi 1 osophi ca 1 pri nci pl es and 
categories from another direction. This, of course, is pre-
cisely Whitehead's criticism--and Lonergan's also. 116 Ogden 
then proceeds to "doubt Lonergan's account II at two points. 
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Fir s t, he con tin u est 0 dis tin g u ish II sen se" and II i n tell e c t : II 
The reason this distinction leads to misunderstanding 
is the point of view from which it derives - namely, 
one which starts from understanding to understand 
experience instead of stalf~ng from experience to 
understand understanding. 
Second, he fails to carry out his view of an isomorphism 
between epistemology and metaphysics--with which Ogden agrees--
by using a category of lIunrestricted understanding" to arrive 
at an infinite transcendent God. 118 
Recent years have also seen a number of significant 
essays on specific doctrinal issues, two of which in part-
icular touch on themes relevant to our topic. liThe Point of 
Christologyll (1975)119 gathers together some familiar theses 
related to the position of Christ for Christian theology and 
general philosophy. The material is not essentially new 
but this is, nevertheless, a valuable article in terms of 
systematizing Ogdenls views. 
I have already, in discussing the influence of Whitehead, 
referred to the argument of liThe Meaning of Christian Hope" 
(1975). It is of interest both as an actual example of doc-
trine building by use of a demythologizing hermeneutic and 
also for the structure of metaphysical principles, in particular 
those relating to God, that form its basis. 
My purpose in this section, as I stated, was to provide 
an historical overview of the development of Ogdenls work. 
53 
This will allow the reader to place the thematic materials 
in following chapters in their chronological setting, as 
well as to see the major themes of Ogden's discussions. 
We are now in a position to consider the actual content 
of Ogden's program of working out the relationship between 
philosophy and theology. 
Chapter II will look at the basis of Ogden's system: 
its presuppositions and starting points, and particularly 
his analysis of the history of theology which defines the 
problem. This will bring us to the core of the chapter, 
Ogden's epistemology, and its implications for the identity 
of theology within philosophy. 
Chapter III will show how Ogden's concept of faith 
is derived from his epistemology, and how it, in turn, leads 
to definitions of theology and philosophy. This will set 
the stage for the second argument. 
Chapter IV will be concerned with the core content of 
theology-philosophy as an example of Ogden's principle that 
metaphysics must be derived from epistemological analysis. 
This metaphysical analysis will be used to construct a second 
argument for the containment of theology in philosophy. 
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
A. The Presupposition and Criteria of a 
Valid Theology 
B. An Experiential Epistemology 
C. The Project of Demythologization 
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A,. The Pre sup p 0 sit ion and C r i t e ria 0 f a 
Valid Theology 
1. The Failures of Recent Theologies 
Introduction. - There are undoubtedly many ways in which 
to interpret Ogden's system, depending on one's view of 
Ogden's own primary intention as well as the use which one 
wants to make of it. Some have seen it as an intricate 
com bin a t ion 0 f ex i s ten t i ali sma i1 d P \"10 C e 5 s tho ugh t, so mea san 
attempt to show the necessary real ity of God, sti 11 others 
as an existential theology merely augmented by a process 
God. I shall not argue that these are not possible inter-
pretations. My own goal, however, as stated before, is to 
say something about the relationship between theology and 
philosophy. To do this, I shall have to say something about 
Ogden's use of existential and process themes but only as 
an aside. I am also aware that I am can structing Ogden's 
system in a rather unique way in order to allow it to make 
a point that is undoubtedly not its primary intention. One 
cannot find either of the two arguments of this dissertation 
explicitijy in any of Ogden's essays. In fact, he has said 
relatively little directly on the subject at all. Neverthe-
less, the view which I shall present in this dissertation 
is clearly implied. 
In this chapter I want to show that Ogden's epistemology 
can be construed as an argument for the identity, pure and 
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simple, of Theology and Philosophy. The exposition of his 
metaphysics in following chapters will modify that thesis 
into what I termed a countainment view. My argument here 
follows this pattern. a) Presupposing a version of the 
IIsubjectivist principle ll leads Ogden to a broadly experen-
tial epistemology. b) This epistemology, due to its exist-
entialist flavoring, brings Ogden to an extreme view of 
the demythologization and existenti.al interpretation of 
theological statements. c) This position, in turn, removes 
for Ogden any uniqueness of content and source that theology 
might claim for itself, which merges it into philosophy. 
Ordinarily one of the most difficult decisions to be 
made in expounding a system is the choice of a starting 
point. Fortunatel~ Ogden makes two points which settle 
the question. The first is his elaboration of a version 
of Whitehead's II re formed subjectivist principle. 1I Although 
Ogden did not accept the principle explicit ly, or by that 
name, until 1966, it is implicitly presupposed by his 
epistemology all along. Its function in Ogden's system, 
contrary to Whitehead's, is to establish the precedence 
of epistemology over metaphysics. 
The second aid in finding a beginning is the consistent 
application of his two criteria of adequacy and intel-
igibility to theology in all of his essays, from the earli-
est to the most recent. 
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Together, we thus have a basic presupposition as well 
as criteria for the construction of any interpretation 
of Ogden. I shall elaborate on these in the next sections 
and then develop the first argument for the identity of 
theology and philosophy in the remainder of the chapter. 
It is not always easy to ascertain just why a given 
thinker begins where he does. Ogden himself never provides 
any careful rationale for his foundations, although he 
clearly identifies them. I shall discuss the origins of 
the IIsubjectivist principle ll in the next section. In 
this section I want to show that Ogden's criteria for a 
proper theology are in fact highly determinate for the 
res u 1 tin g s y s t em . A s fa r a s the i r 0 rig i n, howe v e r , my 
thesis is that they are best understood as the result of 
Ogden's perception of the recent history of theology. We 
shall see that his interpretation of that history indicates 
to him that theology must be both adequate to the Christian 
tradition as well as intelligible to the II man on the street. 1I 
This may sound innocent enough. Both concepts, however, 
are given unique and narrow definitions which, I shall 
argue, are the antecedents of Ogden's existentialist epis-
temology. 
The history of modern theology and culture is, for 
Ogden, a repeating alternation of periods of theological 
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thought-lag or reaction, and attempts to modernize and 
become relevant to cultural patterns. That is, there 
seems to be a tendency to work "too long" on a specific 
formulation. Thus, by the time theologians have perfected 
it, it has long since become unintelligible to the culture 
which originally generated it. It is also possible for 
conservative reaction to set in, particularly when the 
attempts at modernization are radical. 
For Ogden it is seventeenth and eighteenth century 
theology that marks the first period of thought-lag. By 
the early part of the nineteen hundreds the Enlightenment 
had "decisively challenged" this orthodoxy.l 
It was "liberalism," following the lead of Schleier-
macher, that undertook a complete revaluation of theology, 
according to Ogden. The concern of this movement was two-
fold. First, it attempted to avoid the criticism of Lessing, 
and others, that the defense of Christian theology rested 
too heavily on unique historical events. Secondly, it 
had a revisionary purpose, namely to state Christian faith 
in terms intelligible to a society whose orientation was 
increasingly formed by the physical sciences, particularly 
in the latter half of the century. 
Ogden concludes, however, that liberalism in general 
must be judged a "splendid failure,"2 but a failure never-
58 
theless. The reason is that it went too far in its reformu-
lation of Christian faith in that it compromised some of 
the essential claims of Christian truth, particularly in 
the areas of Christology and revelation. 
In this instance a reaction against the attempts at 
reapprochement with culture set in. It began with Barth 
and Reinhold Niebuhr and came to be known as IIneo-orthodoxy.1I 
Ogden sees its aim as primarily twofold: First, it IIl ed 
to a fresh sense for authentic witness of Holy Scripture 
and of the Reformers. 1I3 That is, it sought to replace the 
liberal emphasis on GefOhl (Schleiermacher) or Erlebnis 
(Herrmann) with the orthodox insistence on Scripture as 
the criterion for essentiality. 
Secondly, however, Barth and his followers were reacting 
against the liberal obsession with relevancy and the intell-
igibility of the Christian proclamation to the unbeliever. 
Theology was now viewed as totally segregated from the sphere 
of secular culture. The sphere of the divine is the II wholly 
other.1I 
Ogden summarizes the result as follows: 
The new movement definitely succeeded in breaking 
the hold of liberal theology. But this it did, at 
least in some of its representatives, less by 
providing a more adequate solution to the problem with 
which the liberals had struggled than by exposing 
the inadequacy of their achievements and disregarding 
the seriousness of the problem itself. The result 
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was that, while some of the distinctive claims of 
Christian faith were rediscovered and reasserted, 
the question of the meaning and truth of these 
claims for men living in the modern secular world 
was for the most part not even clearly posed, much 
less effectively answered. 4 
Since the second World War, intelligibility to contem-
porary culture has appeared in the form of what Ogden inter-
c han g e a b 1 y ref e r s to· as' ". n e 0 - 1 .i be r a 1" 0 r II po s t 1 i be r a 1 " 
theology as expressed by Bonhoeffer, Tillich, and Bultmann. 
This movement is once more concerned with the apologetic 
task, but still wary of compromising distinctive Christian 
traditions. At least on the surface, then, Ogden sees it 
as characterized by the positive aspects of both liberalism 
and neo-orthodoxy. On the one hand, Bultmann, especially, 
is concerned that theology be conceptualized in patterns 
intelligible to modern man and compatible with contemporary 
science. Yet there is also a concern among post-liberals 
that theology be truly Christian by maintaining essential 
distinctives, although each theologian's list may differ. 
My point in rehearsing Ogden's perception of recent 
theological history is that it demonstrates quite clearly 
his view of what makes a theology successful. The criteria 
are twofold: theology must be intelligible, and it must 
be adequate to its tradition. 
These two criteria are found implicitly in most of 
Ogden's definitions of theology, as, for example, the 
following: 
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The task of theology is that of the adequate 
conceptual statement in a given historical 
situation of the existential understanding of 
God, the world, and man, which is given in and 
with faith in the kerygma or proclamation of 
the Christian church.o 
One can also find explicit statements of criteria, 
such as this: 
For what constitutes a given theology as adequate ... 
is: (1) the extent to which, in its particular 
historical situation, it states the authentic 
Christian understanding of existence consistently 
and without essential distortion ... ;and (2) the 
extent to which the conceptuality that it actually 
employs for this purpose is genuinely understandable 
to those to whom it is here and now called to speak. 6 
In the following section I shall discuss these criteria 
in detail, showing, in particular, their function in 
eliminating certain types of theologies. We must also note 
that they operate within Ogden1s system as presuppositions. 
They are not justified or argued for in any direct way, but 
form the guidelines upon which the house is fashioned. 
2. Criterion 1: Intelligibility 
We have seen that Ogden1s interpretation of the historical 
development of theology indicates the necessity for the 
general intelligibility of theological assertions to con-
temporary man. 
However, two developments in modern philosophy, which 
have filtered through to the general culture, have seemed, 
at least to many, to present serious difficulties for state-
ments about God in particular. The first was the formulation 
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of scientific method and the growing anthropocentrism and 
increasing naturalism of the last two centuries. This 
Ogden summarizes under the term "secularity." The second 
is the emergence of a "secularistic" mentality as a result 
of logical positivism and atheistic existentialism. Let 
us look at Ogden's analysis of each in detail. 
Secularity leads to a war with theology wherever it 
intrudes into the physical realm. The dogmatic assertions 
or scripture of Church are no longer taken as authoritative, 
but subjected to the relentless and unsympathetic examination 
of scientists and often found to be without basis. 
The result for theology has been a distinction between 
literal truth and myth, Geschichte and Historie, or sense 
perception and intuition.? Thus the need to demythologize 
the assertions of traditional Christianity became apparent, 
and Bultmann's program is the result. 
The current opposition to demythologization among 
conservatives is hopeless. Says Ogden: 
The scientific world picture is here to stay and 
will assert its rights against any theology, 
however imposing, that conflicts with it. So far 
as his knowledge of the world is concerned, 
modern man long ago opted for the method of 
science andstherewith decided irrevocably for 
secularity. 
Ogden is quite willing to agree with this step in thought. 
In fact, it has become one of the main pillars and most 
repeated observations of his argument. He insists that 
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his development in thought shows the need to demythologize 
or even scrap many traditional doctrines and even classical 
metaphysics itself as the basis of traditional orthodoxy. 
We will enumerate these problem areas below. 
a) Creation 
A number of traditional beliefs of Christianity regarding 
creation seem simply untenable to contemporary man. A recent 
date for creation (Ogden refers to Wesley who thought that 
it was in 4404 B.C.), fixed species, and an at least partial 
denial of evolution are examples of such doctrines. 9 
The concept of creation as a specific historical event 
is also repugnant to science. God can be seen as the lI ever -
pre sen t p rim 0 r d i a 1 g r 0 un d II 10 0 rna t u r e, but not as its pas t 
originator. Although the concept of historical creation 
has often been thought to be the necessary inference of a 
scriptural doctrine of creatio ~ nihilo, lias Thomas Aquinas 
made clear, the conventional interpretation has no warrant 
in the idea of creation as such. IIII 
b) Miracles 
Ogden thinks that the biblical miracles can better be 
explained in one of two ways. Many of them were perfectly 
natural occurrences. Others are lithe products of faith, 
instead of extraordinary happenings that somehow produced 
faith. 1I12 
There is, however, some hesitation regarding Christl s 
resurrection. Ogden notes that most theologians, himself 
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included, would consider it essential to Christian faith. 
Accounts of miracles, in conclusion, simply lack the 
backing of scientific and historical evidence and can only 
be accepted by scientific minds with separate scientific 
and religious compartments. 
c) Eschatology 
Nineteen hundred years of unfulfilled expectations, 
together with our present knowledge of nature and 
history, have utterly discredited any notion of a 
near end of the world such as Wesley could still 
t t . 13 en er aln, ... 
Thus Ogden is certain that Christian eschatology, in its 
traditional, literal, historical form, cannot be accepted, 
and this for two reasons. First, contemporary theologians 
tend to feel that lIit is simply not given to us - to ~ 
of us - to speak with authority about issues that transcend 
our qualifications to speak. 1I14 
Secondly, eschatological symbols have lost any clear 
meaning to modern scientific man. He just cannot understand, 
says Ogden, what could be meant by Christ returning to earth 
on the clouds, or even heaven, hell and a last judgment. 15 
d) God and Metaphysics 
Traditional theism has described God, Ogden claims, 
in terms borrowed from Plato and Aristotle. 16 The conception 
is one of total absoluteness implying IItimeless, changeless 
and unrelated being. Ill? For Ogden, this basis leads to a 
number of insoluble antinomies which must ultimately dis-
credit the traditional notion of God. The reason for this 
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is the commitment of secular man to the dictum of "logical 
self-consistency as one of the necessary conditions for 
the truth of any assertion. IIIB Ogden enumerates three such 
antinomies as follows: 
(i) Creation: The antinomy here involves the contin-
gency of created beings and the necessity of God's nature. 
We can briefly state it thus: 
However: 
IIGod creates the world freely, as the contingent 
or nonnecessary world our experience discloses 
it to be. lIlg 
1I ••• God l s act of creation is one with his own 
eternal essence, which is in every respect 
necessary .... "20 
The first of these propositions finds its basis, as 
stated, in experience, but also in the actual account of 
creation in scripture. The latter proposition is the nec-
essary conclusion of classical metaphysics. Together we 
arrive at the "hopeless contradiction of a wholly necessary 
creation of a wholly contingent world. 1I21 
(ii) Service: Here the antinomy involves man's act-
ivity IIfor" God and God's static perfection: 
However: 
" ... The end of man is to serve or gl ori fy God 
22 
through obedience to his will and commandments. II 
God, as actus purus, is a " s tatically complete 
perfection ll23 and it is impossible that he be 
increased or diminished by anything. 
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Ogden sees the first proposition as the traditional 
doctrine of the Church, while the second again derives 
necessarily from classical metaphysics. In summary, it 
is inconceivable that God could in any way be affected by 
the service he commands. 
(iii) Relationship: It is this antinomy that is 
mentioned most often by Ogden (and Hartshorne). It actually 
includes antinomies (i) and (ii) but is stated somewhat 
differently: 
However: 
God is all-knowing and the cause of all things. 
"God is in no way genuinely related to the ord-
inary beings beyond himself," 24 for that would 
involve depende~ce and God is immutable. 25 
Put in general terms, we can say that classical meta-
physics necessitates a God who is void of real connections, 
possessing only an external relation to the world. 26 All 
of God1s classical attributes signify this divine isola-
tionism, e.g. pure actuality, immutability, impassivity, 
aseity, immateriality, etc. Aquinas may have been the 
theologian who gave this metaphysics its final form but 
Ogden feels that it has been part and parcel of Christian 
thinking since Philo of Alexandria attempted to identify 
the God of Israel with that of Greek philosophy. The 
early church Fathers followed his lead without recognizing 
his lack of success. 27 
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The problem is perpetuated by a faulty interpretation 
of scripture, forcing it into a Greek procrustean bed. 
Traditional theism simplY,eliminates scriptural myths rather 
28 
than interpret them. It understands predications such 
as IIknow,1I IIlove,1I etc. not in an analogical sense, but 
instead takes them to mean the opposite of their function 
in ordinary language. Thus it can maintain a monopolar 
Absolute, unrelated, in a real sense, to our world. 
The result is a strict dichotomy between the present 
world of time and change, and the divine timeless and un-
related being. 29 God is the wholly other. 
On the basis of these antinomies Ogden concludes that 
the supernaturalism of traditional theism is lIin principle 
an inconsistent and self-stultifying position. 30 It is, 
therefore, unintelligible to IIsecularli man. 
We can see, then, how Ogden's criterion of intelligi-
bility operates in eliminating certain traditional theolo-
gical positions. This, however, creates a problem to which 
Ogden provides no answer. It is one thing to demand that 
theology be restated in contemporary language. Few would 
think that objectionable. But Ogden1s treatment of IIclassicalli 
theology demonstrates that he is after more. The criterion 
not only restates but eliminates certain doctrines. It is 
not that modern man has no linguistic devices for handling 
angels, resurrections, or eschatological events. The 
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difficulty is that he cannot believe them. Thus Ogden's 
criterion becomes a criterion of truth, and not just lan-
guage. 
~, then, does Ogden accept such a criterion? Why 
should he think that contemporary methodological and epis-
temological biases are the correct or most fruitful ones? 
I have no doubt that there are good answers -- and bad ones 
-- to that question, but curiously enough Ogden does not 
provide one. We must, therefore, leave open the question 
of justifying Ogden's first criterion, apart from his inter-
pretation of the demands of history. 
There is another question which must be asked of Ogden 
here to which I know no answer. That is the question of 
how one determines just what actually is intelligible to 
contemporary man. The best one can say, from Ogden's 
examples, is that unintelligibility becomes apparent when 
there is significant social disinterest or desertion of 
once important views. 
3. Criterion II: Adequacy 
Ogden thinks that the meaninglessness of theological 
assertions to many men is due to a second development stem-
ming from David Hume and logical positivism: extreme secul-
arism. It is this trend which has attacked the very core 
of theology, thus making the issue of God's reality - con-
ceptualized by any metaphysics - a problem. 
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This position, for which Ogden tends to use the terms 
positivism and secularism interchangeably, 'gaes beyond the 
mere use of scientific method as a means of gaining know-
ledge of the physical world. It affirms, rather, that sensory 
knowledge is the sole source available. Since the assertions 
of theology, particularly those involving "God" seem to be 
unverifiable, they are discarded as meaningless. 
Although positivism is not a general characteristic 
of our culture, it has, nevertheless, spread beyond profes-
sional philosophers and come to include many intellectuals. 
Some theologians, e.g. Paul van Buren, have attempted to 
escape this further attack by constructing a theology without 
God. 
Ogden responds: 
However absurd talking about God might be, it could 
never be so obviously absurd as talking of Christian 
faith without God. If theology is possible today 
only on secularistic terms, the more candid way to 
say this is tc admit that theology is not possible 
today at all. 31 
Thus, for Ogden God is seen as the necessary center 
of Christian faith. We shall have occasion to amplify 
this point later. It is simply nonsense to speak of a 
God-is-dead theology. By definition, Christian faith is 
faith in God. If Christianity is to be viable at all, we 
must be able to speak of God. This is not to say that 
Christian faith is necessarily true, but that, if it is, 
God cannot be excluded. 
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Van Buren's capitulation to positivism, however, is 
held to be not only invalid, it is also unnecessary. Ogden 
considers the bases of secularity to be sound, but not 
those of secularism. His argument is the familiar one which 
can be summarized by asking how the verification principle 
itself is to be verified. It is apparently neither empirical 
nor tautological and must therefore on its own grounds be 
meaningless. 33 
What is noteworthy about Ogden's rejection of secularism 
in general, and the verification principle in particular, is 
that it results from more than just the self-stultifying 
character of the latter. There is, in addition, the opera-
tion of the second criterion: the doctrine of God must be 
held on to because it is part of a validating tradition. 
But now we must be more precise. Just what defines this 
theological tradition which in turn provides a criterion 
for doctrine? We find the answer if we turn to Ogden's 
statements regarding Scripture. 
Ncthing can be validated as IIChristian ll unless it 
can be shown to be congruent with the re-presentation 
of God in Jesus Christ as attested by the Holy 
Scripture and, less directly, b¥ the special tra-
dition of the Christian Church. 4 
While it is clear from the above quote that Ogden allows 
Scripture to be the determinate factor in deciding what is 
authentically Christian, it is, of course, not the criterion 
of theological truth in general. For Ogden this is due, in 
?O 
part, to the general point that even established authority 
can never, by itself, be a sufficient method of determining 
truth. 35 
The question remains as to what authority Scripture 
possesses in defining Christian faith. The answer is quite 
simple, for Ogden. Scripture has a ~ jure authority, but 
this explicitly presupposes some rule or delegation of 
authority. This source is ultimately the authority of Christ 
as revealer, and thus it is the event of Christ itself that 
alone carries final authority.36 
It is, therefore, not the New Testament per ~ that 
is authoritative for Christian theology but the direct apost-
olic witness to Christ that lies behind it. 
By its very nature, Christian faith is apostolic 
faith - f~ith with the apostles in the Jesus to 
whom they uniquely are the witnesses and who is 
himself personally present as the Christ in their 
witness of faith.]? 
A valid Christian theology, then, is carefully defined 
as adequate to a particular source. As I develop the argument 
in following chapters, it will become clear why this criterion, 
though stated in specifically Christian terms, nevertheless 
has general importance. As indicated, Ogden argues for the 
identity of theology and philosophy, but he also holds that 
Christian theology, given a particular philosophical frame-
work, is the correct understanding of existence. Thus what 
he originally states as a criterion of adequacy to the 
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Christian tradition ends up functioning as a criterion of 
general truth. 
It is this development that will pose a problem as 
Ogden's position is unfolded, for we have now discovered 
two truth criteria. The first dictates that a proposition 
can be part of a valid theology if it is largely unintelli-
gible to contemporary secular man. The second eliminates 
as equally false any proposition that contradicts the Chris-
tian witness as derived from the original statements of 
Christ. We shall see that there are tensions between the 
two and that ultimately Ogden's system has some structural 
difficulties as a result. 
Let me briefly anticipate the problem. Clearly, 
there will be some possibility that certain propositions 
be clearly endorsed by the Christian witness which turn out 
to be unintelligible to Ogden's secular man. We have already 
identified some doctrines--creation in history, miracles, 
etc.--for which Ogden solves his problem by arguing that 
they are in fact, not a part of the original witness but 
are due to the influence of later philosophical biases, or 
are legendany additions. But this will not always help. 
What Ogden clearly needs now, as a basic procedure in begin-
ning to construct his system is a method that will do justice 
to the obvious witness of Christ, yet render them intelligible. 
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It is just this predicament which, I think, makes 
Bultmann's method of demytholqgizing so attractive to 
Ogden. It is thus not suprising that he judges Bultmann 
to be the necessary standing point for theological activity 
in our day. Nor is it surprising that Ogden finally adopts 
a method, more radical perhaps, but nevertheless substantially 
identical to Bultmann's. 
More than that, however, Ogden's criteria, particularly 
that of intelligibility, dictate for him the outlines of 
a whole epistemology, of which demythologizing as a pro-
cedural method will form an integral part. Ogden's episte-
mology must inevitably be existentialist in nature due to 
his particular interpretation of the concept of secularity. 
One of its components is the notion of radical autonomy and 
closely allied to that, of radical subjectivity. Together 
they give us the basic presupposition of Ogden's epistemology, 
as I see it, namely the subjectivist principle. 
Let me, then, again summarize the course of this chapter 
as it develops what I have referred to as Ogden's epistemo-
log~cal argument. His criteria actually outline the whole 
epistemology but more particularly they lead Ogden to the 
subjectivist principle. This, in turn, when developed into 
a total theory of knowledge will l~ad to Ogden's choice of 
the method of demythologizing as consonant with his criteria. 
This, again, will mean for Ogden that there can be no unique 
content for theology. We now have the ingredients of an 
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argument for the identity of theology and philosophy. 
I turn, then, to the subject of Ogden's epistemology 
in general, and, first of all, the subjectivist principle 
that conditions it. The reader should bear in mind that 
Ogden's epistemology was fashioned with a theological fun-
ction in view, and based on criteria for a theological 
system. Thus, although it frequently has general application, 
certain aspects, for example, questions related to sensory 
perception, are left largely untouched. Since my interests 
are also theological and philosophical I shall not try to 
extend the system any. 
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B. An Experiential Epistemology 
Introduction. - Before we can consider Ogden's positive 
construction of a theistic system we must examine carefully 
his epistemology and his resulting theory of, language appro-
priate to God. Both of these aspects are discussed at 
length in essays that appeared between 1962 and 1965, and 
to some extent summarized in Ogden's dialogue with Antony 
Flew in 1968. 
We find here an epistemology much along traditional 
existentialist lines, but carefully constructed to describe 
theological functions. Recent years, however, have witnessed 
a number of essays in which Ogden has added many process 
themes, insisting on their easy fit into an existentialist 
mold. I shall attempt to discuss the resulting epistemology 
as a whole, rather than survey the individual parts. 
The elements Qf Ogden's epistemology. - Ogden's epist-
emology can be characterized under three headings. First, 
he is a realist in regards to the external world. There 
is a "cognitive encounter with reality."38 The discussion 
of Ogden's acceptance of the tenets of secularity above shows 
this point clearly. As we will see, the only evidence for 
this position that Ogden gives is that objectivity is simply 
given in perception. Perception carries with it a witness 
to its external reference. 
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Secondly, Ogden assumes that God cannot be an object 
of sense experience directly suitable to examination by 
scientific methodology. To speak of him as such would be 
to fall prey to the expressive form of myth: 
By objectifying God in the sense of thinking and 
speaking of him under the same conditions as apply 
to the objects of our external perception, myth 
in effect denies God1s qualitative difference from 
all things other than himself and thus fails to 
~xpress appropriately its own real intention .... 
Like myth, science can think and speak about 
reality only as the object of our sense perceptions 
and so can represent God only by similarly 
misregresenting the uniqueness of his being as 
God. 39 
Thus the refusal of some theologians to separate 
science and theology only destroys theology be forcing the 
identification of God as a IIthing among things.1I 
Thirdly, Ogden accepts the tenets of verifiability to 
a limited degree. This requirement, of course, refers to 
truth, that is, the availability of meaningful propositions, 
not the primal content of experience. IINot even faith can 
assert something as true which is in principle lacking in 
cognitive meaning. 1I40 That meaning can only be established 
by intersubjective criteria. 
Ogden, however, sees a need to restrict this principle 
of verifiability. IIIn its present sense, lempirical I means 
applying through some but not ~ possible experience, while 
lexperiential I means applying through ~ least some possible 
experience, and perhaps all. 1I41 Ogden also affirms that 
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metaphysical assertions are precisely those which must be 
substantiated by ~ experience. 42 
The assumptions Qf Ogden1s epistemology. - Before 
detailing the elements of Ogden1s epistemology we must 
clarify the assumptions that condition it. 
Of primary importance in this regard are the criteria 
for theology which we have just discussed. This is the case 
because Ogden1s epistemology is designed, not for general 
use, but for the very specific requirements of a theologico-
philosophical system. Thus, it is not fashioned ~ novo, 
as it were, but built to a prescribed blueprint. 
Epistemology, then, must, as is true of theology in 
general, conform to the requirements of intelligibility and 
adequacy. We have seen already how these criteria function 
in ruling out certain theological options. In following 
paragraphs it will become evident how the first criterion 
helps to indicate a broadly experiential epistemology. 
The next section will discuss the method of demythologiza-
tion and it will then become clear how the second criterion 
~rmsthe basis of an argument for the use of an existentialist 
method in theology; that is, a method which focuses theology 
around questions of individual authentic existence. 
There is, however, another presupposition, specifically 
epistemological in nature, that plays an important role in 
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Ogden's system. Ogden refers to it as the IIreformed sub-
jectivist principle. 1I He claims that it is Whiteheadian 
in origin. 43 I shall not here analyze the question of 
whether or not Ogden's principle is, in fact, identical 
with Whitehead's, but simply elaborate the former. 
The IIreformed subjectivist principle ll • - Ogden states 
the principle as following from the subjective turn of 
modern philosophy. It can be stated thus: the true object 
of philosophical reflection is the existing individual as 
an experiencing self. 
In Ogden's earlier epistemological essays one can find 
a position elaborated that obviously derives from this 
principle, but it lacks such justification. In recent years, 
however. the reformed subjectivist principle has come to 
play an explicit and crucial role. Let me then expand on 
each of these points. 
The basis of the principle is the Cartesian insight 
that subjective experiencing is the only immediate datum 
for knowing. In fact, my own judgment is that Ogden really 
holds that the principle is little more than a development 
or expansion of Descartes ' insight. I emphasize that for 
Ogden the datum is interpreted as being the experienc~ 
and not the experience as content. The primary encounter 
is always of the self. A characteristic statement is Ogden's 
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reference at one point to lithe primal phenomenon of our 
own existence as experiencing subjects or selves. 1I44 
The IISelfll is thus defined simply as a center of experiencing. 
It is important to note that the self does not simply 
encounter itself ~~, always in the context of being 
the subject of experience. Ogden1s self is always exper-
iencing itself experiencing. It is here that Ogden sees 
an agreement between Heideggerian existentialism and White-
head. Ogden interprets both as rejecting the VOM of the 
subject as an experienced substance. For both, the self 
is always subject and can never be objectified, or treated 
as simple content. Thus Ogden has no difficulty in adding 
his version of the Whiteheadian principle to the essentially 
existentialist epistemology we shall examine in the remainder 
of this chapter. 
The full-blown principle, then has two main elements. 
First, it assumes as primary datum the experiencing subject. 
But second, it claims that subjects experience themselves 
in the act of experiencing. 
For Ogden, the subjectivist principle has three impli-
cations. They are referred to as part of the meaning 45 of 
the principle and as included in it. 46 The first is best 
summarized by Whitehead1s statement that IIconsciousness 
presupposes experience, and not experience consciousness. 1I47 
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Though Ogden does not say why this is part of the subjec-
tivist principle, the reasoning appears to be that the 
very notion of the primacy of conscious perception is a 
result of a substance-quality metaphysics. 48 The model 
of visual perception of solid objects is not only applied to 
ontology by the Greek philosophers and their contemporary 
followers, but is also allowed to displace what is truly 
the fundamental given according to the subjectivist prin-
~iple. The immediate given is always the nexus of experi-
ence of which the self is part. Differentiation of subject 
and object is secondary. 
The second result for Ogden is the primacy of 
epistemology over metaphysics. The essay, "Lonergan and 
the Subjectivist Principle" (1971), is concerned to show 
this application of the principle. Perhaps the main criti-
cism of Lonergan here is that, while accepting some version 
of subjectivism he continues to use metaphysical categories 
which are not derived from his cognitional theory.49 In 
this essay, and elsewhere,SO Ogden presents just this incon-
sistency as the ultimate systematic blunder and one must, 
therefore, assume that he explicitly agrees with Lonergan 
that cognitional theory comes first, metaphysics second. 51 
It is this view of priorities that is identified as lithe 
subjective turn" and held to be the content of Whitehead ' s 
" re formed subjectivist principle. 1I52 
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The third result has to do with method. That is, 
methodology, too, must be conditioned by the discovery of 
the proper and fundamental object of philosophy. 
The primary object of philosophical reflection 
is my own existence as an experiencing self .... 
therefore, philosophyls only proper task and 
method is integral reflective self-understanding. 53 
As will be developed in following sections, this leads 
Ogden to see what he will call "existentialist" knowledge 
as the basis of philosophy and theology. 
Three phases Qf experience. - We are now ready to 
analyze Ogdenls concept of experience. This will provide 
us with the general categories of his epistemology. In 
"Theology and Objectivity," which is perhaps his most com-
plete examination of knowledge, Ogden begins by accepting 
what he claims is the standard existentialistls distinction 
between external perception, i.e. objective knowledge, and 
the awareness of the knowing self, i.e. existential know-
ledge, as the two basic components of experience, a view 
made clear by Whitehead but traceable ultimately to Kant. 54 
Objective knowledge is simply the sensory awareness 
of the external world. It is detached, that is, one can 
maintain distance and identify objects as separate from the 
s elf. It can be con c e p t u ali zed and v e r b ali zed. II 0 b j e c t i veil 
and "descriptive" are thus largely interchangeable for 
Ogden. In Whiteheadls terms it is "presentational immediacy."55 
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Existential knowledge is at the other end of the 
spectrum. It is immediate self-encounter, the experiencing 
of the self directly. Its content is the subject, and in 
that sense one cannot really say that it has an object. 
Subject and object coincide in existential knowledge. 
According to the subjectivist principle, this type is 
basic and precedes objective knowledge. It is perception 
in the IImode of causa 1 effi cacy." 
Even more important is the unique attitude associated 
with existential knowledge. 
Whereas existential speaking and thinking have to do 
directly with the gain or loss of our authentic 
existence as persons, our thought and speech about 
the objects of our external perception are only 
indirectly related to this paramount concern. Thus 
another familiar way of expressing this ... difference 
between existential and objectifying knowledge is 
to represent the former as "concerned" or Iii nvo 1 ved, II 
the latter as IIdisinterested" or IIdetached."56 
Empiricists have frequently ignored or eliminated 
this level of knowledge because their IIsubstance meta-
physics" forces them to focus on what is immediate in 
consciousness, rather than the primitive, basic, though 
vague, awareness of being demanded, as we have just seen, 
by the subjectivist principle. This is one theme in Ogden 
where one could wish for a closer bringing together of the 
existentialist and Whiteheadian elements. He is unclear 
as to whether objective and existential are two t~pes of 
experience or two phases of experience. My presentation 
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here clearly favors the latter interpretation, primarily since 
it is closer to Whitehead, although Ogden's earlier statements 
lead one to think that his original view may have been closer 
to the former. In any case Ogden shows little interest in 
being precise here because he regards neither phase as the 
actual source of theology and philosophy. 
Ogden claims, then, that the twofold analysis is insuf-
ficient. It allows only for direct sensory experience of 
anything other than the self. If it were asserted as the only 
form of knowledge it would reduce to secularism or positivism 57 
and make theology impossible. 
The suggestions of those who follow the later Heidegger, 
e.g. Heinrich Ott, lead to an epistemology characterized as 
extr~mely subjective, which tries to provide for theology as 
existential knowledge. Here "theology shares in the immediate 
encounter or experience of faith and is, in fact, a Imovement 
of faith itself,' faith seeking understanding." 58 This results, 
Ogden argues, in at least two difficulties. First, it precludes 
theology from being descriptive. Secondly, if any objective 
base for language is lacking, theology is reduced to equivocal 
descriptions at best, and is unavailable to the unbeliever. 59 
Ott ends up in the same blind alley as do his mentors, 
the later Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers. He insists that there 
is a difference between faith and theology and if so, then 
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theology must have an object in some sense. It must be a 
descriptive activity, beyond the sheer encounter of faith. 
On the other hand, if theology has no describable object, 
then there can be no real difference between it and simple 
faith. 50 
Ogden feels that a closer analysis of knowledge shows a 
third level or phase beyond, actually between, the objective 
and the existential that is implied by the very ability to 
distinguish these two. 51 This he refers to as lIexistentialist li 
knowledge. 62 It is a "descriptive analysis of the phenomenon 
of existence in general. II53 It is the real source of any 
ontology. 
Ogden wants to extend the meaning of descriptive or 
objectifying to include existentialist knowledge of God with-
out referring to him as a "thing.1I Such knowledge is still 
descriptive and, therefore, objectifying since it has basic 
characteristics in common with objective knowledge; namely 
that it is "disinterested ll and detached. 64 Bultmann argues 
t his sam e poi n tag a ins t J asp e r s by not i n g t hat hell can not 
h~lp explicating what he calls Iclarification of existence l 
in such a way that it becomes universally understandable, 
i.e., he must objectify it as doctrine." 55 "Objective", 
here, retains the sense of experience with a referent beyond 
both the "experiencing" itself and the subject. We must note, 
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however, that the objectifying tendency of existentialist 
knowledge does not eliminate the sharp boundary between 
science and self-understanding, whether the latter is imme-
diate or detached. 
The introduction of this third form of knowing thus 
serves to open up the possibility of philosophy and theo-
logy as descriptive enterprises, but as a logically distinct 
form from that which generates science. Ogden signifies this 
distinction by saying that objective knowledge is open to 
empirical falsifiability, whereas the nonsensory experience 
of the self is existentially falsifiable. The primary dif-
ference, I take it is that objective knowledge can be falsi-
fied by just one observation, whereas existentialist know-
ledge can be falsified only by one's total experience. This 
will have significant application when we turn to Ogden's 
definitions of theology and philosophy in the next chapter. 
The scope of existentialist knowledge. - Within the scope 
of existentialist knowledge Ogden distinguishes three sub-
types relevant to theology: faith, proclamation, and theology 
proper. We can visualize the entire gamut of religious know-
ledge as indicated in the diagram below: 66 
/existential existentialist Objective" 
I ~-----~--------I ~ 
faith proclamation theology 
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Faith is thus the least reflective type of existentialist 
knowledge. Although it involves a high degree of concern 
and involvement, the hallmarks of existential knowledge, it 
is nevertheless a "believing in", which implies that it is 
"conceptually explicit,"67 that is, it has describable con-
tent. 
Proclamation encompasses a variety of pretheological 
types such as prayer, spontaneous worship, etc. It is "ideally 
more a matter of action than of adjusting concepts." 68 Ogden 
uses a quotation from Whitehead who states the matter with 
remarkable clarity: 
The reported sayings of Christ are not formularized 
thought. They are descriptions of direct insight. 
The ideas are in his mind as immediate pictures, and 
not as analyzed in terms of abstract concepts .... 
He speaks in the lowest abstractions that language 
is capable of, if it is to be language at all and 
not the fact itself. 69 
Theology proper, on the other hand, is the most genera-
lized type of existentialist knowledge. Thus it leads to 
universal concepts and allows for a high degree of abstract-
ness in its language. 70 
The language Qf theology. - We are now prepared to turn 
to Ogden1s discussion of the nature of language in reference 
specifically to God. This discussion, in Ogden, has two parts. 
One must, he thinks, deal first with statements within the 
context of the Christian theological tradition. This involves 
identifying their logical type and then developing a method 
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of dealing with them. The second part of the discussion 
becomes necessary, Ogden argues, because the classical 
philosophical framework within which traditional theology 
developed did not allow for univocal language about God. 
The categories of existentialist knowledge were not avail-
able. 
The first part of this discussion involves us in the 
project of demythologization and existential interpretation, 
the second in Ogden1s doctrine of analogy. The former will 
provide the subject of the concluding section of this chapter, 
while we cannot develop the latter until we turn to Ogden1s 
metaphysics in Chapter IV. 
Ogden feels that Bultmann limited himself by the choice 
of Heidegger, in his early, essentially atheistic, period, 
to a position that is theologically weak, despite its great 
anthropological advantages. 71 Nevertheless Bultmann is seen 
as an adequate starting point for a theory of God-language. 
Bultmann has generally been crititized for disallowing any 
meaningful, objective, references to God since his view of 
theology is that it comprises lithe affirmations of faith, 
all of which refer to the realities encountered in man1s 
experience of himself and his world. 1I72 It is largely in 
response to this charge that Bultmann makes a distinction in 
his later writings between myth and analogy which is used and 
developed by Ogden. 
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I must remind the reader again of the purpose of this 
brief outline of Ogden1s epistemology. One could, of course, 
spend a whole book dealing with the topic, though much of it 
would be guesswork since Ogden himself shows little inclination 
to develop many of his central themes. Furthermore, it is 
difficult even to compare him or try to position him in relation 
to other theologians and philosophers. He is trying to solve 
two problems at once. He is akin to Tillich in refusing to 
regard God as just another object in the universe, thus a purely 
empirical or IIsecularisticll epistemology will not do. Yet 
his ideal of intelligibility to secular man leads him to also 
want a system that allows for meaningful and descriptive pro-
positions about God. Thus a purely subjective epistemology, 
as we have seen, is also out of the question. 
My interest here, however, is only to derive two essential 
points that I need to construct the argument of this chapter. 
a) It is possible to experience in a describable way the frame-
work of existence itself. Theology and philosophy are possible 
as cognitive enterprises. b) All knowledge begins in subject-
ivity. It is rooted in self-awareness and never really trans-
cends it. 
These points have clear implications for the type of theo-
logy methodology fitting for Ogden1s system and I turn now to 
that last phase of the argument. How are the traditional 
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statements in theology to be interpreted? Are they in any 
sense unique, thus establishing a discipline separate from 
philosophy? Ogden1s answer, we shall see, is negative. Pro-
perly identified and interpreted they are identical to philo-
sophical statements. 
C. The Project of Demythologization 
Preface. - Most of Ogden1s earlier essays, roughly bet-
ween 1957 and 1962, and including Christ without Myth, are 
concerned with the proper method of hermeneutics for theology 
vis-a-vis the biblical accounts. These essays presuppose 
something of the criteria and definition of theology and its 
relation to philosophy which is sometimes briefly stated, as 
in IIBultmann l s Project of Demythologizing ... 11 (1957), but never 
elaborated. In more recent writings these definitional matters 
are clearly expounded and seen as fundamental to the question 
of method. 
One of the difficulties in interpreting Ogden on this point 
is that it is not always clear when we are listening to Bultmann 
and when to Ogden. This is overcome somewhat by Ogden1s affir-
mation that he and Bultmann are essentially in agreement on 
the question of method,73 although he insists that he is more 
consistent in the application of the method and also goes beyond 
it. Referring to Bultmann he says: 
I, too, would say that the primary use of all 
theological statements is existential and that the 
sense of the statement IIGod acts in historyll is 
an existential sense. 74 
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Thus I will ignore the ambiguity that sometimes is present. 
The discussion of demythologization in this section is 
crucial since it shows the methodological results of Ogden's 
criteria and epistemology. More important even than that, 
is that it leads Ogden to identify theology and philosophy. 
The subsequent chapters must clarify and modify that identi-
fication as they discuss the content of this combined disci-
pline. 
1. What is Ogden's "Project of Demythologizing"? 
Ogden claims that one cannot understand the contemporary 
theological scene without first understanding Bultmann. 
It has become increasingly evident that for one who 
is concerned with the present theological task there 
is no better way to begin than by attempting to come 
to terms with Bultmann's proposal . 
.. . To be sure, we are eventually going to argue 
that his proposal finally fails in being maximally 
significant because it cannot meet the test of logical 
self-consistency. But as we suggested above, this can 
hardly be taken to mean_that his theology is not of 
singular significance.7~ 
Bultmann's great achievement, according to Ogden, is the 
development of a precise theological hermeneutic based on his 
conception of the nature and goal of man .. It is true, of course, 
that some elements of the method of demythologizing and exis-
tential interpretation are not original with Bultmann. Some 
indeed are as old as the patristic fathers. But it remains a 
real accomplishment to have specified a coherent and universal 
method and provided it with both a theological and philosophical 
framework. 
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Ogden summarizes the method as lIan interpretation that 
rests on man's preunderstanding of his own existentiell 
possibilities and therefore is oriented in terms of the ques-
tion of what ought to be. 1I76 This statement is in obvious 
need of explanation. 
To demythologize is, to interpret: it is not to attempt 
a literal understanding but rather to read through a specific 
set of glasses. Elsewhere Ogden clarifies this type of inter-
pretation by defining the method as: 
The restatement of traditional theological formulations, 
which as such are scientifically incredible, in terms of 
the understanding of human existence which they more 
or less inadequately express. 77 
The method has two aspects: First, it is negative inter-
pretation that eliminates the IImythical ll and inadequate. Second, 
it is also positive in its desire to restate theological state-
ments in terms of lIexistentiell possibilities,1I that is, what 
they mean for the possibilities of human existence. 
In the following I shall deal first with the character of 
myth: its definition, linguistic form, and intention. Secondly, 
I shall discuss demythologization and existential interpretation 
as separate parts of the total method. Thirdly, I shall look 
at some questions of justification of specific theses in regard 
to Ogden's method. 
The definition Qi myth. - Ogden's usage indicates three 
general characteristics of theological myth. 78 First, they are 
statements about human experience. They are not pure creations 
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of the imagination such as fairy tales might be. Second, they 
represent an internal awareness of the individual and his world 
as existing within the reality of all things. That is, the 
subject of mythology is not external realities, events, or 
living things, but always the individual himself. Third, 
myths make use of the terminology of objective awareness, of 
things and events. 
Thus, for Ogden the biblical statements concerning God's 
actions in history are simply category mistakes. 79 This asser-
tion, however, needs two qualifications. On the one hand, we 
must remember that the category mistake involved is a very 
particular one, namely, the use of sense-perception language to 
describe non-describable experience. But we must also take into 
account that, although myths cannot be taken literally, they 
are, nevertheless, seriously intended and therefore in some 
sense still true. 80 But in what sense? 
For Ogden, truth takes on different appearances depending 
on the way it is represented in language. I take it that he 
does not mean to say that the truth itself which is under con-
sideration changes, but rather that the criterion for establishing 
it varies as different language forms are used. The method of 
aSGertaining the proper criterion must involve the determination 
of which distinctive questions the speaker is seeking to ask 
and answer. 81 Myth is just such a language form. 
Myths, Ogden claims, are found to be a type of religious 
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assertion which presents answers to the question of how faith 
can be affirmed. Apparently he thinks this to be true of all 
myths, but specifically of traditional theological statements . 
. .. Mythical assertions are true insofar as they so 
explicate our unforfeitable assurance that life is 
worthwhile, that the understanding of faith they 
represent cannot be falsified by the essential con-
ditions of life itself. 82 
Mythical statements, however, fail to meet the need for 
meaningful God-language for two reasons. First, they are 
imp~oper since they objectify God. They speak of him as if he 
were a "something", identifiable within our universe of sensory 
experience. This points to the second reason: since they 
need to be reworded before they can be verified, such statements 
do not, prima facia, indicate the conceptuality or model by 
which they can be more properly stated. 83 Myth is itself depen-
dent on some other form of speaking of God, but by itself it in 
no way helps us in acertaining that means. 
The linguistic form Q.f myth. - "Myth" for Ogden, and he 
claims here to agree with Bultmann,84 has only the very specific 
definition given above. It is the attempt to state in objective, 
empirical descriptions that which can only be existentially 
known. Ogden occasionally expresses this by saying that although 
myth and science share the same linguistic forms they have dif-
ferent meanings: 
Although the "intention" of such mythological 
statements--or, as we may also say, their "use" 
or function--is quite different from that of 
scientific statements, thair grammatical and 
logical form is the same. 5 
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This means that their linguistic form is properly 
distinguished from their intended meaning and the 
latter expressed in other linguistic terms more 
appropriate to it. 86 
For example, the two propositions, IIGod spoke to Moses 
on Sinai ,II and IIPresident Carter spoke to the Nation from the 
Oval office,1I both have the same linguistic form. They appear 
to be simple sensory observations. Their intentions, Ogden 
would say, are nevertheless quite different. The second is in 
fact, observational. The first, however, is really a statement 
about the possibilities of Moses ' existence. 
Myth obscures truth primarily in two areas, the nature 
of man and the nature of God. It represents man as subjected 
to outside forces, even to the fear of possession: as II s tanding 
at the mercy of divine or demonic powers whose efficacy is func-
tionally independent of his own responsible decisions. 87 In the 
same objectifying manner, God is presented as a thing-among-
things, as meddling in the affairs of time and space, as creat-
ing 88 and incarnating and resurrecting. 89 
The intention of myth. - Myth as commonly understood is 
simply primitive science or cosmology. For Ogden it is true 
even of his more technical use that myths are at least that: 
II man l s first crude attempts at what we now know as science and 
history.1I 90 It is in this sense that myth takes on the charac-
ter~ of an outdated and no longer acceptable world-view, and 
underlying that a weak view of empirical justification which 
allows for the fanciful. Thus my this talk of demons, says Ogden 
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is on the one hand objectifying in that it destroys man's 
individuality by subjecting him to supposedly real external 
and personal forces, and on the other it is just bad science 
--the kind that results from an inadequate view of experimen-
tal method, as judged by Ogden's IIsecular" man. 
Myths are, however, much more, and essentially much more 
than primitive science. For Ogden the real intention of myth 
is always to express the objectively inexpressible. This 
follows from--in fact, it is simply the restatement of--the 
definition of myth as existential meaning in objective lang-
uage. 
While ... the mythical mind is able, by reason of its 
capacity for thinking uncritically, to represent its 
experience of the transcendent in objective mytholo-
gical statements, it is also true that the real intent-
ion of such statements does not lie in their objective 
representational contents but in the understanding of 
existence which the latter express only more or less 
inadequately.91 
Ogden repeatedly argues this point. 92 The real use of 
myth is the existential, not the scientific. Myths speak 
about human life, not events or facts in the external world. 
Only on this view can myths retain truth value, as well as 
the possibility of their restatement in non-objectified langu-
age with the same meaning. We must now amplify these points. 
Demythologizing. - Ogden frequently uses IIdemythologization" 
to refer to theentire method of demythologizing and existential 
interpreting. However, he is usually careful to distinguish 
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the two phases of the method of which demythologization is 
the first and negative. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of demythologizing is 
that it is not simply censorship. It is not merely a techni-
que to eliminate the miraculous and anachronistic, as one finds 
for instance in many liberal methodologies. Rather it is the 
identification of those ideas, stories, concepts, and state-
ments, which are improperly expressed. 
One does not, for example, simply cross out the resurrec-
tion of Christ as a flight of loyal imagination, but rather 
accepts the basic concept of continued relevance and seeks to 
alter those elements in its linguistic form which tend to 
objectify the divine presence. 
Demythologizing is justified by the very nature of myth. 
It is really just a reversal of the process that created it. 
Although myth represents a linguistic mistake,93 its intentions 
are honorable. Ogden1s view on this is that of Bultmann: 
It is possible for the theologian to demythologize 
the kerygma only if the kerygma itself allows such 
interpretation. Although this does not mean that the 
kerygma is the only reason of demythologization, it 
does mean that unless the New Testament message admits 
of this procedure, theology as t~~ obedient response to 
this message becomes impossible. 
Aside from the general definition of myth that allows 
the New Testament to demand its own demythologizing, there 
are the following specific justifications. 95 There is first 
the observation that many of the mythological statements in 
the New Testament are loosely connected or even contradictory. 
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Second, the basic motives are often in conflict, as evidenced 
especially in the tension between fate and guilt, determina-
tion and decision. Since my this language is that of external 
actions and events, there is no commitment to a view of what 
is truly involved for the individual. Third, and most import-
antly there is the fact that the New Testament already begins 
to carry out its own demythologizing. For example, its emphasis 
on freedom and responsibility already indicates the proper 
understanding of the conflict between the motives mentioned 
above, and the Gospel of John's elimination of lithe futuristic 
eschatology of the primitive community "96 is a further example. 
Existential Interpretation. - The second and positive 
phase of the method is also determined and justified by the 
very nature and purpose of Myth. Let me repeat that for Ogden 
myth is always intended ~o say something existential about 
man. 97 This is a crucial point in Ogden's argument. I have 
made it before, but it is the second phase of the method that 
applies it. The justification of the method as a whole, and 
especially of existential interpretation, for Ogden, is that 
myths should be translated existentially rather than literally 
because that is how myths are intended--simply by definition. 
Ogden explicitly argues that the demand for demythologizing 
"follows logically" from the definition of myth as existential 
meaning in external forms of expression. 98 More often, however, 
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Ogden argues indirectly by claiming that the possibility of 
myths being true hinges on its being existentially understood. 
Because the meaning of myth is really existential-
metaphysical, the conditions of its truth are the 
conditions implicit in that kind of meaning, not 
those with which either the scientist or the historian 
is quite rightly concerned. 99 
After a longer version of the argument in "Myth and 
Truth" (1966) Ogden concludes: 
Because this is so, the process of actually veri-
fying mythical assertions always presents a peculiar 
problem ... One can actually verify mythical 
assertions only by following the twofold hermeneuti-
cal procedure that Bultmann has called IIdemythologizing. 1I100 
To summarize, we can thus say that the goal in dealing 
with myth is that of determining its truth. One can deal with 
that problem only by recognizing myth's existential nature. 
This, in turn, demands the demythologizing of myth. 
Thus, method is dependent on definition. This is illu-
strated in various examples Ogden gives. One may suffice: 
If mythical statements are considered in themselves, 
in abstraction from their actual function in human 
life, they can only too easily be taken as simply 
man's first crude attempts at what we now know as 
science or history. The Christian myths of 
creation and of the last things can then be 
dismissed as primitive cosmology .... But as 
soon as we recognize that mythical language has 
another and logically quite different use from that 
which its terms and categories suggest, this whole 
familiar situation appears in a new light .... 
Therefore, the real meaning ... is to illumine each 
present moment of our actual existence as an existence 
within and under the all-embracing love of God. 
They teach us that the ultimate beginning and end 
of all our ways ... is the pure unbounded 10Y01which 
is decisively represented in Jesus Christ. 
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It is important to reemphasize that for Ogden demytho-
logization is necessary, not just because it is an appro-
priate process of understanding for myth, not just because 
he considers myth as outdated form of expression, not even 
because myth is inadequate and mis-representational, but 
because demythologization is precisely that for which myth 
was intended all along. Again, myth must be existentially 
interpreted because it is existentially defineable; it can 
be so defined because it was existentially intended. It was 
Bultmann's great achievement to find the adequate form of 
expression for my this content in Heidegger's existentialism. 
Let me summarize the development of this phase of the argument 
so far. Ogden's epistemology implies the possibility of theo-
logical statements but only in existentialist form. The tradi-
tional statements about God do not meet the requirements and 
need to be demythologized. 
Two crucial questions must now be discussed more fully: 
first, why does Ogden think that myth is existential in intent? 
A method, and much more as will become apparent, depends on 
the definition, after all, so we ought to have some solid just-
ification for it. Second, why does Ogden think that Heidegger's 
anthropology is the proper form ot expression for myth? Why 
has it taken almost two thousand years to find the adequate 
linguistic forms for the content of the New Testament myths? 
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~ the intention of myth justified?- I am not aware that 
Ogden gives us what we are looking for at this point. What 
is really needed is some ~historical evidence or reason to 
think that the writers or originators of mythical statements 
were in fact trying to say something about the possibilities 
of human existence, but for some specified reasons were able 
to express it only in observational terms. They really intended 
to say something about divine immanence but could express it 
only in objectifying, spatial terminology. It is not clear 
to me, at least, what would provide such a proof. 
Perhaps the closest thing to it in Ogden is an approving 
quote from Bultmann to the effect that lawful, scientific 
thinking "although only fully developed in modern science, 
is already Ipreformed l in the Iwork-thinkingl (Arbeits-denken) 
that is as primitive as existence itself". 102 Though primitive 
man did not have the concepts to express a law-governed view 
of the universe he subconsciously knew its truth and acted 
on that basis. He could express himself only in primitive, 
objectifying language, but his intention, his real meaning, 
is that of existential self-understanding. 
This seems to beg the question. It offers a scenario of 
what may have been the case, but Ogden provides us with no 
proof that it, in fact, was. I must, however, preserve the 
expository nature of this chapter and wait until the concluding 
chapter to evaluate the position. 
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Bultmann, Heidegger, and the New Testament. - It remains 
for us to find an answer to the second question mentioned 
above, namely that concerning the choice of Heideggerian 
concepts to interpret New Testament myths. Bultmann has 
spent most of his academic career justifying this choice and 
Ogden has done little more than affirm its correctness. One 
of the rare statements of his own is the following: 
Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human 
existence represents the translation into formal 
ontological terms of the un~erstanding of man set 
forth in the New Testament. U3 
The argument in both Bultmann and Ogden l04 is exegetical, 
i.e. that when one understands what the New Testament truly 
means to say about man and his possibility of authentic exis-
tence one can see that it is best and adequately expressed 
by the Heideggerian analysis in Being and Time, regardless of 
Heidegger's actual intentions. 
The argument, as simply exegetical as it may seem, has 
its complexities and problems. On the one hand, it is diffi-
cult to determine just what a neutral exegesis of the New 
Testament might look like on the basis of which one could 
determine its relationship to Heidegger. In addition, there 
is the difficulty presented by Ogden's argument that Heidegger 
himself has been influenced in his conceptualization precisely 
by biblical viewpoints at least in Sein Und Zeit. Referring 
to a footnote in that work, Ogden claims this: 
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I am persuaded we are not far from the truth if we 
regard Heidegger's proposal as stimulated and 
perhaps even determined by the same theological 
influences that were otherwise so decisive for 
this phase of his work. I regard it as highly 
probable that here, as in Sein und Zeit generally, 
the historical back-ground-or-Heidegger's statements 
is the understanding of man and God with which his 
encounter with Christian theology served to acquaint 
him.10o 
2. Philosophy and Theological Methodology 
Introduction. - In this section I shall briefly analyze 
questions which arise concerning the method of demythologizing 
and existential interpretation in its implications for the 
relationship between philosophy and theology. They focus 
initially on the problem of a limit to demythologizing. This 
is a problem which has for many years provoked a great deal 
of comment and controversy--it may in fact be the hottest 
issue in Bultmannian circles, and Ogden has certainly been 
a central figure in this discussion. John Macquarrie's The 
Scope Qi Demythologizing 106 is a very comprehensive and clear 
treatment of the problem, and there are others as well, so 
that at this point I shall simply present Ogden's view in out-
line. What is crucial as the last premise of the argument 
of this chapter is Ogden's position that, in fact, there is 
no limit to demythologizing. No mythical statements of theo-
logy can be excepted. As a result the historical elements 
that appear to brand Christian theology as a discipline sepa-
rate from philosophy are eliminated. 
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The limit to demythologizing. - As we have seen, this 
was the first problem, chronologically, with which Ogden 
chose to deal in the published essays which were derived 
from his dissertation at the University of Chicago Divinity 
School. Although on the surface it may appear as the purely 
internal theological issue of the parameters of a particular 
method, it is cast by Ogden as the large interdisciplinary 
problem of the relation between theology and philosophy. 
The problem is this: Bultmann, claims Ogden, maintains 
a "structural inconsistency." While insisting on the complete 
demythologization of New Testament myth, he stops short of 
eliminating the death of Christ as historical event and insists 
on its necessity for the authentic existence of any human 
being. 
In other words, what distinguishes theology from 
philosophy in Bultmann's view is the fact that it 
speaks about a unique act of God in the person and 
destiny of Jesus of Nazareth, which, as he says, 
'first makes possible ' the authentic human existence 
that philosophy also knows about and proclaims as 
man's original possibility.107 
Thus, for Bultmann, what distinguishes theology from 
philosophy is not their source, nor their central content, 
since both are concerned with the existential analysis of 
human authenticity. In fact, philosophy has on the whole done 
a clearer and more adequate job of expressing the central con-
tent than the New Testament authors. lOB What ultimately must 
distinguish the two is that philosophy is the completely 
general analysis of the possibility of authentic existence 
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while theology ~ addition to this analysis, knows that the 
actuality of authentic existence comes only because of a 
unique event. Philosophy knows only what i~ true ~ principle, 
while theology knows of historic conditions that make possible 
authenticity ~ fact l09 , though it has no unique prepositions. 
Bultmann's argument rests on the claim that the true Christ-
event is not mythical nor is it intended so.110 
Ogden argues that in making this distinction Bultmann 
involves himself in inconsistency, primarily because on Bult-
mann's own definition the proposition, IIGod acted in Jesus 
Christ ll is prima facie mythological. It is clearly a case 
of objectifying language used to refer to the divine. 
This, then, is the ultimate inconsistency of 
Bultmann's position. He affirms a distinction 
between theology and philosophy which he can 
maintain only by appealing to an event that he 
himself not only in effect negatively rejects 
but also positively is incapable of expressing. lll 
The inconsistency is seen even more clearly, Ogden argues, 
if we compare his following two summaries of Bultmann's 
position to which we referred earlier: 
(1) Christian Faith is to be interpreted exhaustively 
and without remainder as man's original possibility of 
authentic historical (geschichtlich) existence as this 
is more or less adequately clarified and conceptualized 
by an appropriate philosophical analysis. (2) Christian 
faith is actually realizable, or is a IIpos s ibility in 
fact", only because of the particular historical 
(historisch) event Jesus of Nazareth, which is the 
originative event of the church and its distinctive 
word and sacraments. 112 
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Thus Bultmann is held to involve himself in speaking of a 
divine act of revelation in space-time history when his own 
definition identifies such a statement as myth. The issue 
is, of course, hardly that simple. Much controversy has 
raged around Ogden's contention and he is frequently accused 
of misinterpreting Bultmann. However, I am not concerned 
here with the validity of Ogden's understanding of Bultmann. 
What is important is Ogden's insistence that demythologizing 
be carried out unremittingly. There are no affirmable divine 
acts in history. Such acts could be referred to only by 
mythical statements. 
Ogden concludes that there are really only two options. 
The first is to reject the entire concept and project of 
demythologization as do conservatives; for Ogden this is both 
culturally and theologically impossible. The other alternative 
is to reject Bultmann's limited demythologization, and consis-
tently apply the method throughout the whole scope of theolo-
gical statements. 113 This will, of course, necessitate a new 
approach to God-language but it is the only viable course. 
Only this option allows theology to remain in compliance with 
the criteria established for it. A statement of the historical 
death and resurrection of Christ as an action of God would 
most certainly offend the empirical conscience of contempor-
ary man, Ogden feels. Even worse, however, is its denial of 
the very intentions of the New Testament and myth in general. 
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Thus any attempt to hold on to a distinctive event as the 
identifying theme of theology is neither understandable to 
contemporary man nor adequate to its Christian tradition. 
One question remains to be clarified. Is it the event 
or the statement of a unique action of God that contradicts 
Bultmann1s method and thus the secular world-view? Ogden 
seems curiously ambiguous on this point. The ambiguity, how-
ever, dissolves if one keeps the definition of myth in mind. 
A myth, again, is a statement about existential possi-
bilities in the observational language of sensible events. 
Thus, strictly speaking, it is not the event that contradicts 
Ogden1s (or Bultmann1s) position. If Ogden is correct, there 
is no event. What contradicts the stated general method is 
to refuse to treat as a myth what one has already been defined 
as one. Thus the problem is not linguistic, nor is it scien-
tific, but methodological. 
Most important, however, is that this option of consistent 
application is theology1s distinctive. Now IIChY'istian faith is 
to be interpreted exhaustively and without remainder as man1s 
original possibility of authentic existence, as this is clari-
fied and conceptualized by an appropriate philosophical analy-
sis. 1I114 
At the basis of his system, then, Ogden establishes that 
philosophy and theology must be seen as indistinguishable, 
though we have not yet given them careful definitions. For 
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Ogden this is the only way in which theology can secure for 
itself a voice in contemporary culture. It is still true 
that theology, as Christian theology, knows of an event which 
gives rise to it, and as such it appears more culturally 
bound than philosophy. Nevertheless, it knows nothing beyond 
lithe demand which has already been laid upon men by their 
Creator at all times and which, therefore, a truly adequate 
philosophy also properly knows and proclaims. 1I115 
Ogden's epistemology, then forces the conclusion that 
theology cannot establish an independent identity by specifying 
a unique content. That, by itself, will not completely estab-
lish the coextensional identity of theology and philosophy. 
Nevertheless, it does rule out one frequent rationale for 
separating the disciplines. For the time being, the notion 
that they speak in different ways of the same truth is still 
an option--Ogden's system will rule that out, too, however--
but there cannot be two areas of truth: one of abstract and 
general propositions about God and man, and one of specific 
and historical actions that are his uniquely. 
This particularly rules out many traditionally orthodox 
views of theology. They are Ogden's primary opponent at this 
point. In following sections the nature of his system will 
also rule out IIlanguage-game ll views, that is, that theology 
and philosophy play entirely different roles. 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF OGDEN'S SYSTEM 
A. The Total Scope 
B. Faith: The Datum of Philosophy and Theology 
C. The Nature and Criteria of Philosophy 
D. What is Theology? 
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Introduction. - If theology cannot claim any unique con-
tent~ and if~ in fact~ it coincides with philosophy~ then we 
must now ask for a more specific answer to the question of 
source. In our epistemological considerations we identified 
the existentialist level of experience as that which makes 
philosophical knowledge possible for Ogden. The aim of this 
chapter is to explain more fully the generation of philosophi-
cal and theological knowledge~ and from that to clarify the 
definitions of those disciplines. 
It will undoubtedly strike the reader as noteworthy that 
the actual content and definition of philosophy can be deter-
mined by purely epistemological considerations~ as Ogden holds. 
That may be plausible--or not--in a system where the meaning-
fulness of metaphysics is derived~ but here we have a complete 
metaphysic. Ogden does seem unaware of the metaphysical pre-
suppositions built into his epistemology~ as opposed, for 
instance, to his mentor Whitehead. We shall have to return 
to that matter; for now I simply warn the reader of what is 
coming. For Ogden"faith in meaning" is an unavoidable aspect 
of existentialist experience. Its analysis is philosophy-
theology. Its ultimate implication is the reality of God. 
I should emphasize here that in this chapter I shall be 
concerned only with the structural implications of Ogden's 
epistemology~ in particular the formal relationship between 
philosophy and theology and their common source in faith. 
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While running the risk of getting the cart before the 
horse, it seems best to begin with an overview. This is 
advantageous due to the fact that Ogden1s concepts of theo-
logy and philosophy flow from a common source: the self 
analyzing itself. Following this overview, there will be 
individual sections amplifying each aspect. 
Ogden provided much of the outline himself in a lecture 
delivered at the"Consultation on the Future of Philosophical 
Theologyll at McCormick Theological Seminary in Chicago in 
1970. It was later revised and published as liThe Task of 
Philosophical Theol ogy ll1 (1971). 
A. The Tota 1 Scope: 
Concentric definitions. - I would represent Ogden1s struc-
ture by four concentric circles, each one picturing a more 
objectivized, dogmatized, and specialized form of knowledge 
than its outer neighbor. These forms are faith, philosophy, 
philosophical theology, and Christian theology. A diagram of 
their relationships might be made as below. 2 
faith----------------
philosophy-------
(philosophical 
theology 
(Christian)-
theology direction of 
objectification. 
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This is not meant to indicate a narrowing of subject 
matter or content, but rather a more particularized methodo-
logy and terminology, and, perhaps primarily, increased 
o b j e c t i f i cat ion. Let me, the n, 0 u t 1 i nee a c h tho ugh t - t y p e 
individually. 
Faith. - The analysis of existence shows that a human 
self as a thinking, speaking, and perceiving being is possible 
only on the foundation of faith, be it explicitly confirmed, 
or only acted upon, perhaps even while being denied. 3 This 
faith is not contentless for Ogden, but rather can be defined 
as ~ distinctively human, self-conscious confidence ~ the 
meaning, value, and purpose of onels environment. 
We shall see, however, that faith contains only a min-
imum of objectivity. It may ~e analysed and understood reflec-
tively, but it is not arrived ~ by argument. 4 It is the pre-
supposition of all activity, therefore necessary and unjustifi-
able in principle. 
Faith is the essential material with which philosophy and 
theology deal in a reflective manner. It forms the basic topic 
and cont@nt of both of these disciplines. 
Philosophy. - Philosophy is the general and reflective 
understanding of faith. 5 Its source is thus the expression 
of human experience. As such, it must be seen as a secondary 
act i vi t y . T hat is, i t doe s not pro v ide its 0 w n II stu f f II 0 r 
content. It simply works with the given, namely the analysis 
of faith. 
III 
Since the reality on which faith is grounded, namely God, 
is present in all being, and since all philosophies are based 
on some aspect of being, no philosophy, though incomplete, is 
totally wrong. Instead, all philosophies must be seen as 
fragmentary or as pointing beyond themselves, unless, of course, 
they are self-contradictory.6 
Philosophy, for Ogden, can be defined as the rational 
coordination Qf the direct insights Qi man into the nature, 
aspects, and implications Qf faith. It can be divided into 
more specific inquiries of which the central and most impor-
tant is metaphysics. 7 
Philosophical Theology. - Philosophical theology is the 
general analysis Qi the reality Qi God, ~ the ground of faith. 
Its possibility is given in the possibility of philosophy: 
... Philosophical theology is possible because the 
original encounter in which all our knowledge has its 
basis is an encounter not merely with ourselves or 
our fellow crea~ures, but also with our infinite 
ground and end. 
Ogden's God is not a special object of perception. He 
is included in all encounters with reality, and seen as neces-
sary Being itself. Thus, the question of, God, the clarification 
of which is the task of the philosophical theology, is not just 
an important question, not even the primary one, but, in fact, 
the only question that can be asked. 9 For this reason theistic 
arguments from the nature of contingent beings are impossible. 10 
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The method of philosophical theology is two-staged. It 
begins with a careful analysis of human experience and life. 
It then forms a synthesis of these data into a consistent 
whole. The resultant system can then be used to judge the 
authenticity of revelation as it occurs in the "acts of God." 
Ogden notes that Hartshorne uses the term " na tural theo-
logy" rather than "philosophical theology." The identification 
is correct as long as we avoid the traditional definition 
which involves a procedure along the lines of a contingent 
teleological or cosmological argume~t.11 
Natural theology is a "secularized Christian theology, 
i.e., the restatement in wholly secular philosophical terms 
of the understanding of God decisively re-presented in the 
Christian revelation." 12 
Philosophical theology is dependent not only for its 
content but also for its methodology on philosophy proper. 
By definition, the task of theology is hermeneutical, that is, 
its purpose is to analyze faith. The epistemology and metho-
dology by which this is accomplished is provided solely by 
philosophy. 
By explicating in adequate conceptual terms our 
original encounter with ourselves, the world, and 
God, the philosopher also clarifies the specifically 
religious question to which the theologian interprets 
faith in Jesus Christ as the final answer. 13 
Christian theology. - Christian theology is seen as a 
particular form of general philosophical theology. It is the 
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examination of specifically Christian faith ~ 11 is seen in 
Christ himself and the tradition of the Church. 14 
Since, however, Christ's revelation is judged by Ogden 
to be the decisive act of God, Christian theology is, in a 
sense, the norm for all other theologies. This is not to im-
ply that all else is false religion, but that other theologies 
are at best fragmentary. The Christian revelation, since based 
on a general philosophical explication of faith, has a "univer-
sal and all-inclusive claim." 15 
B. Faith: The Datum of Theology and Philosophy 
Introduction. - One of the most important aspects of 
defining philosophy and theology, and their relationship, is 
the stipulation of content. For Ogden, this discussion falls 
into two categories. There is, first, the immediate content, 
faith, the object of direct existential analysis. According 
to the subjectivist principle, knowledge must start here. 
There is, however, a second and more ultimate content: the 
object of faith, God himself. I shall discuss the latter in 
Chapter IV. 
We have already looked at the epistemological position 
which Ogden has taken as the basis for an analysis of faith. 
We can now look at the content of that analysis. 
Although Ogden had studied under Hartshorne during his 
years at the University of Chic;;ago, it was only during and 
after his year at Marburg, 1962-1963, that he first began to 
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make great use of Hartshorne's ideas. As we have noted, the 
first essays which resulted from this research are highly 
methodological in nature, although a somewhat minimal system 
is present. An exception is his 1963 essay, "What Sense 
Does It Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?", although even 
here the subject is fairly narrow. 
Beginning in 1965, however, Ogden concentrated on deve-
loping a thorough doctrine of God, including a careful argu-
ment for divine existence as the ground of faith. Perhaps 
the two most important statements are his essays "The Reality 
of God," (1966) and "Love Unbounded: The Doctrine of God" 
(1966) . 
In this section I shall discuss Ogden's concept of faith, 
particularly as it serves the system as the only source of 
content. 
1. The Characteristics of Faith 
In the discussion of epistemology we have already given 
a minimal description of faith, but we must now elaborate. 
For Ogden, the concept of faith consists in the explication 
of two aspects: commitment and understanding. This follows 
clearly from the very fact that faith is experience and, 
moreover, a form of existentialist knowledge, comprising 
elements of both objective and existential knowledge. That 
is,although faith is primarily an inner involvement, it never-
theless demands an "object" to which it is directed. Ogden 
doubts that we can even speak of an "unconscious faith," 
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that is, a simple faith in faith. 16 We will consider each 
aspect separately. 
a) Commitment: The Existential Aspect 
According to Ogden there are at least two ideas subsumed 
under the notion of commitment. First, it has the character 
of confidence. It is a resting of the mind in the acceptance 
of specific facts. It is an existence in trust, a freedom 
from fear.17 Thus faith carries the connotation of 'security'. 
This in itself implies an object for faith, for it is not a 
self-assuredness based on some form of blind optimism, but 
a realistic appraisal leading to inner peace. This implies 
the second phase of commitment: faith as commitment is response. 
Faith, for Ogden, is a response to God who has acted 
first in the 'resurrection' of Christ. At this point, we need 
to summarize Ogden's view of the resurrection and its implica-
tions for faith, particularly in light of the danger of myths 
as we saw in the last chapter. 
The immediate meaning of the symbol 'resurrection' is 
the coming of faith in the possibility of self-authentication 
which the early church saw in Christ. 18 Resurrection is the 
historic decision to affirm faith in the life and death of 
the man Jesus as a decisive revelation of man's possibilities. 19 
However, this purely existential interpretation does not 
exhaust the scope of New Testament meaning. Ogden ,and Bultmann 
agree that Christian faith has an objective referent 20 and 
so we must look beyond the immediate commitment. 
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This further referent is the IIself-attestation of 
the risen one, the act of God in which the salvation-occur-
rence of the cross is completed. 1I21 It is God's own witness 
to the decisiveness of Christ's cross, which in a sense is 
also the witness of the risen Lord to himself. What does 
Ogden mean? 
By the very fact that this referent is an lact of God ' 
it is indicated that it is not a real historic event subse-
quent to the death of Christ. The New Testament language at 
this juncture is lIundeniably mythical. 1I22 Thus language of 
objective sense perception must be demythologized. 
The witness of the disciples--their faith--was therefore 
itself an event in till1e as a response to God's own witness 
to the decisiveness of Christ's death.23 Thus the resurrec-
tion was not created by the disciples, nor is it 'decided 
into existence ' by us today. It originated in a divine act 
and is only completed by the obedience of faith. 
We are now faced with a problem in interpreting Ogden. 
What is an lIact of God?1I Clearly, this indicates a content 
for faith--though not an objectifiable or sensory one. The 
clarification of this problem is the end result of the analysis 
of faith as related to a content. In fact, it is the whole 
purpose of theology-philosophy: the understanding of the real-
ity of God. We can now begin that analysis which will take 
us the remainder of the expository part of this dissertation. 
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(b) Understanding: The Objective Aspect 
The understanding involved in faith includes two notions: 
the lobjectl of faith and the content of faith. The lobjectl, 
for Ogden, is clear: only God is eligible. He is the loving 
Father,24 who is committed to our progress and controls our 
ultimate destiny.25 I shall reserve for chapter IV the explica-
tion of Ogden1s doctrine of God as the object of faith. 
Turning to the question of the content of faith, we can 
summarize Ogden1s position thus: Faith is confidence that 
there is an objective ground of all reality, giving it meaning 
and value. 26 We can best explicate this content by asking 
two questions. First, is there really any meaning? Second, 
why should we suppose that this meaning requires a ground? 
Why do we need and even Ifeel I that there exists meaning 
and value both in life and in reality in general? Ogden 
answers that an analysis of scientific, moral, and religious 
assertions all show a logically prior presupposition of meaning, 
value, or order. We shall look at each in turn. 
For Ogden, every question or assertion of a scientific 
nature, including a simple observation statement, assumes an 
external reality.27 Although some philosophers h~ve doubted 
real external existence and opted for an absolute idealism, a 
true science could hardly be grounded on such a base. Certainly 
the average non-philosopher grants such a foundation. Thus, 
science for Ogden is grounded in an unavoidable assurance in 
the reliable character of perception. 
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Moral questions are even stronger evidence for a presup-
posed order to life. Here we are forced to ask whether we 
could even make moral choices unless we were, at least to 
some degree, confident of their long-term significance. 28 
Granted that this confidence may be in practice subconscious 
and conceptually undeveloped, still no one could be called 
rational in opting for morality unless he somehow sensed that 
the value of actions was not null. To quote Whitehead: 
... The immediate facts of present action pass into 
permanent significance for the Universe. The 
insistent notion of Right and Wrong, Achievement 
and Failure depends on this background. Otherwise 
every actjvity is merely a passing whiff of insign-
ificance. 29 
Inevitably, therefore, both scientific and moral assertions 
are based on fundamental assumptions of meaning. Questions 
of the meaning of life are termed IIboundary questions" by 
Ogden, and they are religious in that they are the ultimate 
questions about reality. It is with specifically religious 
questions that the issue is clearest: 
Logically prior to every particular religious assertion 
is an original confidence in the meaning and worth of 
life, through which not simply all our religious answers, 
but even our religious questions first become possible 
or have any sense. 30 
Or to state it more succinctly: 
I cannot question the worth of life without presupposing 
the worth of questioning and the worth, therefore, of 
the life by which alone such questioning can be done. 31 
Thus Ogden concludes that even to ask the question of 
meaning, in fact, to speak and think at all, presupposes faith 
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in meaning as a general ordering of man's environment. 
Why does Ogden suppose that the basis of such a confi-
dence is any more than our sheer trust itself? To answer 
t his que s t ion 0 g den m us t fir s t g i ve a de fin i t ion 0 f II rea 1 II . 
He tells us that the criterion will vary from one language-
ga met 0 t hi e n ext, but wit h 0 nee 1 em e n tin com m 0 n : II rea 1 II i s 
IIwhat we in some way find ourselves obliged to take account 
of. 1I32 Put differently, IIreality in any particular mode of 
reasoning must be understood as 'what (for purposes of this 
kind of argument) is relevant. '1133 
I hardly need to point out that Ogden's argument is less 
than clear and seems to be mere word-trickery. What I take 
Ogden to mean is that the argument for God's existence from 
necessity of faith is really two-staged. I would summarize 
it as follows: 
a. (1) All judgments, even speech and thought, imply the 
reality of meaning. 
(2) It is self-stultifying to renounce the possibility 
of judgments (at least in ethics, science, and 
religion). 
(3) There must be meaning. 
b. (4) Meaning requires a source or ground as real as 
itself. 
(5) There exists a real ground of meaning, etc., 
namely God. 
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While the first stage of the argument is clear enough, 
though not without difficulties, premise (4) is given no 
backing. I can find nothing in Ogden's presentation that 
would justify the principle that meaning requires a real 
ground. As we will see, he explicitly denies one possibi-
lity, namely an analogical or ~ posteriori argument such as 
the "teleological argument." The implication of his statements 
is clearly that the reasoning is ~ priori. While it is clear 
that meaning follows from the nature of God in Ogden's meta-
physics, the reasoning is lacking that would permit us to go 
in the other direction, from the nature of meaning to the 
reality of God. 
The argument is made only more complex by the fact that 
Ogden conflates two, perhaps three, senses of the word "meaning" 
in his essays. He implies by the form,first of all, the notion 
of the functional orderedness of the environment, the regulari-
ties, connectedness, and the adaptation that makes perception, 
language, and science possible. The term also includes the 
notion of purpose, satisfaction, and happiness in life: the 
final good of man. In addition, it also carries the denotation 
of value, particularly in an ethical sense. 
No real justification is offered for this conflation of 
senses. In any case, the reasons cannot be metaphysical for 
Ogden wants to construct his metaphysics on just this foundation: 
that an unavoidable faith invairably detects a basic meaning-
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fullness to the universe. We must say that the argument 
for the b rea d tho f the sen s e 0 f " mea n i n g" i sex per i e flt i a 1 . 
Man feels meaning to his environment. Whether he does so 
in an as yet undifferentiated larger sense, or in multiple 
ways which he sees as closely related, Ogden does not say. 
The subtle platonism which we shall detect in Ogden's 
metaphysics would indicate that, in fact, these senses of 
"meaning" do come together, that would not, however, nec-
essitate that they are felt as such in primitive faith. 
Nevertheless, Ogden holds that once we grant the proper 
mode of reasoning in religious questions it immediately becomes 
absurd to ask the question of God's reality. I nth e s p he r e 
of ultimate questions "God" and "reality" are synonymous. 34 
We may indeed inquire how the ground of our confidence 
is most appropriately understood or conceived, and 
whether any among the historical religions is justified 
in claiming to be its decisive representation or reve-
lation. But to question whether the word "God" as here 
analyzed refers to anything objectively real is not, 
I believe, a sensible inquiry.35 
Faith, then, the understandable commitment of an 
individual to "God", whom he recognizes as the ground of meaning 
in life. Such faith is made plausible for us by Christ's 
"resurrection" to which it is an obedient response. 
122 
The next stage of the argument, as I see it, must be 
to clarify the analysis of IIground of meaningll as God. 
This will give us the content of metaphysics. There are, 
however, two matters which we must elaborate on first. We 
must clarify the inevitability of faith. We see this aspect 
best by explaining Ogden's ideas on atheism. In the remainder 
of the chapter I will then discuss the definitions of philo-
sophy and theology as those follow from the concept of faith. 
2. The Impossibility of Atheism 
IntrQ~uction. - Ogden's concept of faith allows for three 
forms of unfai tho On the theoretical side there may be mis-
understanding, while on the existential side there may be 
divided commitment. 36 Finally, a combination of both is also 
possible. 
Unfaith, generally, is the refusal to IIbelieve inll God. 
Specifically, it is a failure to respond to the resurrection 
as Ogden defines it. As noted, this may be because of mis-
understanding or because of lIidolatry,1I or both. In any 
case, unfaith turns out to be atheism because of the identity 
of God as the ground of meaning. 
Existential Unfaith. - Existential atheism is really the 
most difficult kind of atheism to deal with since it often 
occurs without any intellectual problems. In Ogden it is a 
matter of the will's refusal to obey and is IIquite compatible 
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with flawless orthodoxy."37 Thus, it may include moral 
culpability. 
A closer look at existential atheism reveals that it is 
not a total lack of faith, not its polar opposite, but rather 
a perverted or deficient form of faith. 38 An existential 
commitment to meaning is, in some sense, unavoidable. Samuel 
Beckett or Eugene Ionesco make meaningful use of language in 
everyday affairs; and cannot escape it even in their plays. 
There is always consent, perhaps unconscious, that the very 
existence of absurdity depends on rationality. 
Thus, existential atheism is really idolatry. It 
accepts meaning and value but refuses to acknowledge their 
sole ground . 
.. . The issue ... is how we are to believe in the only 
God in whom anyone-can believe and in whom each of us 
somehow must believe. And here there are but the two 
possibilities clarified once for all by the Protestant 
Reformers: either we are so to believe in God that we 
finally place our trust in him alone; or else we are 
so to believe in him that we divide-our ultimate trust 
by placing it in part in some idol along side him. 39 
At this point, Ogden disagrees with Hartshorne. The 
latter does not allow for inauthentic faith but feels that 
all atheism includes at least an implicit knowledge of the 
truth. 40 Against this, Ogden frequently insists that it is 
not necessary that such implicit knowledge be authentic. 41 
Existential atheism, then, is the idolatry of refusing 
to see God as the sole source of meaning. Ogden agrees with 
Paul IS affirmation in Romans 3:22f, that all men are idolators 
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to some extent. 42 
Theoretical Unfaith. - Atheism, however, can exist on a 
second, clearly conscious level. That is, it can be a 
rational denial of God1s existence in any form. Such denials 
are generally concerned with apparent or even real contradic-
tions within theism, either in terms of a particular type of 
God-concept, or of a certain metaphysical backing, or even 
of the very notion of metaphysics, let alone theism, itself. 43 
Ogden, as noted above, considers the third possibility 
to be self-stultifying. The first and second objections, 
however, occur quite frequently and are often valid. Since 
one can only speak of God in terms of a specific metaphysic, 
the first possibility can be included in the second. This 
has been the usual historic form of atheism: the rejection 
of Christianity on the presumption that only the classical 
metaphysical basis was orthodox and that this basis was faulty.44 
We shall deal with Ogden1s solution to this problem in chapter 
IV. 
A third type of atheism is conceivable, namely one which 
combines the theoretical and existential. Generally, however, 
this is simply an extension of theoretical atheism. Were 
that to be overcome, the existential rejection would cease. 
We should note, however, that Ogden is aware of the fact 
that theoretical atheism may not always include willful rejec-
tion. Few men are completely consistent within the scope of 
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their conscious beliefs, not to speak of the frequent dicho-
tomies between their intellect and their actual life. 45 
Ogden's method of dealing with theoretical atheism can 
at least be illustrated at this point if we analyze two of his 
essays challenging specific atheisms: liThe Strange Witness 
of Unbelief" (1966) which is directed toward Sartre, and "God 
and Philosophy" (1968), which deals with Flew. If faith is 
truly unavoidable then it must always be possible to show that 
any atheistic position is internally contradictory, that is, 
that theism, in Ogden's sense, can be derived from one of 
its premises. 
Sart!~. - Ogden summarizes Sartre's position as follows: 46 
(1) If there is no God, then all is permitted and there 
is no human essence. 
(2) There is no God 
( 3 ) " .. . All is permitted man, who has no essence. 
Ogden's route is to show an internal contradiction by 
demonstrating that it proves that man does have an essence, 
thereby destroying the major premise by modu~ tol~~. Ogden 
is assuming here that Sartre's major premise is more accurately 
stated as: (11) If and .2J!ll.if there is no God then all is 
permitted and there is no human essence. This is a crucial 
characteristic of the premise since its denial not only 
refutes Sartre's argument but establishes its opposite. 
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Ogden claims to be able to marshal evidence refuting the 
major premise. He argues that Sartre's concepts of the human 
"universality of condition," "condemned to be free," etc. 
all clearly indicate some content to a human essence. One 
can even show, he says, that Sartre denies his own moral 
relativism by establishing freedom as an absolute. 47 
The important factor is that these data which negate the 
major premise arise from withi~ Sartre's atheism. Thus it is 
a "strange witness of unbelief" to the reality of God. Sartre's 
system, then, is an example of an attack on classical theism; 
in fact, however, it ends up proving the necessity of God, 
although one perhaps quite different from the sovereign, abso-
lute one of traditional metaphysics. 
Flew. - Ogden's argument against Flew48 is even more 
instructive in pointing out the "necessary" character of faith. 
By using examples from God ~~ fhi12~Q~y49 Ogden attempts 
to show that Flew's IIStratonician atheism ll is itself non-
factual. What, for example, could falsify the statement 
lithe universe itself is ultimate ll ?50 
Thus, Ogden wants to force Flew into the dilemma of 
choosing between whether the falsifiability theory is non-
sense - at least at certain levels - or whether both theism 
and atheism are. 
This argument makes it clear that metaphysics cannot be 
made liable to total empirical verification. It is true that 
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metaphysics is based on facts, but not on particulars, rather 
on the entire category of fact. 51 Therefore, metaphysical 
assertions, if true, are necessarily true, not contingently 
so,52 and thus not falsifiable by an individual fact. 53 
The implication for understanding is obvious, if Ogden 
is correct in this. If "God" denotes an individual fact with-
in the universe, then it comes under the purview of falsifia-
bility and is judged meaningless. If it refers to something 
beyond or apart from the universe, then it is totally separate 
("wholly other") from experience, and it is not clear how we 
could speak of God at all. The only workable alternative is 
to see God as "the universe itself as a whole," though still 
in some sense unique and individual. 54 
We can see already the directions in which Ogden will 
develop a metaphysical and theological content on the basis 
of an analysis of faith. For now, however, we must continue 
our examination of the implications of faith for the systemic 
relations between those areas. 
In summary, for Ogden, faith, and therefore the reality 
of God, is unavoidable or inescapable for two reasons. First, 
even a denial of meaning affirms meaning. Thus, although faith 
may be idolatrous, it is always implicitly present. Secondly, 
when atheisms are examined and their inconsistencies reduced 
they tend to prove their opposite, namely the existence of God, 
the object of faith. 
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C. The Nature and Criteria of Philosophy and 
Metaphysics 
1. Metaphysics as the Core of Philosophy 
What ~ Philosophy? - In liThe Task of Philosophical 
Theologyll philosophy is defined as lithe fully reflective 
understanding of the basic existential faith which is con-
stitutive of human existence. 1I55 Statements with similar 
import can be found in other places as well .56 Philosophy is 
the existentialist analysis of content, implications and 
prerequisites of the constitutive understanding of meaning. 
This definition clearly excludes one concept of philo-
sophy·s role: it is not the quest or attempt to justify faith. 
IIFaithll has two senses in Ogden. In its broad sense, which is 
the use with which we have so far been concerned, it includes 
a level of reflection and is thus a mode of existentialist 
understanding. But both IIfaithll and IIreasonll can be given 
strict abstracted senses, namely reflective reason and fully 
ex i s ten t i a 1 fa i t h . In t his sec 0 n d use, fa i t his not ref 1 e c t ion, 
but encounter. Nevertheless, Ogden holds that it still has 
content, and thus gives a IIpreunderstandingll57 to reflection, 
and is, thereby, still experience. 58 
This distinction lies at the basis of the insight to 
which Ogden also subscribes, that faith in the strict sense 
precedes reason and seeks it. 59 From this it follows that 
faith as such neither needs nor permits justification. It is, 
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rather, the ground of justification and, thus, logically pre-
cedes philosophy. 
From the above definition it is clear that philosophy is 
essentially existentialist. Its subject is man!s being within 
his meaningful world. 
The very definition of philosophy already indicates its 
three major components. First, it is concerned with man's 
being and is thus anthropology. Second, it examines man as 
part of a total context and is thus cosmology. !Finally, its 
discussion of both man and the world is dependent on the 
presupposition of meaning and its ground. Thus philosophy is 
theology. Together these three constitute metaphysics. 
Ogden nowhere attempts a more refined delineation of 
the disciplines that make up philosophical inquiry. He notes 
at one point that any such attempt would be incomplete, arbi-
trary and of limited value. 60 He does mention that philosophy 
of law, morals, science, art, and religion 61 are IIperipheral. 1I 
Epistemology and logic are also mentioned but their classifica-
tion is not indicated except to say that they are lIimportant. 1I 
As we have seen, they play an introductory methodological role, 
rather than one of content. 
The centrality Qf metaphysics. - One thing is quite clear 
about Ogden's classification of philosophical inquiries, and 
that is that metaphysics is the central core. The argument 
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for this position begins with the definition of philosophy as 
a reflective understanding. This, for Ogden, demands that 
philosophy be both analytic and constructive. 62 His argument 
is as follows. 
In its critical and analytic phase, philosophy is con-
cerned, among other things, with the clarification of lan-
guage. Some, Ogden asserts, have confusedly identified 
philosophy with linguistic analysis. That they are wrong 
can be seen from their own recognition that philosophy is dif-
ferent from philology. They deal with depth grammar, with the 
presuppositions of language or with Illogical frontiers,1I 
demonstrating thereby that their concern is really metaphysical, 
not linguistic. This point in Ogden is vague at best, but 
appears to mean primarily that linguistic analysts, though they 
profess to want only to dissect, actually involve themselves 
in the construction of theories about the nature of reality. 
Thus they echo what has always been the dominant theme of 
.philosophy. 
Precisely in meditation on the II var iety of expression ll 
which makes up the history of human life and culture, 
phildsophy alw~ys has aimed, and quite properly 
should aim to lay bare the faith by which every man 
exists simply as a man, together with the struc-
ture of reality as revealed to such faith. 63 
What Ogden has done here is simply to draw the logical 
conclusion from his definition of faith. If faith is the 
confidence in meaning as such and metaphysics is the heart of 
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its analysis, then it must follow that every attempt to 
discuss meaning--and surely linguistic analysis is such an 
attempt--is metaphysical in nature. 
In summary, philosophy is metaphysical at heart, first, 
because in its second phase it is constructive or synthetic in 
its approach to the reality of faith. But it is metaphysical 
also because in dealing with faith it involves itself with the 
"most basic and comprehensive" themes that face us as human 
beings. 64 The content of philosophy is focused on the meaning 
of life itself and its grounding in God, which, for Ogden, are 
the paramount existential concerns. 
There is a third reason as well for the centrality of 
metaphysics. Not only is its content foundational, it is 
concerned with the conditional questions of human existence. 
Thus, content indicates clearly that the method of existen-
tialist analysis is "transcendental," by which Ogden means 
lithe raising to full self-consciousness of the basic beliefs 
that are the condition of the possibility of our existing or 
understanding at all." 65 Metaphysics is the attempt to answer 
what is not only the first question for man, but also that 
question, namely of meaning itself, the answer to which is 
determinative for all others. 
2. The Disciplines of Metaphysics 
Ogden's earlier position. - We touch now on a question 
on which Ogden appears to have shifted his stance in recent 
years. Although I must admit that his present position is 
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not entirely transparent to me, it does differ in one signi-
ficant way from that elaborated in his essays through 1971. 
Let me briefly state the original account of the disciplines 
that make up metaphysics, much of which remains, and then turn 
to the present development. 
It may be helpful to clarify this division of metaphysics, 
as well as the overall classification of philosophy in the fol-
lowing diagram. 66 
PHILOSOPHY 
epistemology METAPHYSICS phil. of art, science, 
logic ~ law, morals, religion, 
etc. 
M. Generalis M. Specialis 
Ontology Theology, Cosmology, Anthropology 
Metaphysics divides into two main studies. First, Ogden 
mentions what was traditionally known as metaphysica generalis, 
or what today we call ontology. This is the study of the 
most general features of reality,67 or of existence itself,68 
features so general that they are inclusive of God, man, and 
the world. 
For Ogden the history of ontology appears to be made 
up of classical metaphysics, which operated with the categories 
of IIbeingll and II su bstance ll , and the neoclassical alternative 
in which IIprocess ll and IIcreativity" are the primary categories. 69 
The second division of metaphysics is metaphysica specialis 
which comprises three disciplines: theology, cosmology, and 
anthropology. About the first nothing need be said here, since 
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the next section will discuss it in detail. 
Concerning cosmology Ogden has said, as far as I am 
aware, nothing to date. It is, in fact, quite curious to 
find it as an equal partner here since Ogden's argument for 
the rejection of existential philosophy is that it is incom-
plete because it is no more than anthropology: it needs a 
theology to complete it. One may wonder why Ogden's system 
does not also need a cosmology. A partial answer is given in 
his most recent statement on the nature of metaphysics, which 
I shall discuss below, but no final answer. 
Philosophical anthropology is the existential analysis 
of man as carried out, for example, by Heidegger and Bultmann. 
In some places this is referred to as Ipsychology"70 although 
Ogden states, without any argument, that "anthropology" is 
his preference.71 
Ogden's present position. - Ogden's most current analysis 
of metaphysics, brief though it is,72 presents some changes 
and refinements that leave us with something quite different 
than the original scheme. Nothing is said to indicate any 
change in the overall breakdown of philosophical disciplines, 
but metaphysics itself appears to have the following analysis. 
METAPHYSICS 
M. Generalis 
Ontology 
sense" 
Theology M. Specialis 
~__________ Cosmology 
~ 
"broad sense" 
Anthrol~ 
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The changes introduced can be summarized as follows. 73 
(1) Metaphysics is now more precisely defined by a criterion 
of truth, namely that of necessary, unfalsifiable or unavoid-
able belief. I shall discuss this criterion iri the following 
section. (2) The primary result is that anthropology is no 
longer to be considered part of metaphysics since, although 
unavoidable to the individual, its statements are strictly 
contingent and falsifiable as such, and especially for God. 
(3) This, however, would leave us with a metaphysics which 
no longer provides lithe full truth about human existence,1I 
and which violates the general definition of an analysis of 
faith. Ogden, therefore, introduces a distinction between 
II me taphysics in the broad sense ll or lIintegral existential 
truthll and II me taphysics in the strict sense ll which is concerned 
only with necessary truth. 
Aside from the above line of thought there is a second 
which also introduces some changes. (4) Ogden's increased use 
of process categories in relation to God and the world has 
resulted in a breakdown in the distinction between ontology 
and theology. 
Ontology is also theology in the sense that its 
constitutive concept II rea lity as such ll necessarily 
involves the distinction/correlation between the 
one necessarily existing individual and the many 
contingently existing individuals and events. 
Conversely, theology can only be ontology, in the 
sense that its constitutive concept IIGod ll necessarily 
requires that the implied distinction/correlation 
between God and the world be i9~ntical with that 
involved in II rea lity as such. 1I 
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(5) Likewise, and for the same essential reason, ontology 
cannot be completely separated from cosmology. Reality as 
such is identical with God-and-the-world. (6) The result of 
(4) and (5) is that the distinction between metaphysica 
generalis and metaphysica specialis disintegrates. If the 
world is,in a sense yet to be clarified here, to be understood 
as God's body, then the most general features of reality just 
are the features of God (and the world), and neither have any 
special and therefore less general ones. 
What is left unclear in this revised understanding of 
metaphysics is the position of anthropology. It's centrality 
to faith demands its inclusion as an equal, whereas its avowed 
contingency forbids it. And yet the puzzle is that man must 
surely be included in the total reality of God-and-the-world 
which is necessary.75 
We have now had, in a number of instances, occasion to 
refer to the truth criterion and the notion of verification 
within metaphysics. I must now turn to that topic in detail. 
3. Metaphysics and Truth 
Introduction. - The notion of truth for metaphysics is 
doubly important in Ogden's system. For, as has become clear, 
it serves as a criterion not only for philosophical truth, but 
also for theological truth, since the latter is included in 
the former. Thus it bears the weight of the entire system. 
As a result, one might expect Ogden to have spent more 
time on the subject than he has. Although he has not ignored 
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it, the statement that he has made lacks something in the 
way of careful exposition. As a result, this section may 
leave the reader with some feelings of vagueness, but I shall 
try to live up to the commentator's ideal of being at least 
a little clearer than the original. 
Factual versus metaphysical. - The question of truth 
begins with a distinction between the statement of fact and 
the statements of metafact. The level of factual truths 
divides into the purely empirical, those based solely on the 
information of the senses, and the existential, or those 
based on our awareness of reality in a broader sense.?6 
Ogden provides at least three distinctions to charac-
terize the factual level over against the metaphysical. First, 
factual statements areontic, while metaphysical ones are 
ontological.?? The former are concerned to describe actual 
facts while the latter are intended to describe factuality. 
The difference, then, is at least one of the level of descrip-
tions of the general features of what is observed. 
The second distinction is that of contingent versus 
necessary. One shudders to even bring this up for all of the 
harrowing problems it involves and I shall avoid here going 
much beyond the few remarks Ogden makes. The distinction is 
explained as having reference to that which must exist versus 
that which can exist. It is, therefore, a distinction of 
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modal status, not merely logical. Ogden refers to contingent 
and necessary states of affairs as well as truths, but does 
not explain their relationship.78 
I must, however, immediately add a caution. There are, 
as we have said, two senses of II me taphysics ll and the contin-
g e n t / n e c e s s a r y d i! S tin c t ion a p p 1 i e son 1 y tom eta p h y sic sin the 
strict sense. Metaphysics in the broad sense includes anthro-
pological statements about my own existence, which, however 
unavoidable for the individual are nevertheless contingent. 
Thus, there is an understanding of metaphysics for which it 
is not true that all of its statements are recognizable by 
being necessary. It is also true that Ogden does not claim 
the reverse, namely that all necessary statements are meta-
physical. 
The third distinction between factual and metaphysical 
is that of falsifiable versus unfalsifiable. Again, with this 
distinction the qualification regarding the two senses of 
II me taphysics ll is relevant. Anthropological statements, including 
many of the typical claims of (Christian) theology are existen-
tially falsifiable, although unavoidable, since they II cou ld 
conceivably be false. 1I79 But in the strict sen.se metaphysical 
statements are in no way subject to falsification. 
The criterion Qf truth ~ metaphysics. -
What, then, is the criterion of metaphysical truth? 
I submit that it is the criterion of unavoidable 
belief or necessary application through experience . 
... . they are the statements which would necessarily 
apply through any of my experiences .... 80 
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Ogden makes similar statements in other places, but their 
meaning is anything but clear. His declarations that metaphysical 
statements are not falsifiable by individual facts that may not 
support them,82 only complicates understanding. 
We must, I think, begin by reminding ourselves that meta-
physics, as is true of all philosophy and theology, has its 
source in an analysis of faith--an existentialist analysis. 
The result is that Ogden's criterion of truth for metaphysical 
propositions cannot be consistency with observational facts 
since they are not derived from such facts, nor can it be simply 
coherence alone since they must be true to a given content. 
Let me repeat: metaphysical propositions are not, for Ogden, 
higher level generalizations (super-science), or abstractions 
from the data, or descriptive in any observational sense. While 
they have an objective--and hence descriptive--element, they 
are statements of existentialist analyses of a specific content: 
faith. 
The key here is that a proposition about faith must always 
be a statement about the order of the universe--about its mean-
ingfulness. It is thus a statement about facticity not about 
a fact or any collection of facts. I shall illustrate this 
point by two examples of Ogden's discussions. One example 
would be his interpretation of the ontological argument for the 
existence of God. Its real meaning, Ogden holds, is that the 
possibility of any metaphysics is identical with the reality 
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of God. 83 That is, if anything at all is true, then the mean-
ingful structure of the existence of God-and-the-world is 
true. Metaphysical truth is one whole, not a collection of 
individually verifiable statements. That is, one cannot 
separate a theory of reality from the context of the grounding 
of that reality. Faith necessitates both an ordered world 
and a world orderer. This is a unity derived, not from the 
multiplicity of facts but from the simple experience of the 
meaning of facticity. 
A second example brings out this same point. We noted 
in chapter II that Ogden dismisses classical supernaturalism 
as unintelligible to contemporary man. Its real difficulty 
is not its internal, structural incoherence, not its occasional 
incongruency with certain facts, but its inability as a world 
view to meet the requirements of modern thought. That is, 
classical supernaturalism as a whole is an extended analysis 
of faith that does not do justice to the contemporary secular 
criterion that must apply to our understanding of meaning. This 
traditional version of theism fails for Ogden as a metaphysical 
system, again, not because it misconstrues the facts but because 
it does not see the meaning of the universe implied by faith. 
Of the various problems Ogden mentions, the failure of classical 
theism to do justice tothe autonomy of man seems to be its 
primary disqualification. 
These examples will explain Ogden's view that a metaphysical 
statement may remain true even when the facts which relate to 
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it or may support it turn out false. 
Something taken to be a fact may be taken as such 
with reference either to the factual question, 
IIWhat are the facts?1I or to the metaphysical 
question, IIWhat is it to be a fact?1I If in a 
given case, then, the taking should subsequently 
prove to be a mis-taking, any answer given to the 
factual question-must, so far as dependent on the 
mistake, itself be rejected as mistaken or corrected 
accordingly. And yet, significantly, this need not 
be done in the case of an answer to the metaphysical 
question. Even though what is taken as fact should 
prove to have been mistaken, the metaghysical 
answer itself ... may still be correct. 84 
To clarify, Ogden at one point compares the factual/ 
metaphysical distinction to the empirical/existential in 
reference to history.85 Here, too, the meaning of an his~ 
torical event can be relevant, regardless of the historicity 
of the facts from which it is derived, O~den claims. 
Consequently, if empirical-historical research 
should prove that Jesus did not in fact say or do 
what he is taken to have said or done, this need 
not in the least affect the truth of what the 
Christian witness of faith asserts, as distinct 
from what it assumes. 86 
In the same way the metaphysician can assume certain 
facts to be true in order to learn from them in their facti-
city, without asserting their truth or depending on it. That 
there is a ground of meaning does not depend on the statements 
of Jesus that there exists a God who as father and creator 
girves meaning to lives and things. That there is a meaningful 
order is known to us apart from and before the knowledge of 
individual facts. It is the metaphysical knowledge of existen-
tialist experience that tells us how to coordinate and understand 
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the facts, not the reverse. I take this to be the meaning of 
IInecessary application through experience. 1I In summary, to 
say that a metaphysical proposition is true is to say the 
following: 
(a) The proposition is part of the analysis of the exis-
tentialist experience of meaning. 
(b) The proposition says something about every possible 
objective or sensory experience, but is not derived 
(in any sense) from any individual or collection of them. 
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D. What is Theology? 
Introduction. - We have now seen that Ogden1s definition 
of philosophy, metaphysics in particular, is that of an eluci-
dation of faith. We turn now to theology. In chapter II we 
concluded that Ogden1s epistemology leads to an identification 
of theology and philosophy. In this chapter we have indicated 
something of the nature of that identity by noting their common 
source and content in faith .. The purpose of thiS section will 
be to define that identity in more detail. 
1. Ogden1s Statements of Definition 
Ogden has frequently given brief statements in definition 
of theology. It will serve as a helpful introduction if I 
quote some of these. 
(1) The task of theology is that of the adequate 
conceptual statement in a given historical situation 
of the existential understanding of God, the world, 
and man, which is given in and with faith in the 
kerygma or proclamation of the Christian church. 
(1958)87 
(2) For what constitutes the essential theological task 
in every historical situation is the adequate con-
ceptual statement in that situation of the under-
standing of human existence which is implied in 
obedient faith in the Christian proclamation. 
(1958)83 
(3) Theological thinking and speaking are a more or 
less distinguishable type or level of thinking and 
speaking about God as apprehended through faith in 
Jesus Christ. (1965)89 
(4) In this sense theology is the particular hermeneutical 
task of so understanding the Christian witness at the 
level of reflective thought that the resulting 
interpretation proves to be fitting tothe essential 
claims of that witness. (1969)90 
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(5) Just as philosophy is the fully reflective under-
standing of our common faith simply as selves, so 
Christian theology, say, is the attempt to become 
fully self-conscious about specifically Christian 
faith. (1971)91 
(6) Thus theology, properly so called, is the deliberate, 
methodical, and reasoned attempt to determine what is 
meant by the Christian witness of faith and whether 
or not this witness expresses, as it claims to do 
the ultimate truth about human existence. (1975)92 
2. The Method of Theology 
Ogden has repeatedly emphasized that theology is a type 
of knowledge continuous with, but on a different level than 
faith. It differs from the spontaneous form by being reflec-
tive, deliberate, methodical, reasoned, sustained, and specia-
lized. 
It has already been indicated that theology, as philosophy, 
is the result of existentialist knowledge, a form of awareness 
that shares characteristics of both objective sense-based and 
internal existential forms. 
Theology is objectifying in two senses. 93 First, it 
shares with sense knowledge the fact of external direction. 
It is concerned with reality as distinct from ourselves. 
As such, it has to do only in an indirect way with authenticity. 
This is clearly distinguished from existential knowledge which 
is exclusively self-understanding. 
But secondly, theology is objectifying in the sense of 
being IIderived rather than original, peripheral rather than 
centra 1 ,11 94 and thus has the cha racter of detachment and 
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disinterest. It is a type of knowing that is not pure intuition. 
It is not immediate, but goes beyond personal encounter to 
include some level of cognitive analysis of that which is 
not self. 
As objectifying, theology always runs the risk of 
becoming mythology. As our diagram on page 84 illustrates, 
theology is placed well at the objective end of the existen-
tialist continuum, and it will always be tempting simply to 
treat God as one more object among objects and to pattern our 
forms of expression after the scientific knowledge which our 
culture inclines us to think of as the only exact and respect-
able kind. To do this is to fall prey to the same temptation 
as the ancient Greeks or the writers of the New Testament, 
despite the greater sophistication of our scientific system. 
Theology is held back from this danger in that, as exis-
tentialist knowledge, it has also the characteristics of purely 
existential understanding. As Ogden puts is, it objectifies 
as subject not as object. 95 
3. Theology and Truth 
Perhaps the most significant result of theology's 
objectivity is that its statements clearly have truth-value. 
The nature of theological truth, particularly in relation to 
scientific truth, is spelled out most explicitly in Ogden's 
IIFalsification and Belief ll (1974). 
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Ogden sees two main positions that have been taken in 
attempting to settle the question of theological truth vis-a 
vis factual or scientific truth. 96 The first is to present 
theology and science as representing distinct logical types. 
Thus, no conflict could ever develop since their utterances 
serve very different functions and any apparent contradictions 
are the result of misunderstanding one or another's intentions. 
In no case can one be used to cast doubt on or falsify the 
other. 
The second position argues that science and theology 
both belong tothe same logical type, but that conflict is 
unlikely since they both have their source in the same com-
mitment to understanding. 97 For this view, theological state-
ments have no special problem of verification since they 
share with many scientific utterances the character of being 
beyond empirical demonstration, since neither are strictly 
observational. When there is clear conflict on the level of 
particulars there will be no real reason to prefer the claim 
of science. Rather will the problem have to be arbitrated in 
the same way as any intrascientific dispute is settled. 
In fact, the claims of theology may often be preferable due to 
their greater scope. 
Despite the obvious price, Ogden chooses the first type 
of position. The price to be paid is the inevitable assertions 
of doubt as to theology's cognitive status. His assignment 
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of theology to existentialist knowledge, while science belongs 
to the objective level, already commits Ogden to the position 
that they are of different logical types. How then does he 
rescue theology's cognitive status? 
The problem is solved first by introducing two notions 
of falsifiability: empirical and existential. 98 Empirical 
falsification pertains to 'those· statements' whose truth can 
be setted strictly by sensory observation. Existential 
falsification, relevant to theology, applies to statements 
whose truth claim can be decided by the IInonsensuous experience 
of our own existence ll rather than such experience as we may 
have through our senses. 99 
Statements that fall into this category are those 
concerning our perception of our own existence, as well 
as our existence in relation to others and the world around 
us. This category includes especially those central utterances 
relating to the authenticity of our existence. 
There are, of course, some statements of theology, part-
icularly in scripture, which are subject to simple empirical 
falsification, including many which we regard as mythological, 
although these are to be treated primarily by demythologization, 
due to their true intentions. lOO 
This, however, still does not exhaust the varieties of 
theological expression. In fact, nothing has yet been said 
of those statements which are more properly theological, 
namely those about God himself, his existence, attributes, 
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and activity.101 And furthermore, since there is a sense in 
which all theological statements are not only existential but 
also about God,102 there is therefore a sense which one can 
give to them that is not open to any sort of falsification. 
Although they cannot be dealt with either empirically 
or existentially, statements about God, using language 
analogous to expressions about the human self, must, never-
theless, be justifiable in some sense, or else they would 
be non-cognitive. 
If theological statements not only express faith 
but also assert something about the divine reality 
in which faith understands itself to be based, then 
the question of how they are to be rationally 
justified is an altogether appropriate question. 103 
The clue to dealing with statements about God is provided 
by the fact that they both have reference to objective states 
of affairs and are true necessarily. Thus, they must be 
of the same logical type as metaphysical statements generally. 
Let me add Ogden's warning: 
Please notice that I have not said theological 
assertions simply are metaphysical assertions .... 
lY1y point, rather, isthat the class to which 
theological assertions logically belong is the 
general class of metaphysical assertions and that, 
therefore, the kind of rational justification to 
which they are open is the kind generically 
appropriate to all assertions of this logical class. 104 
We can, then, at this point simply refer our discussion 
of the justification of theological statements back to the 
last section concerning the statements of metaphysics. 
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4. Theology as Included in Metaphysics 
We have seen that theology shares with philosophy a common 
source, content, method and logical type. The discussion of 
metaphysics has indicated that their identity is to be under-
stood by way of inclusion. 
Ogden's remarks are frequently confusing, because in some 
places he treats philosophy and theology as separate and con-
trasting disciplines. This can be explained, I suggest, by 
noting that the specific content of theology, that is, the 
ground of meaning, occurs at two levels within the scope of 
philosophy. It appears first in the very abstract and general 
discussion of ontology, although in categories generalized 
beyond the specifically theological. It also appears, however, 
as a metaphysica specialis. At this level the more concrete 
terminology of "God, "authenticity," "revelation," etc. is 
possible. Within this general or philosophical theology there 
are also the particular theologies, such as the Christian with 
its even more specialized terminology (e.g. "Trinity," 
II redemption," and IIScripture"). 
This twofold division of metaphysics, therefore, allows 
theology to be included within philosophy and yet be dis-
tinguishable as the more specific and less general discipline. 
As such, theology is closer to life. At one point Ogden says 
For the philosopher, ordinarily, God is less the 
answer to the existential question of the ultimate 
worth of his own life than the answer to the more 
reflective guestion of the ultimate coherence of 
l Ot 105 rea 1 y ... 0 
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Thus, more specific analyses faith will tend to be 
closer to the existential pole of knowledge and more immedia-
tely relevant to one's experience. Nevertheless, what Ogden 
appears to offer as a distinction between philosophy and theo-
logy in terms of function, is almost fully taken back by his 
position that the intellectual and existential questions are 
really.one and the same and that no person can ever be just 
a philosopher. 
God-talk is existential talk--talk about the mystery 
of our own existence and all existence within the 
ultimate reality whence we come and whither we go 
and which therefore determines, finally, whether 
or in what way the course of our life as any abiding 
meaning. 106 
In this chapter we have pulled together Ogden's definition 
of faith, philocophy and theology as they are derived from his 
epistemology. 
Faith, for Ogden, is the unavoidable confidnece in the 
meaning of one's life and environment which is part of existen-
tialist knowledge. Philosophy is the general analysis of the 
i.lnplications of faith. Its central component is theology, the 
specific analysis of the ground of meaning, that is, God. Thus 
Ogden sees theology as a specification within philosophy. It's 
concern is a particular aspect of the analysis of the experience 
of meaning: What grounds or explains it? That theology must 
be identified within philosophy follows, as we saw in chapter 
II from the results of demythologizing. That both find their 
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content in the analysis of faith, follows, Ogden thinks, from 
the very possibility and nature of existentialist knowledge. 
There is another argument for the identify of philosophy 
and theology to be discerned in Ogden's system. In this case 
the argument depends on some of central tenets of Ogden's 
metaphysics, particularly the nature of God's action in rela-
tion to the universe. It will thus be necessary in the following 
chapter to briefly trace Ogden's doctrine of God and the rationale 
for a choice of process categories. I shall then be able to 
state the second argument for the identity of philosophy and 
thelogy. 
IV. THE METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENT 
A. The Central Content of Theology and 
Philosophy 
B. The Doctrine of God 
C. God's Action as Revelation 
D. Summary: The Relationship of Theology 
and Philosophy 
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Introduction. - We are now in a position to discuss the 
core content of Ogden's system of theology-philosophy as it 
follows from the concept of an analysis of faith, and ultim-
ately from his epistemology. 
We have already established that unavoidable faith implies 
the existence of God. The first task of this chapter will be 
to develop Ogden's argument for the theocentricity of theology-
philosophy. This, in turn, leads to his theory of analogy. 
The way has then been prepared for a discussion of the actual 
nature of God and the resulting concept of revelation. 
This is a rather circuitous route but it is necessary to 
give us Ogden's full position regarding the identity of theo-
logy and philosophy. I argued in chapter II that Ogden's 
epistemology, in particular the consistent application of 
demythologization, makes the identity necessary since there 
can be no exception to the existential interpretation of his-
torical events. Thus theology cannot claim a unique, objective, 
divine intervention in history as its separating criterion. 
In this chapter I shall argue that Ogden is committed to 
the identity by his metaphysical position, in particular as 
it concerns the nature of God's action. This also provides us 
with Ogden's criterion of revelation which allows him to 
identify the right philosophy with Christian theology. 
A. The Central Content of Theology and Philosophy 
Bultmann's position. - Ogden's argument is best understood 
153 
in the context of an argument against Bultmann1s christo-
centric system. Ogden reduces this system to two basic 
points: 
(1) Christian faith is to be interpreted exhaustively 
and without remainder as man1s original possibility 
of authentic historical (geschichtlich) existence as 
this is more or less adequately clarified and conceptu-
alized by an appropriate philosophical analysis. 
(2) Christian faith is actually realizable, or is a 
IIpossibility in fact,1I only because of the particular 
historical (historisch) event Jesus of Nazareth, which 
is the originative event of t~e church and its dis-
tinctive word and sacraments. 
Thus, Christ is seen as an ultimately necessary historical 
event in that in him man1s original and inherent possibility 
is realized. 
The apparent anthropocentricity of demythologized theology. -
Ogden has stated frequently that, on at least a superficial 
level, theological talk is about man. Note the fo.llowing 
quotations: 
All theological statements are, directly Or 
indirectly, existential statements and ... there 
are serious dangers in speaking as though only 
some such statements are existential, while others 
have to do not with man but with God and his 
action. 2 
The question of faith necessarily presupposed by 
the Christian witness and by faith in the God 
whom it attests is, at bottom, the universally 
human question of the true understanding of our 
existence. 3 
By definition the analysis of faith is anthropocentric 
on one level because faith is always man1s faith. Existentia-
list analysis is the self studying itself. 
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Bultmann, however, wishes to go beyond this. By con-
structing an incarnational theology he can claim that, in 
fact, theology is always christocentric since everything 
that it says about man's possibilities, it says because of, 
and actually about, Christ. 
The false christocentricity Qf theology. - Ogden has 
denied the consistency of Bultmann's move for the following 
three reasons. a) It is exegetically inaccurate. In Christ 
Without Myth Ogden presents a fairly extensive treatment of 
the exegetical soundness of Bultmann's position, arguing in 
three pOints. 4 First, the New Testament pictures every 
individual as ultimately and totally responsible before God. 
Ogden cites Paul in Romans 1:20 as an indication of this 
contention. Here it is made clear that all men at all times 
have been able to relate to God, thus fulfilling their auth-
enticity, and were therefore responsible and capable of acting 
on that basis. There is, therefore, no need for a specific 
historical event to make redemption possible other than the 
IIprimordial revelation ll which God gave of himself in creation. 
Thus Ogden argues that natural revelation is sufficient for 
man, and any direct revelation in the person of Christ, though 
perhaps helpful, is completely unnecessary. 
Secondly, Ogden affirms that the New Testament knows of 
no other basis for man's salvation than God the Father. 
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I Corinthians 15:24-28 makes it perfectly plain that God is 
not only the source but also the goal of all creation as well 
as redemption. Ogden does not see Christ in this picture in 
any significant way. Thus he resists the general Protestant 
position that the scriptures are christocentric and holds, 
rather, that they are theocentric: 
Unless it is made clear not only that II we are 
Christ's,1I but that IIChrist is God'sll (I Cor. 
3:23; cf. 11:3), that is, unless the theocentric 
basis and sanction of IIchristocentrism ll is 
explicitly acknowledged, emphasis Qn-~esus Christ 
can be a snare and a delusion and a mere travesty 
of authentic apostolic faith. Contrary to 
Bultmann, who, significantly, offers no scriptural 
support for his claim, the New Testamane does not 
affirm that in Christ our salvation IIbecomes --
possible. 1I It affirms, rather, that in him what 
has always been possible now IIbecomes manifest ll ... 5 
Thirdly, Ogden suggests that even Christ himself, in 
Matthew 25:31-46, taught that the final condition for salvation 
lay not in the confession of himself as Lord, or of faith in 
him at all, but rather in the simple acceptance of God's 
love. That is, man must understand himself authentically. 
Together, then, the scriptural evidence suggests to 
Ogden that Christ is not lithe Wayll but ~ way. Indeed, God 
is to be found everywhere. He IIsaves man by grace alone in 
complete freedom from any saving 'work' of the kind tradition-
ally portrayed in the doctrines of the person and work of 
Jesus Christ. 1I6 
b) Ogden also argues in his essay, IIBultmann's Project 
of Demythologization and the Problem of Theology and Philosophyll 
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that Bultmann's solution is philosophically impossible. His 
point is simply that a IIpos s ibility in Principle ll as distin-
guished from a IIpos s ibility in factll is meaningless: 
For to say that man has a possibility which cannot 
be realized--and this is all a possibility in 
principle means--is simply to deny that he has 
any such possibility at all. 7 
The objection amounts to this: (1) Bultmann's proposal 
of demythologizing and, underlying this, his existentialist 
historiography, demands that man be capable of authentication 
in genera 1, ei ther by hi s own means or by the grace of God. 
(2) It must be factually possible for all men at all times 
to find authentication. (3) IIpossibility in principle ll is used 
to deny that any man at any time has or even could authenticate 
himself, since it means that apart from the contingent fact 
of Christ, actual (factual) authentication would have remained 
impossible in practice. (4) Thus, either all men before Christ, 
and those since him without knowledge of him, are not men at 
all, or the major premise (1) - (2) is false, or the minor 
premise (3) is false. 
Ogden's argument turns, of course, on the meaning of 
II po S sib i 1 i t yin p r inc i p 1 ell 0 r, i n fa c t, s imp 1 yon the mea n i n g 
of IIpos s ibility.1I For possibility by definition materially 
implies realizability so that IIfactual possibilityll is 
redundant and IIpos s ibility in principle ll either identically 
redundant or internally contradictory. 
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c) Finally, Bultmann's position is methodologically 
inconsistent. This objection is perhaps the most obvious, 
particularly when one states Bultmann's position as Ogden 
does .in the quotation above. 8 Now it may well be that Ogden 
has misunderstood Bultmann, although he argues that we 
would then have to say the same about Barth and Buri. 9 
Nevertheless we are really only interested in Ogden's 
conclusion in terms of its implications within his own 
system. 
Ogden, then, claims that Bultmann is incomplete in the 
manner in which he carries out his demythologization. In 
terms of Ogden's summary of Bultmann's position, he is claim-
ing that (l)contradicts (2). That is, on the one hand Bult-
mann holds that authenticity is open to all men as a result 
of an analysis or recognition of faith. On the other hand, 
however, he asserts that authenticity is unrealizable apart 
from a specific histo~ical event--which remains undemytholo-
gized. Thus, Bultmann maintains christocentricity only by 
failing to complete his project of demythologization. For 
these reasons, then, Ogden denies the truth of Bultmann's 
claim of christocentricity. 
The actual theocentricity Qf theology. - We have already 
examined Ogden1s arguments negatively, but they also have the 
positive function of demonstrating the theocentric nature of 
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theology. Theocentricity is demanded by exegetical considera-
tions, byme universal possibility of salvation within God's 
creation, and it results from a consistent application of 
demythologization and existential reinterpretation. 
Theocentricity, however, leaves Ogden with a serious 
problem: he must provide some means of bridging a linguistic 
gap. As we have already seen, superficially at least, theo-
logical statements are about man, not God. It is this problem 
that leads Ogden to deny the adequacy of Heideggerian exis-
tentialism 10 , and provides the impetus to make use of process 
categories, in order to develop a doctrine of God. 
Ogden's solution to the problem of statements about 
human faith which are also about God is his doctrine of 
analogy. Like most other such doctrines, Ogden's is made 
up of two parts: first, a metaphysical thesis regarding 
the relationship between man and God; and, second, a trans-
lation device that allows us to convert empirical statements 
about man into statements about God without falling prey to 
the need to demythologize. In Ogden's case the first part 
of the doctrine is really his whole metaphysics. We turn then 
to the subject of the core content of metaphysics for two 
reasons. First, it completes our examination of the identity 
of theology and philosophy--now in terms of content--and, 
second, it will enable us to answer the question of how a theo-
logy can have its origin in an analysis of human faith. 
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B. The Doctrine of God 
Introduction. - Along the way we have, of course, given 
a rough indication of the nature~of Ogden's God, but it remains 
to spell it out in detail. In this section I shall first 
examine Ogden's specific God-concept. This will be followed 
by shorter chapters dealing with God's relationship to Christ, 
and to eschatological hope. Finally, I shall develop Ogden's 
account of God's action, in particular as it relates to 
revelation. 
1. A Process Doctrine of God 
Classical versus Neoclassical Theism. - Ogden has, thus 
far, written relatively little concerning his own general 
metaphysics. As we have seen, his epistemology is well developed 
and has been stated quite clearly. With the exception of the 
doctrine of God, Ogden's process metaphysics is limited to 
minor passages in a few of his essays. Beyond this, his 
reader is referred to Hartshorne and Whitehead for many of 
the basic principles of the system. I shall have to be con-
tent here to examine Ogden's reasons for accepting a process 
metaphysics rather than direct arguments for it. That is, 
Ogden accepts a process structure as a whole. It is not 
developed step by step from his basic principles. Rather, 
having rejected classical theism for reasons already discussed, 
Ogden adopts his neoclassical panentheism because, as a total 
system, it best fits the criteria for an adequate theology 
as well as his epistemological principles. 
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In general, Ogden argues that neoclassical theism 
avoids the contradiction and unintelligibility of its 
classical counterpart. 
It is the most adequate reflective account we 
can give of certain experiences in which we all 
inescapably share. 11 
This general point is specified in four ways. 
(1) Neoclassical or process theism alone accounts for 
the ultimacy of the self. 
Ogden insists that the " re formed subjectivist principle" 
indicates not only the subjective starting point or source 
of epistemology but also the primary content of metaphysics. 
We generalize the disclosures of experiences, but these 
disclosures are also experiences of the self. 
The characteristics of classical philosophy all 
derive from its virtually exclusive orientation 
away from the primal phenomenon selfhood toward 
the secondary phenomenon of the y~rld constituted 
by the experience of our senses. 
Ogden argues that this misorientation leads to categories 
such as " su bstance" and nontemporal "being" which are applied 
also to the self. 
As soon, however, as we orient our metaphysical 
reflection to the self as we actually experience 
it, as itself the primal ground of our world of 
perceived objects, this whole classical approach 
is, in the Heideggerian sense of the word, 
Idismantled." 13 
With this point, then, Ogden claims to have disqualified 
all of classical met~physics and established process cate-
gories of " re l a tion", " soc iety," and "event." As we pursue 
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Ogden's concept of God we shall find that this point is also 
the cornerstone of the doctrine of analogy. 
(2) Neoclassical theism alone allows for a truly secular 
view of the autonomy and significance of life in 
the world. 
We have already noted this point as a criticism of classical 
theism. It fails to provide a God who is genuinely related 
to the events and concerns of this world. As such, this 
view must always be unacceptable to modern secular man. 
As we shall see, the neoclassical alternative overcomes this 
by allowing for real and significant relations between God 
and the world. 
(3) Neoclassical theism alone confirms the genuine 
moral significance of man's decisions and actions. 
This, too, we have noted as a criticism of classical super-
naturalism. Its God, says Ogden, is one of static perfection, 
to whom our actions--even our existence--can make no con-
tribution, and therefore have no worth. 
As we noted under (2), however, God's relation to man 
in process thei~m is quite different. Its doctrine of real 
relations as well as its concept of immorrality allows Ogden 
thinks, for the genuine value and significance of human actions. 
(4) Only neoclassical theism meets the double criterion 
of intelligibility to modern man and adequacy to the 
tradition of Christian thought. 
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Classical supernaturalism is hopelessly flawed by internal 
contradictions according to Ogden1s lIantinomies. 1I These 
are already suggested by points (1) through (3). While 
God is absolute, and the tradition insists on that, he 
is so at the expense of relatedness, and both Christian faith 
as well as secular faith insist on that as well. Classical 
theism is therefore both intellectually and lI ex istentially 
repugnant. 1I14 
Ogden claims, however, that a process concept of God, 
linked to his experiential epistemology, provides modern man 
with a system of belief that is both intelligible as well 
as being genuinely Christian in its understanding of faith. 
We turn, then, to Ogden's process metappysics, specifi-
cally his concept of God. Applying the reformed subjectivist 
principle as indicated above, we must start with the content 
of the self's awareness of itself. 
The self and God. - Ogden interprets the classical 
position on the nature of the self as one based onthe 
notions of substance and being. 15 This is due to the classical 
principle that what is most immediate for consciousness, i.e. 
sense experience, indicates most nearly the nature of reality.16 
It only follows that the self should be conceived as a 
special type of substanCe, but always a substance nevertheless. 
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To the neoclassicist, such as Ogden, the primary categories 
are process and becoming. By viewing the self as it is actu-
ally present to us, he sees it as temporal and social. lilt 
is nothing if not a process of change involving the distinct 
modes of present, past, and future." 17 The self exists only 
within and by its social relatedness. It is known only as a 
sequence of present occasions which are "integrated" from the 
pas tan d "a n tic i pat e II the f u t u r e . 18 
God's existence ;s to be conceived as strictly analogous 
to that of the self, because God is not the exception to 
metaphysical principles but rather their eminent example. 19 
He is therefore living, growing, temporal, and related. 
Since, however, he is the eminent example, he is, in a sense 
to be specified, also immutable, eternal, and absolute. 
The reality that is God.~ For Ogden, God is to be under-
stood as dipolar. He is both absolute and relative. I must 
note here again that Ogden does not provide an argument for 
this point directly. He simply assumes the process (read: 
Whiteheadian) ontology that implies this concept of God and is 
content to have shown reasons for accepting that ontology as 
a whole. He does, however, develop the theological content 
that results from this view. It will be simplest to deal with 
each pole of the divine being separately. 
(1) God as Related to All 
It is in enunciating the relative pole of God that Ogden 
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is most opposed to classical theism: 
... We must cease, finally, to ask in what sense, if any, 
that which is absolute can be understood as personal and 
ask, rather, how that which, by analogy with ourselves, 
is genuinely and eminently personal can also be conceived 
as absolute. 20 
It is at this point that neoclassical theism attempts to be 
original in providing a corrective to traditional thought. 
In order to understand clearly God1s relatedness, we must 
explicate how Ogden understands the notion of having a body. 
Direct interaction for the self is limited to lIits own brain 
cells. 1121 The body is the environment in which 11111 am incar-
nate and to which I have direct relations. 22 Ogden even refers 
to the lI others that constitute one1s body,1I23 apparently meaning 
(Whitehead1s) actual entities. It is hard to know how to inter-
pret this except as extreme dualism in which mind is not a 
substance but yet a real process separate from that of the 
body in which it is incarnate. 
God1s being must now be understood in the same way, taking 
into account only that he is the eminent form of being. This 
follows from the position that God is also an actual entity 
subject to the same metaphysical categories. Thus, we must 
say that God1s sphere of interaction is limited only by the 
confines of the universe. The world itself is God1s body.24 
The truth of God is therefore the truth about the total struc-
ture of reality.25 Since, then, all entities are part of his 
body, God must be internally related to them all. There are 
many aspects to this relation which we will consider individ-
ually. 
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(a) Love 
Love is the livery principle of all being." 26 This is to 
be understood in the Whiteheadian sense of the principle of 
relativity, that is, that every actual entity is related either 
by negative or by positive prehension to every other. 
God as the eminent actual entity, therefore, is concerned 
with the being of every other actual entity which is his body. 
This not only has relevance to an individual in terms of 
ultimate present meaning, but also in terms of eschatological 
hope. God's relatedness is one of IIsympathetic participation," 
since he is "synthesizing in each new moment of his experience 
the whole of achieved actuality with the plenitude of possi-
bility as yet unreaJized." 27 
God is thus lovingly involved in co~stantly recreating 
the environment of actual entities. They are, as events, in 
continual process of returning to him. 
(b) Value 
God gives our lives value in two senses. First, as noted 
before, it is he who is responsible for the coming together 
of actual entities which constitute our bodies. He is the one 
responsible for the structure and order which exists. This 
is simply another way of saying that he is "whatever it is 
about this experienced whole that calls forth and justifies 
our orignial and inalienable truth in life's worth." 23 In 
saying this, we have described the whole purpose of God: he 
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alone makes it possible to avoid the conclusion of absurdity. 
Our lives make a difference, they are valuable, because he 
exists. This does not abrogate man's responsibility to 
decide for authentic existence. We must still choose to live 
in light of this God-given meaningfulness. 
Second, he gives our lives eternal value as well. It is 
to him that actual entities return to become eternal objects. 29 
It is in God that our lives make an "imperishable difference" 
and in him that they "find their ultimate justification."30 
(c) Dependence 
Since the world is God's body, for Ogden, God's own reality 
as an actual entity is dependent on the cosmos. 31 This is not 
to be understood in terms of God's existence as such. That 
he is, is dependent on "what actual state of the infinite 
number of states possible for him is in fact actualized."33 
We must take caution in understanding this, however, since 
Ogden also wishes to claim that it is meaningless to assert 
that God was ever without a body, that is, a real cosmos. 34 
Thus, to create is for God necessary, yet any individual world 
is contingent. 35 Thus, there is never more than one necessary 
actua 1 ent i ty. 
We can summarize God's relativity by saying that God is 
not an addition to the world. He is encountered in all experience 
and is immanent in all conception. 36 He is inclusive of all 
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reality, and therefore also of both the actual and the poten-
tia1. 37 
(2) God as Absolute 
Again we can best explicate this idea by indicating its 
various aspects. We shall note in each case that l a bso1ute" 
does not have its classical meaning of infinite. In a dipolar 
concept there can only be absoluteness in terms of relativity, 
i.e. " re 1ative abso1uteness." This will become clear below. 
(a) Absolute in Inclusion 
The basic character of God's absoluteness is given for 
Ogden in hiS all-inclusiveness, a concept which implies not 
only relatedness as mentioned above, but supremacy as well. 
He is all being; to experience at all is to experience God. 38 
God's body is the universe and he is therefore the supreme 
actual entity, emcompassing all, and in that sense absolute. 
It is ultimately this notion of all-inclusion that 
emerges in the characteristics of God below. 
(b) Absolute in Relation 
The absoluteness of relation in God is understood in two 
ways. First, as we have noted before, he is immediately related 
to all entities in the universe in the way human beings are 
related to only those entities which make up their bodies. 
Second, his relations are absolute in that there are 
" no gradations of intimacy"39 among the objects of his attention. 
His relatedness is equal to all actual entities. 
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We should emphasize the fact that God's relations are 
direct. Thus, he is both"affected by all," and affects all. 40 
The former signifies his dependence, the latter his love. 
Since Ogden is thinking of this within the scope of process it 
becomes clear that God is absolute in change: 
So far from being the wholly absolute and immutable 
Being of the classical philosophers, God must really 
be conceived as the eminently relative One, whose 
openness to change contingently on the actions of 
others is literally boundless.~l 
Ogden, then has-a God who is in constant flux. as the actual 
entities which are his body change, and they do this co-caused 
by God and the precedent state,42 so he, in his essence, 
changes with them. Yet in this very fact lies the absolute-
ness of his nature, and thus his "perfection" of relation. 
Whereas the classical notion of perfection was one of 
concurrent actualization of all possible value, for Ogden 
i tis a "d y n ami c maX i mum 0 f po s sib i 1 i tie s , " 43 the s cop e 0 f 
which is constantly changing. At this point, Ogden defers to 
Hartshorne whose main work has been the discovery and eluci-
dation of this neoclassical concept of perfection, primarily 
in his The Logic Qf Perfection. 44 
(c) Absolute in Knowledge 
The concept of absolute knower is not much developed 
in Ogden's writings; nevertheless it should be mentioned here 
in passing. 45 God's "omniscience" is clearly implied in his 
absolute relatedness. "God knows all" means that at every 
stage of the process every existent is within the scope of 
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God's relatedness. 46 Ogden usually tends to think of this 
relation in more fully personal terms as God's absolute love. 
(d) Absolute in Temporality 
If God is absolute in change, then he must also be lithe 
eminently temporal one." 47 Thus, God's perfection, in order 
to remain perfection, is constantly increasing: 
This is so ... because anything we do to advance the 
real good either of ourselves or of one another is 
done quite literally to lithe glory of God," as an 
imperishable contribution to his ever-growing perfec-
t ion, w hi chi s, i n dee d, II the t rue 1 i f e 0 f all. 1148 
We can summarize God's absoluteness by noting that his 
"being related to all others is itself relative to nothing, 
but is the absolute ground of any and all real relationships."49 
Thus, his perfection is a perfect relativity with many 
aspects such as love, value, dependence, knowledge, temporality, 
etc. 
We shall conclude our elucidation of Ogden's God-concept 
by developing it in three areas. In each case Ogden has written 
at least one essay dealing specifically with the topic. Each 
is also an instance where Ogden has been highly creative in 
adapting process philosophy to Christian theism. 
2. God and History 
In this discussion, I am concerned with Ogden's answers 
to two questions. First, what is God's relationship to time? 
Second, what does it mean to affirm that God acts in time? 
God's Temporality. - Ogden takes his cue from the following 
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note in Heidegger's Being and Time: 
It requires no extensive discussion to show that the 
traditional concept of eternity, in the sense of the 
"stationary now" (nunc stans), is drawn from the 
vulgar understanding-Df time and is limited by a 
orientation tothe idea of "constant" presence-on-
hand. If the eternity of God would admit of being 
"construed" philosophically, it could be understood 
only as a more primal and "infinite" temporality. 
Whether the via negationis et eminentiae could offer 
a possible way-to this goal-Would remain uncertain. 50 
The primal understanding of time is that of actually 
creating time by our experiences and relations, not of acting 
in time. Time takes its shape by our continual construction 
of significantly ordered wholes from memory and anticipation. 51 
Since, then, for man temporality is defined by relations and 
his relations are severely limited and finite, his temporality 
itself is restricted. Manis birth is lithe constant reminder 
that there once was when he was not,"52 except as potential. 
In God, however, the limits of relation are lifted. He 
is, therefore, not timeless but radically temporal and, by that, 
eternal. 53 For God, time "exists" as a maximum unlimited by 
space, without beginning or end. But by the same token he 
is never above time in any sense. He knows the future only 
by anticipation of the potential. 
Thus, God creates reality in two senses. First, it exists 
in relation to him and his own personal goals. Second, by his 
inclusiveness God is, in fact, temporalizing reality. 
God i..Q. history. - \lJe are now in a position to understand 
what it means for Ogden's God to act in history. God's action 
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exists on two levels. First, God as originator is the ultimate 
ground of all actual entities. Reality is constituted not 
only by its own subjective aims, but by God's loving, responsive 
decision of inclusion. This, however, is an acting above 
history, just as our decisions to act are not equivalent to 
our bodily actions, but are their ground. 54 
On a second level, however, we can affirm God's action in 
history in two senses. In one sense every creature is an act 
of God. That is, there are not only joint causes on the level 
of decision, but also on the level of actuality. We are, in 
part, self-created, yet always based on God's creation, that 
is, his giving to the event its initial direction. This 
is true in that same way in which the actions of our bodies 
are also our actions. 55 
Although the acts whereby God actualizes his essence 
are his acts and not the acts of the creatures, every 
creature is what it is only by partly reflecting or 
expressing in its action God's own free decisions. 56 
God acts in a second sense as well, namely in events in 
history which uniquely express his character. This does not 
apply to every event in history, although each has the poten-
tial,57 if it chooses to fulfill God's original direction. 
Anytime, however, an act is interpreted as a symbol of God as 
creator or redeemer it becomes God's unique revelational act. 
Other acts are distorted or fragmentary and are God's acts 
only in the first sense described above. 
3. God and Jesus 
Although we have limited ourselves to the areas within 
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the doctrine of God itself, we need at this point to briefly 
clarify Ogden's thinking on the position of Christ in relation 
to God. Both this as well as the last topic will be crucial 
in understanding the concept of revelation with which we must 
deal in the next section. 
We mentioned above that some human events or actions 
within history have a special revelatory character of the 
nature of God and are, therefore, his acts in a special way, 
usually that they are interpreted as fully carrying out God's 
intentions for them. The criterion by which a revelation is 
discerned is both objective and subjective. Referring to the 
revelational function of such characteristic acts, Ogden says: 
This it can do only insofar as its form and structure 
are such that the possibility of selfunderstanding 
they express is in fact the true or authentic under-
standing of human existence.~8 
The objective part of the revelation is its actual content, 
whereas its subjective part is its "fit" or adequacy to our 
existence. 
One of the clear marks of the Christian community is the 
understanding that Jesus is God's decisive act of revelation. 
liThe truth as it is known in Jesus Christ is the only ultimate 
truth to be known anywhere." 59 This obviously rests on Ogden's 
demythologized view of Jesus, particularly of the resurrection. 
It is in Jesus that he sees the ultimate revelation: 
... That all things have their beginning and end in 
God's pure unbounded love, and that it is in giving 
himself wholly into the keeping of this love, 
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by surrendering all other securities, that man 
realizes his authentic life. 60 
Thus, the event that is Jesus, including his teaching, 
is not just a human act, but God's decisive revelation of 
himself. 61 Jesus fully carries out God's intentions for 
authentic human existence. 
In conclusion we should note three characteristics of 
Ogden's view of Jesus as a revelation. (1) The problem of 
the two natures of Jesus is solved somewhat simply for Ogden. 
The reality of Jesus is clearly the reality of God,62 just as 
all actual entities are God's body, yet identifiable as indivi-
dual event. Thus Jesus' dual nature is not unique, . but repre-
sentative of every event. 
(2) Just as Ogden argues against Bultmann's concept of 
Jesus as the actualization of authentic existence on the basis 
of the identity of philosophy and theology,63 so now, armed 
with a more thorough metaphysics, he can reaffirm that Jesus 
represents authentic selfhood,64 in a sense which I shall examine 
in the next section. 
(3) We should note, finally, that for Ogden the decisiveness 
of an act of God does not lie in its historicity, but existen-
tially in our response of faith to it. Faith is concerned 
with the message of Jesus not Jesus himself. 65 
For Ogden, the eschatological hope is our inclusion in God's 
mind as an "eternal object" or memory, and thus as potential 
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for the future. This is what Ogden refers to as the "promise 
of faith.1I55 In a sense, we are already assured of our lI e ternal 
life" by our understanding of our present inclusion in God as 
shown by faith. 
There is, therefore, a solution to the apparent meaning-
lessness of death, for we shall always be of significance in 
God. 57 Even those who refuse total faith in God's love will 
be included in God, although still without true faith. This 
precisely is hell: to be bound to God without faith in his 
love. 58 Thus, God does not deny man's freedom: 
What is given man to decide is not whether he shall 
be the object of God's gracious love; that, to the 
contrary, God alone freely decides. Man's decision 
is only whether he shall accept God's love for him ... 59 
It should be noted that Ogden's understanding of immortality 
is a purely formal one. We retain significance as memories in 
the mind of God, as possibilities or models to be used in fut-
ure goals. Certainly there is no concept here of conscious 
afterlife, let alone of bodily resurrection. This is one point 
where it is particularly difficult to maintain that Ogden 
is within the orthodox Christian tradition, or that he is 
merely demythologizing the New Testament. 
Thi s coneludes the overvi ew of Ogden's doctrine of God. 
My purpose is simply to provide a basis for an examination of 
his view of God's action, revelation in particular. I have 
indicated the metaphysical basis for speaking of God's action 
in history in Ogden's panentheism. This, however, leaves us 
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with a problem. How can we coordinate the notion of God's 
action with the criteria of demythologization? We must be 
able to specify how and why it is possible to speak of God 
acting in history without falling prey to objectifying lan-
guage. We shall then be in a position to understand Ogden's 
metaphysical argument for the identity of theology and 
philosophy, that is, that the notion of decisive revelation 
can be explicated without uniquely theological categories. 
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c. God1s Action as Revelation 
1. The Doctrine of Analogy 
Introduction. - We are now in a position to give a more 
complete answer to the problem of language about God in Ogden1s 
system. Specifically, how can the existentialist analysis of 
faith also be theology? Put simply, the answer is in two parts. 
(1) Since the universe is God1s body, any descriptive statement 
is descriptive of God beyond whatever other content it may 
have. Thus, in Ogden1s IIpanentheismll the metaphysical portion 
of the doctrine of analogy is constituted by the complete 
inclusion of man in God. (2) The linguistic component, that 
is, the translation device, is supplied in the sharing of self-
hood by God and man. The language of the self can be applied 
literally. Let me now expand. 
Analogy Qf selfhood. - Bultmann holds that it is possible 
to speak of God analogically on the basis of univocal elements 
in the concept of human existence and Ogden accepts this view. 70 
By means of an analysis of human existentiality we can lIexpli-
cate the conception of God and of God1s action. 1I71 The actual 
working out of such a theology, however, is lacking in Bultmann. 
It is precisely this theological deficiency in Bultmann 
which Ogden sees as supplied by his process metaphysics. A 
passage quoted in Ogden1s essay for the Hartshorne Festschrift, 
Process and Divinity, will serve as an introduction to his view. 
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... The analogy between God and man "may be used to 
shed light in both directions. On neither side of 
the comparison do we have simple direct, literal 
understanding, or wholly indirect, non-literal 
understanding. Rather, on both sides, we have 
something literal, but inadequate, needing to be 
helped out by the analogy with the other". 72 
This is true, because God is the "Being in which all beings 
are precisely a diversity in unity,"73 and therefore neither 
God nor the self can ever be viewed in strict separation. The 
assertion of "something literal" on both sides implies, although 
Ogden does not develop this until his later essays, that there 
is at least some direct knowledge of God. 
As we have seen, the theoretical basis of analogy is for 
Ogden primary content of theology and metaphysics. Let me 
briefly sketch the basic univocal element in the analogy. 
The univocal element in the man-God analogy is the nature 
of selfhood. We understand God by understanding ourselves: 
i.e. existential analysis is the key to theological analysis. 
For Ogden this is guaranteed by one of the cardinal principles 
of process thought: that God is not the exception to, but the 
paramount example of metaphysical categories. 74 He differs 
only by being the unique and perfect example. 75 
Thus, just as our self is spatial, temporal, and related 
to and dependent on a body, so too, God exists in space, but 
without limits, is infinitely temporal, and related to all 
that is. 
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Ogden's process doctrine of analogy claims success in 
finding a genuine univocal element, thus overcoming the inher-
ent problems of the classical version which, according to 
Ogden, never accomplished its purpose of univocity.76 He 
claims that, since the God of classical theism is infinitely 
different from the universe, no real univocal element is pos-
sible. We have, then, a quite different type of analogy. 
There is an analogical relationship between God and man, but 
on both sides our knowledge as well as our language is, in 
part, direct. This is, of course, an advantage of Ogden's 
paOentheism. Since the world simply ~ God's body--his rela-
tive nature--analogy is, in fact, based on identity. 
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2. Ogden's Concept of Original Revelation 
God'~ action. - It will be helpful to introduce the topic 
of revelation by summarizing the basic points of Ogden's views 
of God's activity in history.77 Our understanding must begin 
with the fact that our knowledge of God comes by way of analogy 
with the human self. 
Particularly essential is the distinction between inner 
and outer actions, that is, between mental acts and overt 
acts. Of these two, it is mental activity that is fundamental. 
Behind all our public acts of word and deed there 
are the self's own private purposes or projects, 
which are themselves the product of action or 
decision ... ; all its outer acts of word and deed 
are but ways of expressing and implementing the 
inner decisions whereby it constitutes itself as 
a self.7~ 
This distinction is then applied to God. The interaction 
of the self's mind and body is analogous to the interaction 
of God and the world. The difference, in addition to the 
absence of finitude, is that God's participation is, if any-
thing, even closer, since his love is boundless. 
The whole world is, so to say, his sense organ, 
and his interaction with every creature is un-
imaginably immediate and direct. 79 
When this conception is clarified in its process backdrop 
the following doctrine emerges. While it is true that each 
state of the world is in part the result of natural. cause and 
effect and, in particular, the free decisions of creatures, 
those decisions are responses to God's initial aim and i~ turn to 
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responded to as potential for God's future choices. 
God's existence is without beginning or end; he simply 
is. ao His boundless love extends to all that is actual. But 
more than that, he includes within himself the possibilities 
that will actualize the future. 81 Thus it is his decisions 
that initiate what will be. 
On the other hand, God includes within his memory all 
that has passed--that is, the past. 82 Whereas the memory of 
the human self is limited and thus preserves only bits and 
Pieces and that only for a short time, God's memory is all-
encompassing and eternal so that nothing is lost. As the 
actual passes into the eternal it becomes part of that from 
which God continually recreates. 
None of this, for Ogden, is meant to rule out human free-
dom,although the precise metaphysical parameters of divine and 
human initiative are not stated. It is meant to back up his 
conclusion that, in some sense, all that happens is the expres-
sion of God's character: it is~ in part, his action. 
God's characteristic action. - The analogy between the self 
and God can be carried a step further. It is true of human 
actions that some are more characteristic than others. That 
is, some of them more fully express our true being. 
Such actions are, as we say, our "characteristic" 
actions, for in them or through them the persons 
we are, are uniquely re-presented or revealed to 
others .... all the other things that we may be 
and do are interpreted by our fellows in terms of 
what they understand to be typically our state-
lSI 
ments and actions. S3 
Just so, some actions and events in this world, which, 
as said, are all God's actions in some sense, most typically 
represent the truth of his being. This occurs primarily in 
those actions usually denoted as religious, in which man 
seeks to express the true meaning of his existence. S4 
That is to say that man as the being who can 
understand his existence and can express its meaning 
symbolically through word and deed can, at least in 
principle, also re-present or speak for God. Insofar 
as what comes to expression through his speech and 
action is the gift and demand signified by God's 
transcendent action as Creator and Redeemer, he 
re-presents not only his own understanding of God's 
action, but God's action itself .... , in this case, 
man's action actually ~ God's action. S5 
Thus, there are some historical events and actions which, 
because they express man's authentic existence, are truly 
God's characteristic acts. Nevertheless, they remain also 
man's free acts as his deliberate choices to carry out God's 
initiative. 
The QQssibility of revelation. - We can now see how 
certain historical events carry with them the possibility of 
being, in fact, revelation. At this point we must distinguish 
between two kinds of revelatory events: original and special. 
Ogden follows, here, the long-standing theological tradition, 
but, as will be seen, his definitions, particularly of special 
revelation, are quite different. S6 
Ogden sometimes identifies original revelation as the 
content of faith. It is the recognition of meaning in life, 
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and its grounding, that every man possesses ~ man. It is the 
"or iginal presentation of God to man which is the constitutive 
event of all human existence;" 87 hence, the universal ity of 
religion. At one point he speaks of original revelation as 
lithe primal disclosure of reality as such as received somehow 
through our common faith as selves." 88 In his essay liOn 
Revelation" (1975) he is more explicit than in any other 
place on the general topic of original revelation: 
One is led to conclude that the only necessary 
but also sufficient, condition of the possibility of 
authentic faith is ... an event that never fails to 
take place as soon and as long as there is any 
distinctively human being at all. 89 
Implied here is an aspect of Ogden's position which he 
has nowhere developed, perhaps because it is hidden, in a 
sense, until the metaphysical implications of the system are 
fully drawn out. If every act is, in part, God's, then it 
follows that epistemic acts are his as well. And clearly 
the epistemic act of faith, that is, the recognition of meaning 
is a characteristic act which can therefore take on a revelatory 
function. 
Therefore, once one understands the doctrine of God, 
one can recognize a metaphysical analogy to the purely 
epistemological (anthropological) doctrine of faith. It is 
not that faith is itself a revelation. To talk thus would be 
to fall prey to the temptation of myth. The correspondence 
between faith and revelation must be understood as that between 
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human action and Godls action. They are an analogous pair, 
but, for Ogden, the divine action can never be the object of 
sensory experience. We know it to be the case only after we 
have developed the metaphyiics of God. 
I must repeat that this analogy between faith and revela-
tion is not explicit in Ogden. It appears, however, to be 
the most consistent way of extending the system. 
3. Special Revelation 
The definition. - Ogdenls argument from analogy for the 
uniqueness of particular human actions allows for a second 
kind of revelation. While it is true that every act is Godls 
in a limited sense, and also that each event that constitutes 
a human history that are characteristically representative in 
a special way. That is, they very clearly display Godls central 
attributes of love and concern as we have previously discussed 
them. 
The existence of many different religions with conflicting 
claims is clear evidence that some authentically intended 
actions fail to represent the divine character, while others 
do so in a fragmented or distorted way.gO 
True representation can take place under two conditions. 
First, there are those actions which are intended by man to 
display authenticity. 
The possibility of bein~ such a special act of God 
is peculiarly open to those uniquely human events 
in which man expresses his understanding of the 
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ultimate meaning of his existence through symbolic 
speech and action. 91 
In addition, there are those events and actions, apart 
from any intentions, which are received as authentic 
representations. This, of course, can happen with any action, 
event, or creature,92 dependent only on the individual IS 
discernment. 
It is important to note that special revelation for 
Ogden is always conditioned by the discernerls subjectivity. 
That is, there are no events in history that are simply Godls. 
As we have seen, Ogden must regard any such claim as ante-
cedently implausible and in need of demythologization. 
Every event is at the same time natural and supernatural. 
It is always both part of the natural and/or human causal net-
work as well as the result of divine initiative. 93 Since, how-
ever, its divine aspect and function are known only by faith 
in meaning and never objectively, its character as revelation 
is dependent on the recipient. He cannot, for Ogden, know 
revelation until he understands neoclassical metaphysics, for 
that is the only assurance that revelation takes place, as 
well as the source of the only criterion for judging those 
especially characteristic events. 
Are there necessary special revelations? - At this point 
the question of the necessity of special revelation to com-
plete the original may well seem to be an insignificant 
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intratheological issue. In fact, however, it is central to 
Ogden's argument for the identity of theology and philosophy.94 
It will be simplest if I confine my remarks to the special 
revelation claimed to be present in Jesus, since, although a 
few more general remarks can be found, Ogden himself is primarily 
concerned with clarifying this one instance. 
The crux of Ogden's position is this: Jesus, as an example 
of God's special revelation, provides us with no understanding 
that was not already available to us in original revelation 
simply as human beings. 95 Original revelation is sufficient 
for authentic existence; it is universal in that it is present 
in every act and event; it is unavoidable by its continuous 
presence to every human being; finally, it is naturally con-
stitutive of human existence as such; there is therefore no 
doubt as to its presence to all men. 
Why then should special revelation be important to Ogden, 
especially after his rejection of Bultmann's position? It 
is important, he holds, not in that it reveals new content, 
but in that it reveals a possibility to be, in fact, actualized. 
What Christian revelation reveals to man is 
nothing-new, since such truths as it makes explicit 
must already be known to him implicitly in every 
moment of his existence. But that this revelation 
occurs does reveal something new to him in that, 
as itself event, it is the occurrence in his history 
of the transcendent event of God's love. 96 
Special revelation, then, is necessary only in one narrow 
sen s e . As 0 g den ph r as e sit, it i slim e d i ate 1 y n e c e s sa r y . 1197 
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By this he means that, although Jesus makes nothing possible 
that was not already open to man, it is only here that we 
find it lived-out in a fully explicit form. He does not 
create new possibilities but rather objectifies and "re-
presents" 98 a possibility already present. Ogden uses the 
hy ph e nat e d II r e - pre sen t s II to i n d i cat e jus t t his con c e p t t hat 
the gift which God has always extended to man is, in Jesus, 
simply offered fully realized. 99 
There is, then, a sense in which special revelation, 
particularly the Christian one, is necessary but it is not 
an epistemological sense, that is, it provides no exclusive 
knowledge. There is neither light nor saving act in Christ 
that is not already present in Godls love to every man. lOO 
The decisiveness of Christ. - We have not, however, said 
the last word on Ogdenls view of the Christ-event. The final 
question has to be concerning the truth of the revelation in 
Christ. Although it is not ultimately necessary--and theology 
therefore has no information or source not shared by philosophy--
Ogden does hold that it is the final truth about human authen-
ticity. 
The truth as it is known in Jesus Christ iOlthe 
only ultimate truth to be known anywhere. 
There is no doubt that Ogden is quite clear on this 
point of the decisive truth of theChristian claim. 102 
Unfortunately Ogden is not very specific as to which criteria 
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are sufficient to judge the decisiveness of the Christ-event 
and thereby the truth of christianity. He does at one point 
argue that Christ1s preaching, his acts of healing, his 
willingness to associate with sinners as well as his death 
are all decisive symbolizations of divine love and acceptance. 103 
Generally, however, his approach is to state that the 
existentially interpreted Christian kerygma is expressable 
in philosophical language and thus is verifiable in metaphysical 
statements. The conclusion of this argument for the identity of 
theology and philosophy lies, then, in Ogden1s position on the 
relationship between specifically Christian theology and general 
metaphysics. Let me first summarize the argument to the point. 
Ogden will infer the identity of theology and philosophy from 
the absence of any unique content. That is, while some revela-
tions are more complete than others, no single event displays 
a content beyond what is already available to every man. Two 
reasons for this position can be found in Ogden. The first is 
that original, general revelation is complete. Simple unavoid-
able faith already knows the possibility of authentic existence. 
Second, in Ogden1s panentheistic system every event is God1s 
action. This eliminates the notion of a singular incarnation 
in the person of Jesus--or anyone else. What then is the 
importance of specifically Christian theology in Ogden1s system? 
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4. Universal and Particular Theology 
Introduction. - It is extremely difficult to pin Ogden 
down on the question of the possibility of general theology 
(i.e. metaphysica specialis) and the status of specifically 
Christian theology. One finds, in fact, three apparently 
inconsistent emphases. First, Ogden almost always refers 
simply to theology in general. However, he also explicitly 
claims that Christian theology is only one among many possible 
forms and that theology exists only in its particular varieties. 
Finally, there is the clear implication that New Testament 
theology, using existential and process forms of expression, 
is the true understanding of human existence. Let me, then, 
document these points and attempt to correlate them. 
Ogden's statements. - I shall begin with a selection of 
passages from Ogden's writings. As to the first point, 
Ogden's definitions of theology are almost invariably general. 
Among his actual attempts to define only one refers to speci-
fically Christian theology, although frequently there is mention 
of the tradition of Christian witness. This is, of course, just 
the curiosity to be explained here. In what sense is the 
Christian analysis of the ground of faith tantmount to theology 
in general? 
As for the particularity of Christianity, note the 
following: 
189 
(1) The evidence to which theological reflection must 
attend cannot be restricted solely to the 
specifically Christian tradition, however 
broadly construed, or for all its decisive 
importance. 104 
(2) Religion never exists in general, ... , but always 
only as a religion, which has its origin and principle 
in some particular occasion of insight, whether 
"hierophany" or Irevelation."105 
(3) Of course, the claim of Christianity to be the 
decisive witness to that final truth is exactly 
that - a claim; and whether or not it can be vin-
dicated is the crucial question which it is the 
task of theology to answer. 106 
These quotes point out clearly that Ogden regards the 
Christian interpretation of faith as only one among many 
traditions. Furthermore, precisely because of the identity 
of theology within philosophy as a cognitive enterprise, there 
is a question of truth. That is, although the varying claims 
may contribute to each other to some extend, they also conflict. 
As for Ogden's answer to that last question--does Christian 
theology provide the true analysis of human existence?--note 
these statements. I want especially to focus on the use of three 
terms: "adequate," "decisive representation," and "right philo-
sophy." 
(1) Therefore, the important question is never so much 
whether a man has a theology but which theology he 
has, i.e. whether the theology which he holds is a 
really adequate theology .... 
... . What makes any theology an adequate theology 
is the extent it states directlD7and clearly 
precisely what faith means .... 
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(2) The ultimate tests of truth are something other than 
the principles of a supposedly "pure" reason. They 
are themselves matters of faith, and so are grounded 
in that original revelation of God to mankind of which 
the Ch~isti5g faith claims to be the decisive repre-
sentatlon. 
(3) Inevitably ... there is the wide variety of religious 
insights and traditions, each with its claim to be 
true. But this only intensifies man1s need for a 
special revelation of God1s gift and demand that 
will be decisive - that will objectify his existence 
in a full and adequate way .... 
... . Insofar, then, as such objectification is in 
turn necessary ... it is by no means only Christians 
for whom the re-presentation of God in Jesus Christ 
can in a sense be claimed to be necessary.l09 
(4) The "right" philosophy for Christian theology is not 
Heidegger1s analysis of man alone, but his analysis 
in conjunction with Hartshorne1s dipolar doctrine of 
God. 110 
Christian theology is true. - It remains to draw the 
inferences from these and many similar passages in Ogden. 
His position can, I think, be summarized as follows. (1) There 
is a general analysis of human faith as such. Ogden is somewhat 
ambiguous as to the name of this discipline. It is referred 
to as "philosophy,"lll "metaphysics,"112 "theistic metaphysics,"113 
"philosophical theology,"114 "natural theology,"115 and apparently 
simplylltheolqgy~116. The only suggestion of some differentiation 
in terms of content is that philosophy, as the broader concept, 
focuses more on the nature of faith, whereas metaphysics and 
theology (and their variations) are concerned more specifically 
with the nature of God, as known in faith.lll We have, however, 
already seen that God and faith cannot really be separated as 
contents or objects (better: subjects) of study. In any case 
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metaphysics, which does focus on God, is said to be the 
"noncompressible core" of philosophy. lIB 
(2) The existential activity of religion does not occur 
as a general phenomenon, though it is universal, but only as 
the encultured expression of particular revelations. These 
insights account for a variety of expressions of faith. 
(3) Particular theologies, including Christian theology, 
are attempts to be reflective within a particular religious 
tradition or understanding of faith. 119 The function of the 
Christian theologian is principally to reflect on the Chris-
tian tradition of faith, in particular as it is grounded in 
the New Testament. An important characteristic, however, of 
every major theological tradition is its claim to exclusive 
truth. 120 Each claims to be the "decisive representation of 
the ultimate truth of human existence." 121 
(4) Christian theology likewise includes a claim to final 
truth. Ogden clearly holds this claim to be borne out, due to 
the decisiveness of Jesus as a special revelation. As a result, 
Christian theology and theology in general are ultimately ident-
ical. 
(5) Christian revelation, that is, the message of the 
New Testament, when properly understood or demythologized, 
turns out to be identical in meaning and best expressed by an 
existential anthropology and a process theology. This construct 
can then be viewed as the right philosophy or metaphysics and 
and distinction between theology and philosophy disintegrates. 122 
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( 6) 0 g den use s II rig h til, II t rue", and II a de qua tell, i n t e r-
changeably, all three in the sense of necessary application 
through all experience. To be the right philosophy for a 
true theology is to be the total analysis of faith that is 
unavoidably believab1e. 
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D. Summary: The Relationship of Theology and 
Philosophy 
Introduction. - It is now time to take stock of where we 
have come in this essay. My stated intention was to say some-
thing about the relationship between philosophy and theology 
by explicating the views of Schubert Ogden. We have noted 
that both share in using the method of existentialist analysis, 
although, as a specialized tradition, theology--Christian theo-
~--employs the method of demythologization and existential 
interpretation in addition. We have noted that both share the 
same content: the understanding of faith as the existence of 
meaning in life as grounded in the reality of God. We have 
also examined Ogden's definitions of theology and philosophy 
as being both the existentialist reflection on the nature of 
faith and have noted particularly their identical logical status 
and method of justification as metaphysical statements. 
In conclusion it remains to summarize Ogden's position on 
the relationship of theology and philosohpy. I shall do so by 
discussing the topic separately under the categories of method, 
content, source, intention, and logical type. This will give 
a better overview of the specific issue, unhampered, as it has 
been up to now, by the necessity of staying with the logical 
order of development. 
1. The Methods of Theology and Philosophy 
It would appear on the surface that Ogden sharply delineates 
the method of theology from that df philosophy. Theology is an 
194 
historically conditioned enterprise. It exists within a speci-
fic tradition and finds its source in a specific historical 
event and person. As a result, its main concern appears to 
be the interpretation of that tradition into statements of 
existential import and its method is thus that of decoding 
and recoding--demythologization and existential interpretation. 
Philosophy, on the other hand, is direct analysis of human 
faith. It is self-understanding. As such, it employs the method 
of existentialist analysis: it observes itself as subject. 
In fact, however, the divergence is not nearly so sharp. 
In terms simply of time, the professional theologian may well 
spend the majority in historical interpretation, that is, dis-
covering the present meaning of Scripture. And the professional 
philosopher, for his part, may well spend much or most of his 
time in original reflection. When one, however, seeks to 
discover what is essentially theological activity, one finds, 
in Ogden, that it, too, is selfanalysis. Correspondingly, philo-
sophy is part of its own tradition, so that contemporary philosophy 
is in some sense always a working out of historical conditions. 
Let me elaborate on these last two points. Ogden's defini-
tions of theology as an activity are identical with those of 
philosophy: it is a reflective understanding of faith. 123 It, 
too, is said to be "self-reflection."124 As we have seen, 
original revelation is the ultimate source of theology so that, 
although it must be "adequate" to a particular tradition, theology, 
too, is primarily the direct analysis of faith. 
195 
Secondly, philosophy is also conditioned by a tradition. 
To the extent that any inquiry is genuinely philoso-
phical, it can establish the truth of its assertions 
only through common human experience ... Nevertheless, 
philosophy, too, is historically conditioned, and the 
philosopher cannot simply ignore the wealth of man's 
cultural expressions .... 120 
It is thus true for both theology and philosophy that they 
employ the method of self-reflection, although they exist within 
and are conditioned by their traditions. Furthermore, as Ogden 
recognizes, that tradition is largely shared. 
2. The Content of Theology and Philo~ophy 
After the discussion of chapters III and IV it should be 
clear that the content of theology and philosophy is identical. 
For both it is the analysis of faith and its grounding, God. 
In fact, many of Ogden's clearest statements regarding the 
identity of the two have been made in this context. Perhaps 
the strongest appears in his very first published essay: 
The endeavor to distinguish between theology and 
philosophy by appealing to an einmalig salvation 
occurrence would have to be rejected as invalid 
on material grounds. 
The only alternative, then, which is really 
open to contemporary theology, is to abandon com-
pletely the attempt to distinguish itself in any 
final way from philosophy.126 
The identity of content follows primarily from the 
argument recounted in section C, which revolves around the 
claim that there is no light shining in Christ that has not 
always been available to all men, that is, the lack of necessity 
of special revelation in relation to original revelation. 
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3. The Sources of Theology and Philosophy 
In answering the question regarding the methods of these 
two disciplines we have largely also answered the question of 
source. 
On the surface, ~eology may appear to have a specialized 
source in distinction to a general and unrestricted one for 
philosophy. While this distinction may have some validity 
in terms of emphasis, it is misleading when one considers the 
proper activity of theology and philosophy. 
For the philosopher, while his source is universal, it is 
nevertheless true that he must pay ultimate heed to those 
characteristic events which give insight into the nature of God, 
in particular the decisive reveltaion of Jesus. 
If we are to be Christian theologians at all, we must 
seek the IIrightll philosophy and that one of the marks 
of its rightness will indeed be its essential con-
gruence with the claims of Christian faith.127 
This quotation, and others like it, make it clear that 
philosophy draws on the same material as do~s theology, and, 
thus, what makes it the IIrightll philosophy is the same criterion 
as what determines the right theology. They both endeavor to 
reflectively understand faith. 
In addition, we have seen that Ogden is also strongly com-
mitted to the universality of theology's source. While Chris-
tian theology may regard the representation in Christ as decisive, 
as theology it is open to all data as it seeks to understand 
faith in the light of God's characteristic actions wherever they 
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occur, and irregardless of their specific religious tradition. 
4. The Intentions of Theology and Philosophy 
It is only on the issue of the respective intentions, 
purposes, goals, etc. of theology and philosophy that Ogden 
sometimes appears to argue for some difference between the 
two disciplines. As strong as his statements regarding their 
identity, particularly in content, have been, he has distin-
guished their intentions. 
The primary intention of theological thinking and 
speaking is a different one than characterizes the 
thinking and speaking of philosophy and the sciences. 
Unlike the latter, theology intends to be an existen-
tial communication. Its primary purpose is not to 
communicate information to the intellect - although 
it does that, too - but to facilitate actual 
existential encounter .... 128 
Ogden has written very little about this aspect of 
theology. He has himself admitted to concentrating on the 
cognitive use of theology to the neglect of its directive 
purposes. 129 But he has proposed that in such functions we 
ought really to speak of "witness" rather than Itheol ogy ".130 
This, however, seems to leave us with a theology whose intentions 
are really the same as philosophy's. 
Ogden's lack of clarity at this point stems, I think, from 
a fundamental divergence in his two primary sources. His 
existentialist tendencies lead him to regard theology as con-
cerned primarily with changing men's lives, taking them from 
inauthentic to authentic modes of existence. However, his pro-
cess tendencies convince him that personal commitments are the 
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result of metaphysical positions. This is seen most clearly 
in his point that atheism is the result of misunderstanding, 
namely about the nature of God. 
Ogden attempts to resolve this tension by speaking of 
the activity of theologians versus that of philosophers, while 
the content, etc. of their disciplines remains identical. Even 
here however Ogden hesitates to make any clear distinction by 
choosing to call this existential function "witness" as well 
as by noting that philosophy, too, is not purely cognitive. 131 
5. The Logical Types of Theological and Philosophical 
Statements 
Ogden has been quite clear in recent essays on the point 
that religious statements fall into three logical types. Some 
of them are simply empirical. This category includes all of 
those statements, particularly in Scripture, which purport to 
be scientific or historical and therefore open to falsification. 
Some of these Ogden, of course, assigns to the level of myth 
or legend so that on a broader understanding they take on 
existential significance despite their pseudo-scientific chara-
cter. Many, however, lack this intention. 
Not being properly religious claims at all, they 
cannot be established existentially or metaphysically, 
... , Christian belief, at least, has a necessary, if 
only indirect, relation even to empirical falsification. 132 
Secondly, the language of religion is often existential 
in nature. In fact, in his earliest essays, where his concerns 
are primarily anthropological, Ogden talks as if specifically 
theological statements were all of this type. 133 That is, they 
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are concerned not with IIWhat happened?1I but with IIWhat is the 
significance of what happened for human existence?1I134 
Among these are primarily those which result from the 
application of the method of demythologization and existential 
interpretation, about which enough has been said in chapter II. 
The third category is that of the metaphysical. In more 
recent essays it has been this type that Ogden has emphasized. 
I have not said theological assertions simply are 
metaphysical assertions .... My point, rather,-,s 
that the class to which theological assertions logi-
cally belong is the general class of metaphysical 
assertions and that therefore, the kind of rational 
justification to which they are open is the kind 
generically appropriate to all assertions of this 
logical class. 135 
Quite parallel things are said about philosophical asser-
tions. We have seen that there is a large class of stri'ctly 
metaphysical statements which are in principle individually 
unfalsifiable. There are, however, some, namely anthropolo-
gical, statements about the meaning and possibilities of human 
existence, which are not unfalsifiable. Ogden nowhere explicitly 
says that these are identical to the existential statements 
of theology, but they must be related at least in the same way 
that the metaphysical statements of theology are related to 
those of philosophy: they are a sub-set of the broader category. 
Ogden does not identify a class of empirical claims within 
philosophy. He holds, however, that any factual assertions may 
function for metaphysics in the same ways in which religious 
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empirical assertions function for theology. That is, they are 
falsifiable data that serve as the backdrop upon which state-
ments of larger and general meaning are built. Nevertheless, 
in neither case do they function strictly as evidence. The 
metaphysical assertions stand on their own even if the data 
t t t b . t k 136 urns ou 0 e mlS a en. 
There are, then, closely parallel characteristics of the 
logical types of theological and metaphysical statements. In 
conclusion, let me summarize Ogden's general view concerning 
the relationship of theology and philosophy. 
6. A General View of the Relationship 
What, then, is the sum of all this? I have shown here 
that Ogden's system can be presented as an argument for the 
idehtity of theology and philosophy as a type of what I have 
called a containment view. Specifically, philosophy is the 
all-inclusive analysis of man's unavoidable faith in meaning, 
while theology is the specific analysis of the possibilities 
for human existence as disclosed in the analysis of the ground 
of meaning. Theology is a specialization within philosophy. 
In many ways it is the central specialization, since it is 
concerned with the very ground of the objects of other special-
izations. 
Theology's source is always the particular understanding 
contained in the tradition of an individual culture of a specific 
revelatory and, therefore, characteristic act of God. Of these, 
however, Ogden considers the Christian account, as embodied in 
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an existentialist anthropology and a process doctrine of God 
to be the true one. Thus it is Christian theology which is 
properly a part of the right philosophy. 
While in general the methods of theology and philosophy 
are the same, that is, the existentialist analysis of experi-
ence, theology, because it is tied to specific enculturations 
often of a presecular period, must have an additional instru-
ment. Thus Christian theology in particular is in need of 
demythologizing in order for its propositions to be meaningful 
to contemporary man. This does not invalidate the containment 
view, it simply identifies a problem unique to a specific part. 
The theologian's specialty inclines him to be more 
than a theorist: he is also a witness. But strictly speaking 
theology, as philosophy, is a cognitive matter of constructing 
a theoretical system. 
The identity of these two disciplines is seen most clearly 
for Ogden in terms of content. For theology to claim any 
direct, observable divine intervention as its special revela-
tion offends both the standard of language defined by demytholo-
gizing as well as the metaphysics of panentheism, according to 
which every event is both autonomous and God's. 
Identity is indicated also by the fact that theological 
and philosophical statements are of the same logical type. 
Neither are falsifiable by simple observations but are elements 
of a total system, itself unavoidably believed. 
Philosophy, as Ogden sees it, is the broader umbrella 
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under which theology, general epistemology, philosophy of 
science, aesthetics, and so forth are found. Its primary 
function is to provide theology with a language and a 
method. To use Ogden's words: 
Philosophy provides theology with the principles 
and procedure of a theological hermeneutics. 137 
Hidden behind philosophy's role as provider, of course, lies 
the role of critic, By controlling theology's language, philo-
sophy severely restricts its ability to suggest "ways of seeing" 
and thereby supply its own categories. Yet this is not to 
indicate a conflict between disciplines. Both theology and 
philosophy as a whole develop out of the same analysis of the 
same experience--that of faith. Nevertheless, in practice 
conflicts will arise as the theological specialist and the 
general philosopher work separately, often misunderstanding 
their roles. 
In particular, recent history shows up conflicts that 
result from the theologian's primary concern with the second 
of Ogden's criteria--adequacy to tradition--, and the philo-
sopher's insistence on intelligible language, a criterion 
theologians often ignore. Such conflicts, Ogden thinks, 
are entirely unnecessary and are the result of disproportioned 
emphasis of one criterion over another. 
Ideally, for Ogden, there can be no competition between 
philosophy and theology; yet this is not due to their being 
isolated from each other. Ogden avoids the conflicts that 
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result from any view in which theology and philosophy have 
different sources, speculation and revelation, for example. 
Such conflicts are irresolvable except by pronouncing one 
source as ultimately authoritative. Ogden's view also avoids 
the cognitive dissonance that results when theology and 
philosophy are isolated as being different logical types, 
language~games, or pre~categorical schemes. Here, too, conflicts 
are theoretically irresolvable, except by separating and 
compartmentalizing areas of thought. 
Ogden's view clearly avoids both of these positions. 
The question remains, however, as to whether or not his own 
containment view is in fact sustainable. We must turn, 
then, in the next chapter to an evaluation of Ogden's system 
as an argument for the identity of theology and philosophy. 
v. A CRITIQUE OF OGDEN'S POSITION 
A. The Epistemological Argument and Internal 
Consistency 
B. The Metaphysical Argument and the Criterion 
of Truth 
C. Concluding Remarks 
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Introduction. - In this final chapter we must now ask 
whether Ogden's arguments concerning the relation of theology 
and philosophy are acceptable. I should remind the reader 
that my primary purpose is to formulate Ogden's position not 
to discuss it. Nevertheless, there are a few matters which 
cannot be left without examination, some points at which it 
appears to me that his formulations do not work at all, or at 
least need adjustment. 
A comprehensive critique would be quite impossible 
here since it would involve thorough investigations of 
Heidegger's and Whitehead's epistemology, Hartshorne's 
and Whitehead's concept of God and of the self, Hartshorne's 
doctrine of internal relations and much more. I have avoided 
even detailing these areas in the expository sections since it 
would have involved unmanageable complexity and they are, in any 
case, not unique to Ogden's system. Many of these topics are 
currently the subjects of intense investigation in philoso-
phical journals and deserving of dissertation topics in their 
own right. 
I want, however, to focus specifically on Ogden's two 
arguments for identity, by way of containment, of theology 
and philosophy. I want to show that a critique of the first 
argument involves one primarily in questions of the internal 
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consistency of Ogden's system. Here, too, it is tempting to 
range far afiel~, since we shall ultimately face the question 
of the complementarity of existentialism and process philosophy--
hardly a simple question to answer. Here I shall have to be 
content to carefully limit the scope of my remarks. 
The critique of the second argument involves some questions 
concerning the clarity of Ogden's system, in particular whether 
or not his criterion for the decisiveness of Jesus, his cri-
terion for analogy, and finally, his criterion for metaphys-
ical truth are successful. All of this is not to say that 
there is not a great deal to be admired in Ogden's position on 
the relationship between philosophy and theology. I can 
only commend his avoidance of any dichotomy based on different 
types of knowing. It eliminates the artificial setting up of 
"faith" as a separate epistemic function that leads to theology. 
I do want to show, however, that Ogden's arguments that seek 
to disprove the possibility of divine action in history, 
specifically in the person of Jesus, and thereby remove any 
uniqueness for theology, will not stand up under scrutiny. 
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A. The Epistemological Argument and Internal 
Consistency 
1. Can God Act in History? 
The epistemological argument restated. - As we have 
seen, Ogden's first argument involves the main tenets of 
his epistemology. In outline, it runs as follows: 
(a) A proper theology conforms to two criteria: it 
is adequate to its source and intelligible to 
secular man. 
(b) The starting point of all thought is subjectivist. 
(c) Theology, specifically, is therefore possible only 
as existentialist analysis. 
(d) Theology cannot use objectifying language, either 
in relation to the self or to God. 
(e) There can therefore be no objective historical 
events that provide differentiating content for 
theology. 
(f) Theology therefore coincides with philosophy 
as,a general analysis of existence. 
The exposition in earlier chapters will have suggested 
some matters on which one could wish for more clarity from 
Ogden. It is certainly not clear, for example, that his 
two criteria are compatible. But then it is not obvious how 
a system should function when each of its propositions must 
meet more than one criterion. It is clear that Ogden demands 
that a proposition meet both criteria, such that the proposition 
is not acceptable if it meets one criterion, while the other 
negates it. That explains Ogden's procedure when "adequacy 
to source" suggests an interpretation of a doctrine which 
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"secular intelligibility" will not allow. A bodily resurrec-
tion, a creation in history, God as an objective, though 
supernatural being, may all have strong backing from the 
tradition of Christian thought, but we have no alternative 
but to see them as misguided, uninformed, or prescientific 
interpretations of God's original revelation known to all men, 
as judged by modern secular standards. Ogden does not, to 
my knowledge, give any examples of the reverse situation, 
but there are certainly many propositions that are intelligible 
to secular man but not in accord with the biblical tradition. 
I want, however, to focus on the central theme of the 
argument and we will assume that other difficulties can be met. 
That is I think, the contention in (d) that empirical state-
ments about God's action must be mythical. 
God and demythologizing. - What I want to contend is that 
Ogden's position both does and does not permit propositions 
about God's action in concrete history. I shall begin with 
the negative. 
Ogden's epistemology, particularly as it is applied to 
theological language in the project of demythologizing, 
explicitly forbids the use of objective language in reference 
to God. God is not to be spoken of as simply another object in 
space and time. Any attempt to so specify God's action in 
human history is myth. Even Bultmann's last holdout, the 
death and resurrection of Jesus, is not allowed by Ogden. 
The Christocentrism of the Reformation which still prevails in 
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Bultmann is transformed by Ogden into a fully theocentric 
system, yet without diminishing the requirements of demythol-
ogizing. 
The result is the lack of any objective criteria for 
revelation. That is, what is to be judged as a true repre-
sentation of the divine self is determined only by the evoked 
response toward authenticityl and not by any characteristics 
of the event itself. It is noteworthy that this is in sharp 
contrast to other recent process theories of revelation and 
Christology. David Griffin, for example, has sharply cri-
ticized Ogden at just this point and proceeds to develop an 
objective Christology based on the fulfillment by Jesus of the 
divine aims given to him. 2 Lewis Ford, in his The Lure Qf God,3 
goes even further in identifying Jesus as the one who carries 
out God's evolutionary purposes for the advancement of mankind. 
In fact, Ogden stands quite alone among process theologians in 
maintaining strictly existential, subjective criteria. 
Yet this is surely in line with his epistemological and 
methodological precepts which dictate that God cannot be an 
object. 
Demythologizing, then, ought to eliminate every objectifying 
reference to acts of God. It has been argued that this ought, 
in fact, to eliminate any reference to God at all. For 
example, Colin Gunton has argued that if anything ascribable 
to the specific agency of God is myth, then why need one speak 
of God at all. 4 He becomes a superfluous hypothesis, whose 
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only identity is as lithe one who validates human life as it 
is, a divine pat upon the human back.1I5 William Young,6 
Clark Pinnock,7 and Frederick Herzog,S have all made similar 
criticisms. William Young, in particular, describes Ogden's 
God as a II me taphysical myth ll who serves no observable purpose. 
These criticisms are natural inferences from Ogden's 
definition of demythologizing. They are, however, inaccurate 
in relation to other parts of Ogden's system. This brings us 
to the positive affirmation of God's action in history. 
Ogden's adoption of a process metaphysic was motivated by its 
ability to supplement the Heideggerian-Bultmannian analysis 
of man with a process analysis of God. This conjunction 
he holds to be possible, in part, because of the supposed 
similarity between the existential/existentialist distinction 
of the former and Hartshorne's abstract/concrete correlation. 
Ogden concludes that, just as it is possible to ob-
jectify man ~ subject, so we can objectify God as long as we 
speak of the divine existentiality, that is, God's form or 
essence. It is, then, possible to speak of the acting God. 
This is evident from the general truth that in Ogden's 
panentheistic system every space-time event or action can 
legitimately be labeled as God's. Ogden himself allows that 
his theory of analogy permits IIdirect ll speaking of God,9 
in particular when it identifies those characteristic actions 
that represent authentic existence, such as the death of Jesus. 
211 
How can this be unless one can, in fact, isolate and identify 
God's acting in space-time? If God acts in every event then 
surely he acts characteristically in at least some. While 
Ogden may identify these by existential response criteria, that 
does not alter the objective, concrete, space-time nature of 
the acts themselves. Thus Ogden's process metaphysics leads 
him to identify certain events, however vaguely (for example, 
the "revelation of Christ"), as acts initiated and character-
istic of God--his acts--yet, as I argued above, the secular 
method of demythologizing cannot allow propositions about 
such events. 
Let me exemplify the problem by examining a passage in 
"What Sense Does It Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?" 
(1963, reprinted 1966). After summarizing and agreeing with 
Bultmann's position, which he claims properly maintains the 
"infinite qualitative difference" between God and the world,lO 
Ogden concludes the following: 
The force of the preceding argumeot is to affirm 
that, in its fundamental sense, God's action is not 
an action in history at all. Although his action 
as creator is related to history - and, indeed, is 
the action in which all historical events are ul-
timately grounded - his creative action as such is 
not an action in history, but an action that trans-
cends it ... Llkewise God's action as the Redeemer 
cannot be simply identifiedl~ith any particular 
historical event or events. 
Here Ogden is stating the implications of demythologizing 
and the existential epistemology that necessitates it. 
God does not, indeed cannot, act in history. Only a page 
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later, however, Ogden argues that God is not only an 
abstraction but a'l=so a_n eminently historical being. 
God's being is the eminent instance of historical 
being. But ... God's historicity is an eminent 
historicity, and it cannot be confused with the 
ordinary historicity of man ... God's action is his 
action, and it cannot be simply identified with 
the action of ordinary historical beings. 12 
Suddenly we have gone from a God who can not act in 
history to one who is lIeminent,1I the foremost example, in his 
historicity. Ogden is using here the Whiteheadian principle 
that God is the eminent example of, not the exception to 
metaphysical categories. Thus to say that he is eminent in 
his historicity is to say that God is historical. That 
Ogden makes just that transition can be seen a few para-
graphs further on. 
Insofar as what comes to expression through 
man's speech and action is the gift and demand 
signified by God's transcendent action as Creator 
and Redeemer, he re-presents not only his own under-
standing of God's action, but God's action itself. 
Indeed we may go further and say that, in this case, 
man's action actually ~ God's action ... 13 
I do not know how to understand this last sentence except 
as saying that some particular ("in this case") human action 
is God's creative or redemptive act. Later in the same essay 
Christ's life is identified as just such an action. 
Ogden's position in this statement is clearly in line 
with that of other process philosophers and theologians on 
the same topic. David Griffin, who, as mentioned above, 
criticizes Ogden's reluctance to go beyond a subjective 
213 
criterion of revelation, insists that God's action in Christ 
must be understood in an objective sense. 14 This same position, 
sometimes even stronger, is true of every process oriented 
Christology of which I am aware, including Hartshorne's and 
I do not think that Ogden either can or does avoid it. 
He must affirm objective, space-time, historical action 
for God. But how is this to fit in with the requirements of 
demythologizing? Ogden's method, as an implication of his 
criterion of intelligibility, forbids any use of objective, 
empirical language in relation to God. Nor are there any 
objective criteria b~ which to judge the characteristic acts 
of God. We are left with the proposition that God's actions 
both are and are not historically objective. 
If Ogden cannot avoid the incompatibility on this point 
then premise (e) of the argument will not stand and the 
conclusion fails. Theology could be differentiated from 
philosophy, on Ogden's view, as long as there are unique 
historical revelations of God. These would not be included 
in a general analysis of the meaning of human existence, that 
is, philosophy. If Ogden's process metaphysics stands there 
remains distinguishing material and his argument for the 
containment of theology within philosophy will not hold. 
2. Existential and process thought. 
My concern in this critique is with the two arguments which 
I have formulated with Ogden's system. The above remarks 
concerning internal consistency, however, find their validity 
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only within a broader context which has already been suggested. 
Might it not be that existentialism--at least the Heidegger-
Bultmannian brand--and process thought are incompatible at 
important points? 
This is, of course, a complex and broad question. There 
has been one recent attempt to at least survey the terrain in 
response specifically to Ogden, namely in John Cobb and David 
Griffin's Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition. 
The authors list what they consider to be three major areas 
of agreement and six areas of disagreement between Whiteheadian 
process philosophy and Heideggerian existentialism. 16 
The areas of agreement which they identify are the 
following: (1) Existence precedes essence, or,!we are what 
we decide to be. (2) Our existence is radically contingent. 
Finally, (3) existence is a being-in-the-world, or, occasions 
are always part of the actual world. 
However, existential and process philosophy are seen to 
disagree on the following: (1) For Heidegger man is a single 
entity, destined for death; for Whitehead he is a series of 
occasions each dying individually, but each passing into eternity. 
(2) For Heidegger Mitsein is superficial, while for Whitehead 
relatedness is absolute. (3) For Heidegger, nature is the world 
in which being exists, for Whitehead occasions are the world: 
there is no radical separation. (4) For Heidegger the future 
holds no new possibilities, while for Whitehead it is essentially 
novel. (5) For Heidegger, man is absolutely free of the 
past, while for Whitehead he is relatively free, 
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but incorporates the past. Finally (6) human existence is 
for Heidegger Geschichte and not part of the history of 
events, while for Whitehead there is only one process of 
emergence. 
As helpful as this survey is, it does not fill the real 
need for a lengthy in-depth treatment of the compatibility 
of Ogden's two main sources. It also leaves out basic 
epistemological questions which I would hold to be the real 
nemisis of Ogden's system. Clearly, this is not the place 
to supply that need in general. 
I do want, however, to develop briefly some tensions 
between these philosophical systems many of which are illus-
trated in Ogden. Two are of particular importance. There is, 
first, the disagreement indicated in points (2) and (4) 
above between the isolated autonomous self of Heideggerian 
existentialism and the totally integrated man of process 
philosophy to whom God gives initial aim for every actual 
occasion. In Ogden this appears as the dilemma that the man 
Jesus is, in fact, a characteristic act of God, yet there is 
no objective criterion whereby to determine that he is. I 
shall deal with this dilemma in the next section in more 
deta il . 
The crucial difference which Ogden's first argument 
illustrates is, however, the final one above, point (6). 
The existentialism from which Ogden draws his epistemology 
and concept of history makes a radical divide between the self, 
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including God, and the objective space-time events of ordinary 
history. For Bultmann this is the difference between 
Geschichte and Historie. While Ogden does not often use the 
same terminology the distinction between objective and 
existential knowledge is a defining characteristic of the method 
of demythologizing. The distinction is quite similar to that 
between the rational and the historical in Kant's Religion 
Within the Bounds of Reason Alone. The events of history do 
not condition the decisions and potentials of the rational 
will. For Bultmann it is only in the revelation of Jesus that 
the two realms are brought together, but Ogden will allow for 
no exceptions. That is the central contention of Christ Without 
Myth. 
In the philosophy of organism, however, there is only 
one history: the process of actual occasions. Mental and 
physical poles are unified and God's determination of initial 
aims is just as much a part of the event as is the occasion's 
self-determination. 
Thus, the incompatibility in Ogden's argument for the 
identity of theology within philosophy is really a symptom 
of a larger difficulty. His existential epistemology affirms 
the divide between history and reason--Lessing's ditch--
while his process metaphysics denies it. 
Underlying both of these disagreements within Ogden's 
system is an even more basic one. From the point of view of 
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the process philosopher the existentialist commits what White-
head called the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." In 
essence, this fallacy consists of deriving, in some way, the 
concrete (becoming) from the abstract (being). In his 1929 
review of Sein und Zeit Hartshorne says of phenomenologists 
and existentialists that "they have sought to explain the 
definite by the indefinite." 17 Ogden is guilty of the same, 
by Hartshorne's standards, when he derives the reality of 
God from subjective faith, in recognizing concrete authenticity 
from subjective responses, and in separating metaphysics from 
history.18 The "definite" for Ogden, as for Heidegger, is the 
being of the self, when he denies the activity of God in 
concrete history. Yet when his metaphysics affirms the 
creative action of God in history it is becoming that is the 
"definite" and concrete. But Ogden cannot have it both ways. 
As it stands the elements of his system are incompatible at 
this point. 
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B. The Metaphysical Argument and the Criterion 
of Truth 
1. The Nature and Necessity of Faith 
Ogden's second argument restated. - Ogden's second 
argument for the identity of theology and philosophy is 
really an argument equating Christian theology with the 
right philosophy. It consists of the following steps: 
(a) An existentialist epistemology is compatible with 
a process metaphysics. 
(b) Unavoidable faith implies a real God. 
(c) A process metaphysics implies panentheism. 
(d) Panentheism, plus the principle that God is the 
paramount example of metaphysical categories, implies 
that God is to be understood in analogy with the 
self, and that the world by analogy is God's body. 
(e) It follows that every act and event are, in part, 
God's action. 
(f) Analogous to man, some of God's actions are more 
characteristic than others. 
(g) Those actions are characteristic to which I respond 
by realizing authentic human existence. 
(h) The life of Jesus most fully represents God~s 
character. 
(i) Therefore, Christian theology, i.e., the understanding 
of existence based on Jesus' life, is also the 
right philosophical understanding of man and God in 
general. 
The nature of faith. - I have already argued that Ogden's 
system is incoherent and that his epistemology fails to 
show that theology is to be understood as identical to 
philosophy. I want now to turn to Ogden's metaphysics and 
the argument to be found there. In this section I want to 
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show that, in fact, Ogden1s system lacks any clear criterion 
that would allow for the equation of theology and philosophy. 
To see this we shall have to work through the argument 
step by step, looking at each step for the standard that would 
clearly allow for the identifying of Christian theology and 
the II r ight ll philosophy. 
The basis of the argument--and of the entire metaphysical 
construction--is unavoidable faith. A great deal has been 
said regarding Ogden1s argument for the necessity of faith, 
however the only detailed response to his definition of faith 
has been Langdon Gilkey 1s.19 His criticisms are threefold. 
First, Gilkey argues that Ogden1s concept is basically 
essentialistic and thus in contradiction to his existen-
tialist tenets. It is essentialistic in that faith is 
understood as a precondition of rationality, faith is IIconsti-
tutive ll of human being as such. 20 
Second, Ogden is wrong in thinking that his notion of 
faith corresponds to a Christian view. The latter sees faith 
as the answer to the problem of sin, not only of meaning. 
Third, and closely connected, is Gilkey1s criticism that 
Ogden1s faith is not religiously adequate. It fails to resolve 
man1s consciousness of guilt. Thus, it avoids man1s central 
problem and the real source of religion. 
To summarize these objections, Gilkey sees Ogden1s view 
of man as a strange combination of existentialist epistemology 
in which IIfaith precedes and conditions theological and 
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phi los 0 phi cal art i c u 1 at ion, II and II pro c e s s rat ion ali s m II i n 
which ontology will "provide the answers to our existential 
problems of faith and non-faith. 1I21 Ogden ends up, Gilkey 
alleges, with a faith that has an existential status though 
it lacks the existentialistls content. It overcomes ignorance, 
not sin and guilt. 
I am not convinced that Ogden is guilty as charged. 
Faith, as a phenomenon, is unavoidably and always present for 
Ogden. IIUnfaith ll is, in fact, never present. Authentic 
existence, however, is possible only when faith is properly 
understood and rationalized. Philosophy does not make faith 
possible, it seeks to understand what is there--often uncon-
sciously. There is, then, no contradiction here, but there 
remains the question of whether Ogdenls anthropology is 
essentialistic or existentialistic. 
I have indicated already that Ogden is very unclear as 
to the real content of what he refers to as an lIexistentialist 
anthropology.1I This must, first of all, be modified by a 
process concept of God as the giver of initial direction. 
Gilkey is undoubtedly correct at the point of recognizing a 
second modification, namely unavoidable faith. I would, however, 
be cautious in understanding Ogden's use of IIconstitutive. 1I 
Although it has undeniably essentialist connotations, as do 
other of his terms, it is used to modify lIevent.1I22 Faith is 
an inevitable experience for man, not part of his being. 
Again, however, it is difficult to make any evaluative judgment 
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here without clearer development of content on Ogden's part. 
It is, however, the matter of the "inevitability" of 
faith that needs comment. 
The inevitability of faith. Ogden's argument for the 
inevitability of faith and God's reality has engendered more 
response than any other of his theses. Let me summarize his 
argument. 
Ogden claims that (especially) scientific and moral 
questioning presupposes religious boundary question. "Reality" 
is to be defined in terms of relevance to a context. It 
therefore follows that God's existence, as the ground of meaning 
that makes questioning at the boundary possible, is necessarily 
a reality. I want to conclude that Ogden's argument is 
seriously lacking and does not prove nearly as much as he thinks 
it does. I shall begin by noting a number of responses that 
it has provoked. 
A frequent criticism of the argument as a whole is that, 
whatever the internal fallacy might be, its success it defini-
tional only. Note the comments of Richard Vieth and then Ray 
Hart: 
The conclusion is ... merelya trivial tautology, 
per sua s i v eon 1 y too n e2 ~ h 0 a 1 rea d y II a c c e p t s the notion of 'God,' . 
A caesura between premise and conclusion is avoided 
I think, only because the conclusion is already , 
present in the premise, packed into Ogden's under-
~ta~ding of."~e~ning" and "ultimacy." ... in short, 
1t 1S a.def221t10nal or stipulative victory that 
Ogden W1ns. 
The criticism is that, even granting the first premise, the 
existence of meaning only posits a necessary grounding in an 
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ultimate being if one can supply some clear argument for the 
transition, or if one begs the question by defining "meaning" 
as "ultimately grounded meaning." Flew adds the somewhat 
sarcastic conclusion: 
The temptation is to ease an intractable task by 
construing the term "God" for apologetic purposes 
in some very thin and secular sense, but then in the 
expansive environment of dogmatic theology to revert 25 
to a more traditional and substantial interpretation. 
Richard Vieth's analysis and response is probably the 
most detailed one available. He criticizes not only the 
relationship between premises and conclusion as just indi-
cated, but also questions Ogden's evidence for the first 
premise,26 namely that it is universally assumed that moral 
and scientific questioning leads to questions of ultimate 
meaning. Ogden presents it as ~ priori, that is, all men 
necessarily have that confidence in meaning. There are, 
however, too many counter-examples to let this stand. 
Sartre, Camus, even Stanley Kubrick, and many other prominent 
names, are obvious cases. Thus, even Ogden's first premise 
fails according to Vieth. 
In the expositional sections of this dissertation I 
discussed this argument of Ogden's as consisting of two 
stages. The first deduces the necessity of meaning trans-
cendentally from the possibility of various types of discourse. 
That is, moral discourse, for example, presupposes structure, 
order, or meaning in life. Without meaning, moral discourse 
would be pointless and even impossible. If Ogden intends here 
simply the traditional "se lf-referential" argument against 
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the skeptic 27 _-that the very affirmation of non-meaning 
establishes meaning--then I have no objection. None of 
Vieth's factual objections are to the point against such a 
logical argument. There seems, however, to be more to the 
argument, as I have previously demonstrated. I am con-
vinced that Ogden is correct in this as well, that is, that 
moral, scientific, and religious meaningfulness rationally 
require a specifically telic ordering of our lives and envir-
onments. Vieth misunderstands Ogden at this point. It is 
not that Sartre, Camus, Kubrick, or others consciously or 
verbally accept this thesis, but that the logic of their 
denials in different ways actually establishes it. 
I am not certain that Ogden's method of argument will 
28 
accomplish his purpose. HoweveG C. S. Lewis ' appeal to 
the inevitable and universal behavior of promising, excusing, 
judging, praising, and so forth seems to be a more effective 
argument. Nevertheless, I find Ogden's conclusion, per ~e, 
acceptable. 
The second stage of the argument, however, is more dif-
ficult to deal with. It consists of the deduction of the 
reality of the ground or source of meaning--God--from the 
reality of meaning (including value, etc.) itself. This Ogden 
accomplishes simply by noting that, when one properly under-
stands the first part of the argument, the issue of God's 
reality becomes pointless. The peculiarity of Ogden's argu-
ment is, of course, that he attempts the transition on a priori 
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grounds rather than a posteriori. The latter would amount to 
some version of the teleological argument which Ogden rejects. 
It is perhaps even more curious that he does not make use of 
Hartshorne's modal ontological argument. He does evaluate it 
positively but the argument as such is never built into the 
system. Meaning, he holds, has no alternative. Meaning is 
not an empirical state of affairs which might have been otherwise. 
There is, however, clearly something wrong with Ogden's 
a priori argument. It seems trivially true that if meaning 
demands a ground, then real meaning demands a real ground. 
But what Ogden nowhere proves, is that meaning necessarily 
(~ priori) implies a ground. Proving that faith in meaning is 
inevitable is not equivalent to proving that meaning requires 
a source. Again, if he were to use the teleological argument, 
the transition would be clear, but he cannot. I must conclude, 
then, that the second part of Ogden's argument fails. It 
lacks a crucial premise. 
There is, in addition, another structural problem. I 
refer to the assumption on Ogden's part that the grounding of 
meaning is to be identified as a specifically process God. 
Clearly, there is a break in the line of argument here. 
Belief in meaning is unavoidable. Meaning requires a ground. 
Real meaning requires a real ground. But from here to a process 
God there is no direct link. Ogden's problem is somewhat 
unique. Whitehead and Hartshorne avoid it by beginning with 
metaphysics rather than epistemology.29 As we have seen, 
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Ogden must begin anew by deriving his metaphysics in terms of 
its compliance with his criteria and its satisfactory fit with 
his particular epistemology. I rather think that Ogdenls system 
is, at this transition, inelegant at best. Ogden cannot be 
accused of proceeding entirely without grounds. However, 
I see no clearly logical derivation of his process metaphysics 
from the existential epistemology. 
Others have made the same criticism in different ways. 
Gilkey insists that Ogdenls process development of God and 
metaphysics is in contradiction to his original argument 
(/ ~ Toulmin) for the unavoidability of faith as a boundary 
question. 
Toulmin makes clear ... that rational inquiry, as he 
understands it, arrives at a limiting question of a 
IIreligious ll sort because it cannot answer ultimate 
questions metaphysically ... 
And yet, having just used this manls under-
standing of IIreasoningll to establish the reality 
of God, Ogden introduces the third section of his 
essay with the proposal that lithe starting point for 
age n u i n ely new the i s tic con s t r u c t ion II i s the 
II re formed subjectivist principle ll ••• And so, having 
established the ultimate order of things via Toulmin, 
off we go on a speculative ontology ... -an enterprise 
which Toulmin has just assured us is impossible and 
vain. 30 
R. S. Heimbeck adds a parallel criticism. 31 He notes 
that in going beyond Toulmin one requires an independent 
argument to allow Godls existence to remain II c heckable. II 
Hartshorne does this by means of his ontological argument. 
Ogden, although he accepts the argument as valid, does not 
clearly incorporate it into his system nor does he develop 
any further argument. Heimbeck concludes: 
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There seems to be a tendency on the part of 
representatives of the newer theologies to regard 
metatheological scepticism as an ally in the 
struggle against classical theism. The metatheo-
logical sceptic from hi~ side may not be as sanguine 
about such an alliance. 2 
As I have indicated, these criticisms are well taken. However, 
the line of thought it successful only in showing inelegance 
in the system, not inconsistency. Nevertheless, this is 
sufficient to show that faith does not directly imply a process 
metaphysics. The tie between theology and philosophy is not 
to be found here. 
2. The Truth-Criterion for Theology 
Theology and truth. - Ogden's second argument hinges 
ultimately on the identity of what is seen in Christ and 
what is known originally by all men concerning the possibility 
of authentic existence. Following the examinatio above of 
the basis of the system, we now ask for the criterion of truth 
for a specific theology that allows Ogden to conclude that 
theology is to be understood as the correct analysis of faith. 
First, then, given Ogden's definition of theology, why 
ought one to think that its content is true? I shall examine 
to begin with, two criticisms of Ogden's approach and reject 
them as shortsighted. 
Herndon Wagers, Ogden's colleague at Southern Methodist 
University, has simply noted that Ogden is vague on the question 
of what counts as the criterion of truth in theology.33 
He is particularly distressed with Ogden's position, borrowed 
from Toulmin, that various "fields of experience" 34 each have 
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their own standards of what counts as true within them. 
Thus, the most one can say about theological truths is that 
they comprise those statements "worthy of acceptance" within 
that particular logical type of statement. 35 Wagers is 
accusing Ogden, in effect, of not defining "worthy." By 
itself, it does not suffice to distinguish between what is 
accepted and what ought to be accepted. 
Frederick Streng1s criticism is more narrow. 36 He 
argues a) that Ogden provides for no strict distinction 
between Christian theology and theology in general in terms of 
truth criteria. Thus, the former has no special or unique 
standards. b) This must imply that there is some general 
religious consciousness that is universal in order to supply 
the basis of an existential theology as such. 37 The import of 
the criticism is that Ogden has no reason to speak of Christian 
theology. Despite all the talk of the decisiveness of Jesus, 
he plays no role for Ogden in establishing a uniquely Christian 
truth-criterion, and thus leaves theology with only the possi-
bility of a general standard. 
Both of these criticisms ignore some important facts in 
Ogden1s theology. Christian theology for him, is simply the 
result of one tradition of interpretation of the ground of 
meaning. Thus its initial criterion of truth must be that 
of adherence to its own tradition. Beyond that there must 
be, and is, a criterion of truth for revelations in general: 
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that of characteristic representation of the nature of God. 
That indicates the ultimate truth-criterion, namely a general 
criterion of metaphysical truth. 
Just as theology as a discipline is contained in phil-
osophy, so there must be concentric criteria for truth. 
In order, then, to understand the nature of truth for theology 
we shall have to examine each circle individually. 
Theology and Scripture. - The first question concerns 
Ogden's attitude toward Scripture. It has been noted by some 
that for someone who wants to break down the barriers between 
theology and philosophy, Ogden has a high regard for the 
biblical record. William Hordern, in particular, is sur-
. d b h . . t . 38 pr1se y t 1S Sl uat10n. 
Ogden's theologian is bound to a particular text, 
while the philosopher can gain the same 3§uth by 
roaming freely through human experience. 
For Hordern,this duality is evidence for internal incon-
sistency, primarily because he classifies Ogden as part of 
the "theological left," along with, for example, Fritz Buri. 
He sees Ogden's claim that authentic existence is an original 
possibility as tantamound to Buri's "dekerygmatization," 
that is, the denial that salvation comes through Christ. This 
claim, he thinks, would clearly conflict with any emphasis or 
regard for a special revelation focusing on Christ. 
A quite different criticism comes from those concerned 
with the integrity of the biblical text. Kenneth Hamilton's 
comments are typical of those who see Ogden as playing fast 
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and loose with Scripture. 
Ogden's quotations from the New Testament support his 
case only when their460ntext is ignored and adjacent 
passages suppressed. 
Both of these criticisms are particularly interesting 
in light of Ogden's liThe Authority of Scripture" (1976) which 
reasserts his commitment to the dependency of Christian theology 
on the New Testament. 
It would undoubtedly be interesting to analyze carefully 
Ogden's use of Scripture, but that goes beyond my concern here. 
It is sufficient to note that adherence to Scripture does 
function for Ogden as the initial truth criterion for theology. 
I agree with Ogden here, though I am not always happy with his 
exegetical practice. This now leads us to examine the standard 
for truth in relation to determining the decisiveness of Christ. 
The decisiveness of Christ. - A frequent criticism of 
Ogden is the claim that he simply fails to specify any ade-
quate meaning for Idecisive." 41 That is, after qualifying his 
view by claiming that the Christ-event is neither necessary, 
nor does it provide any new information about human existence, 
decisiveness becomes a meaningless quality. 
James Robinson, in his review of Christ Without Myth,42 
recognizes that Ogden has not really worked out a credible 
view of "decisiveness," although he thinks that the beginnings 
are there. 
Ogden is, I think, on the track of a basic break-
through when he identified the "decisiveness" of 
Jesus and the kerygma in the emergence of the wor~j 
which not only talks about, but actually bestows. 
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Ogden's liOn Revelation" certainly fulfills some of 
Robinson's prophesy in developing the concept by distinguishing 
between actualizing authentic existence (Bultmann's position), 
and objectifying it.44 Russell Pregeant's work amplifies 
this notion. 45 
Delwin Brown 46 also tries to support Ogden by claiming 
that his view of "re-presentative" decisiveness amounts to 
a separation of source and norm which he feels is viable 
given a Whiteheadian metaphysics. That is, for Ogden, 
Christ is the mediating source of our concepts of authentic 
existence but not their norm. It is not the case that 
theological statements are limited to that which is "given in, 
implied by, or at least consistent with the Christ event." 47 
What these criticisms really overlook, however, is that 
Ogden's notion of "decisive" is tied to his doctrine of analogy. 
A revelation of human existence is decisive when it is analogous 
to divine existence. That there be such a standard for decisive-
ness is essential to Ogden's second argument for the identity 
of theology and philosophy. Without it, premise (g) in the 
above summary cannot be established. I must turn, then, to 
an examination of my contention that Ogden's concept of 
decisiveness is clarified by his doctrine of analogy. 
Is there a criterion for ~ valid analogy? - The eqution 
of Christian theology with the right philosophy depends ultimately 
on Ogden's doctrine of analogy. Without it God's action 
in general, and the decisiveness of Jesus in particular, is 
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unidentifiable. We need, then, at this point to take a closer 
look at this specific doctrine. The search for a criterion for 
analogy consists simply of this: How can one determine which 
acts are characteristically God's? We can best begin by 
noting a number of possibilities that clearly will not work in 
Ogden's system. 
It is quite apparent that Ogden does not share the tra-
ditional orthodox commitment to the inspiration of Scripture, 
and thus special revelation cannot be the source. Ogden has told 
us that there is no content revealed anywhere beyond what is 
already known generally by revelation, that is, the meaning 
disclosed by an analysis of faith. Although, as we have noted, 
Ogden does speak of the authority of Scripture, it is a 
heavily qualified and conditioned authority, and, curiously 
enough, he has next to nothing to say about the Old Testament. 
His references to Scripture are almost always in relation to 
the Gospels. In any case, it is clear that for Ogden an author-
itative Scripture is at best a secondary source of knowledge of 
God. Its content must first be verified by some more final cri-
terion. 
It is also clear that metaphysics cannot be his source. 
While it is true that the metaphysical structure provides 
Ogden with the methodological principles for explicating deity, 
nevertheless the actual contents of a doctrine of God are gained 
by a procedure of analogy with the human self. That includes 
even his dipolarity.48 Metaphysics gives Ogden a method of 
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analogy, but not the detailed attributes of the nature of 
God. For example, that some of God's actions are characteristic 
and, especially, which are characteristic, is known only by 
analogy. Thus, metaphysics, in Ogden's system at least, cannot 
be the direct source of identifying characteristics of God's 
actions. We know God from man, not the other way around. 
History also cannot be the source of Ogden's knowledge of 
God's acts, in particular the details of the life of Jesus. 
That, of course, gets the cart before the horse, since what 
we need is a criterion that ensures the representative nature of 
Jesus' life. Why him, and not Buddha, Socrates, or Hitler 
for that matter? Ogden cannot really claim to hold to the tra-
ditional concept of the incarnation. Jesus' human life is 
God's only in the sense that he fully carries out God's initial 
aim. But Jesus was not God in any sense in which any of us 
are not at least potentially capable of being God. His life was 
neither necessary nor unique for Ogden. Thus Jesus cannot be 
the direct source of knowledge of God. 
The only direct statements that Ogden makes that might help 
us are that those acts are characteristic of God which express 
"the ultimate meaning of man's eXistence,,49 or "the ultimate 
truth of his existence."SO This, however, only prompts a fur-
ther question: What is the ultimate truth about man's existence? 
To this Ogden does have an answer. It is that anthropology found 
in (Heidegger's expression of) Christian faith. S1 
It is this subargument of Ogden's second argument that 
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appears to me to be circular. 
The argument that underlies propositions (g) and (h) 
really as follows: 
(j) What is authentic human existence (and that it is 
possible) is known by revelation in Jesus. 
(k) What is characteristic of God is known by what is 
authentically human. 
(1) That Jesus' revelation is true is known by its 
being characteristic of God (analogously). 
Thus, if we already know authentic existence, then the 
revelation in Jesus is irrelevant or redundant, but certainly 
not decisive or necessary for objectification. In this case, 
and my impression is that this is the direction in which Ogden 
is moving, Christian theology must loose its specific identity. 
In other words, it becomes meaningless to say that Christian 
theology is the true position. 
The alternative, that is, that we do not know what authen-
tic existence is, would leave us without a basis for analogy. 
We would then have no means of recognizing characteristic acts 
of God since we do not know which of our own are authentic. 
Ogden's argument to equate Christian theology with the right 
philosophy thus fails at the level of theology. He lacks 
any sustainable criterion by which to identify Jesus as a "re-
presentative" act of God. How is man to know how to apply 
the principle that he is the "image of God." Ogden seems to 
totally ignore the ethical dimensions of personhood. (In fact, 
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his discussion of the self is generally much too meager.) If lack 
of ethical perfection in any way reduces or distorts true 
personhood, then Ogden must provide a criterion for establishing 
analogies. Just which actions are characteristic and represent 
God to us? He admits himself the obvious point that many, 
perhpas most, do not. As I see it, this leaves Ogden only 
one choice if he rejects the necessity of the revelation in Jesus. 
He must establish a criterion of truth for metaphysics--apart 
from any reference to Christian theology. This would, in fact, 
provide a framework for a purely philosophical theology, that 
is, a theology wholly contained within philosophy, as Ogden 
wants but at a steep price. First, the end product must now 
cease to deserve the title "Christian." It has become an 
entirely natural theology with dependence neither on the person 
of Jesus nor on Scripture. This alone would seem to make this 
an unattractive option since Ogden has always insisted that he 
is doing explicitly Christian theology and in agreement with that 
particular tradition derived from the biblical witness. 
Furthermore, since Ogden has committed himself to the 
priority of epistemology, that is, that metaphysics cannot be 
be more than the analysis of the self ~ l! experiences, 
it is from the outset difficult to see how there could be a 
truth criterion for metaphysics that permits recognition of 
man's true potential unless he already experiences it. 
Let us, however, set aside all of this and ask whether 
Ogden does have a workable truth criterion for metaphysics. 
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That he wishes to move in this direction is indicated by his 
inclusion of contingent anthropology in metaphysics in recent 
essays. If so, then Ogden has established that theology logi-
cally can be contained within philosophy. He will, however not 
have proved that theology is, in fact, part of philosophy 
since his argument against the possibility of God's direct 
revelation in history fails. 
3. The Adequacy of Ogden's Truth Criterion for Metaphysics 
The clarity of the criterion. Superficially at least, 
there are two lines of argument in Ogden that provide us 
with a truth criterion for metaphysical systems. 52 We shall 
see that they finally reduce to one. 
First, Ogden states straightforwardly that the criterion 
of truth for a metaphysical system is its total fit through 
the whole of experience. Metaphysical systems are complete 
ontologies and they stand or fall as wholes. They cannot be 
falsified by individual facts. 
The second line of thought begins with Ogden's definitions 
of theology and philosophy. They are the analysis of faith; 
and faith is a universal and constitutive phenomenon. This 
must mean that philosophical and theological statements are 
true, if they are universally recognizable descriptions--
existential descriptions. 
To get clearer on these two lines of thought, let me use 
one of Ogden's examples: the abandonment by modern, se~ular 
man of classical theism and "substance" metaphysics. This 
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rejection indicates the following. (1) What is rejected is 
not an isolated piece of the classical puzzle but the entire 
board. This reflects the first approach. (2) The reasons 
for the rejection have to do with the failure, so Ogden thinks, 
of classical theism to measure up to man1s perception of his 
possibilities as indicated by unavoidable faith. Here we 
see Ogden1s second approach. (3) Most importantly, however, 
the rejection does not involve the abandonment of either 
Christianity or faith as such. 
This leads to a crucial problem in Ogden1s thought that 
we must get clear on: does the content of faith logically pre-
cede the content of theology and metaphysics, or is it posterior 
and therefore conceptualized by theology and metaphysics, or 
does, in fact, faith in a strict sense have no content but 
occur always in connection with theology and metaphysics? 
Gilkey, as we have seen, argues that Ogden1s view is an 
incoherent combination of the first (existential) and second 
(process) options. My own position is that Ogden1s view is 
really the third option above, that is, that faith, per ~, 
has no content apart from its existentialist conceptualization 
in theology. This results in the situation that faith is to 
some extent independent of its conceptualizing theory, and yet 
understood only in terms of it. 
This involves complications, but I want only to point out 
that this interpretation brings Ogden1s two lines of thought 
together. Although faith may well be a universal phenomenon, 
it is conceptualized and understood by various whole ontologies. 
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Thus, the real question of truth for metaphysics is for Ogden 
the question of the choice of the IIright philosophy:1I an ade-
quate total theological and metaphysical system. 
We should note that this is not Hartshorne's criterion 
of metaphysics. Although he is the source of much of Ogden's 
metaphysical framework, there is a significant difference 
between their criteria for metaphysical truth. For Hartshorne, 
any, even one, restriction on the applicability of a meta-
physical statement dooms it. Secondly, Ogden's criterion has 
a more subjective ring to it. He speaks of unavoidable belief. 
One could wish that Ogden had spelled out this notion of 
lIunavoidable belief ll carefully, and perhaps that can be expec-
ted in the future. I shall, therefore, make only a few cri-
tical comments concerning what must be understood as two 
characteristics of one criterion, not two separate criteria: 
coherence and unavoidable belief. 
(1) Coherence. 
I want here only to point out the curious position and 
interpretation of a coherence component in Ogden's criterion. 
Langdon Gilkey's criticism is, I think, essentially well 
taken and needs only to be generalized. 
Ogden's urge to build a metaphysical system fits neither 
his existentialist epistemology, nor his (Toulmin's) 
analytic argument for its basis. In particular, a criterion 
that rests heavily on a concept of coherence seems out of place. 
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His understanding of existentialist knowledge as the 
proper form for theology and philosophy ought to require that 
metaphysical statements be closely and individually linked 
with directly existentialist analysis. He has claimed, after 
all, that any statement about God is also a statement about man 
and the possibilities of his existence. This explains, I think, 
his reluctance to part with anthropological claims in his meta-
physical scheme, but it does not allow for metaphysical claims 
to stand ~ true when they conflict with or are not established 
by experience. One may want to maintain them and hope for fur-
ther evidence to clarify the situation, but one cannot speak 
of them as true. 54 
It is also the case that his analytic argument for God's 
reality, as well as his view of God's action, commits him to 
an analogical speaking of God. I shall have more to say on 
this below; for now I note that this also commits him to a set 
of highly descriptive and empirically checkable propositions 
about what is real. 
Ogden's view of the scope of analogy is, if anything, 
more restrictive than Thomas ' , in that it is based on selfhood 
alone. Our knowledge of God is limited to what can be known of 
the human self. Thus, again, it would inconsistent to claim 
truth for a theological statement for which there was no 
experiential backing. I conclude, therefore, that Ogden's 
understanding of metaphysical truth conflicts with other elements, 
and critical ones at that, of his system. 
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(2) Unavoidable belief 
It is this second characteristic of metaphysical truth on 
which Ogden gives us somewhat more detail. With one exception, 
in liThe Criterion of Metaphysical Truth ... 11 (1975), Ogden 
discusses unavoidable belief in the context of how one ought to 
choose the correct conceptualization of faith. This is, of 
course, an all-important problem in a system in which faith is 
continuous with theology and philosophy and thus, although it 
is a level of cognitive awareness, is understood rationally only 
through them. I will deal with this context in a separate 
section to follow, and comment here first on Ogden's statement 
in the context of elaborating a criterion of truth for metaphysics. 
Let me repeat his statement: 
What, then, is the criterion of a metaphysical 
truth? I submit that it is the criterion of unavoidable 
belief or necessary application through experience. 
Those statements are true metaphysically which I 
could not avoid believing to be true, at least impli-
citly, if I were to believe or exist at all; or, alter-
natively, they are the statements which would necessarily 
apply through any of my experiences, even my merely 
conceivable experiences, provided only th5t such an 
experience was sufficiently reflected on.,5 
There are two problems with this criterion. First, 
Ogden appears to be giving two alternative expressions for 
the same criterion, but they are not equivalent. Second, the 
criterion, especially in its first version, is not sufficient 
to establish metaphysics. 
Let me explain. Is lIunavoidable belief ll intended to be 
the same criterion as IInecessary application?1I In the latter 
expression Ogden sounds deductive. That is, he talks of 
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applying metaphysical statements rather than constructing them. 
If the term "necessary" is used here as a synonym for ~ priori, 
then Ogden may well be indicating a criterion similar to Hart-
shornels notion of nonrestrictiveness. 
The difficulty is that Ogden allows for contingent meta-
physical statements, those about my own existence, and these are 
clearly not subject to necessary application. It may be, then, 
that Ogden has two criteria, despite his talk of the criterion. 
The criterion of unavoidable belief can apply to contingent 
statements and it therefore is not equivalent to "necessary 
a p p 1 i cat ion II i f we h a ve pro per 1 y un de r s too d it. S tat e men t s 
which describe, without exception, my actual experiences could 
not be false. Those, however, which I cannot avoid believing 
to be true, may yet be false. Those, however, which I cannot 
avoid believing to be true, may yet be false, or at least might 
have been. 
I must conclude then, that no final judgment can be made 
regarding the success of Ogdenls truth criterion for meta-
physics. It has not been stated with sufficient clarity to 
determine precisely its meaning. Aside from the ambiguity of 
Ogdenls criterion, what it permits is incompatible with a key 
element of his system: metaphysicls source in self-analysis. 
The consistency Qf Ogdenls criterion. - What is most 
amazing about Ogdenls metaphysics is his ability to derive so 
much from so little. Flewls criticism at this point it too 
narrow. Ogden is not limited just to the confines of his 
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argument for the reality of God, but by his epistemology in 
general. Nevertheless, this provides little additional freedom. 
As I have indicated, the source of metaphysics is, for 
Ogden, the self's analysis of itself. This is enough to provide 
an existentialist characterization of man and to demonstrate 
the reality of God. But I fail to see how it can provide the 
principles of analogy which Ogden simply adopts as part of a 
total metaphysical system. For Whitehead the principle that 
God is the primary metaphysical example derives ultimately from 
the principle of relativity,56 and the ontological principle,5? 
which, together, give us the principle that all causes are actual 
and related (either positively or negatively) to all other 
actual entities. 
The difficulty is that in Whitehead's system these princi-
ples are derived from empirical generalizations. To recall his 
well-known definition of metaphysics: 
The true method of discovery is like the flight 
of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of 
particular observation; it makes a flight in the 
thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again 
lands for renewed observ~~ion rendered acute by 
rational interpretation. 
I do not see how Ogden's epistemology can provide them. 
Now Ogden certainly provides good reasons for connecting 
his process metaphysics to his existential epistemology. But 
nowhere is there a clear derivation of the sort he himself has 
required of others, most particularly in "Lonergan and the 
Subjectivist Principle." Here it is stated that one's meta-
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physics must be established "methodically and critically 
by deriving it entirely from one's theory of cognition." 59 
He is explicit that mere "correlation" or lIisomorphism ll is not 
enough. 60 
What I am proposing is that his own system fails to 
live up to this standard. It is anything but clear how one 
could derive a process metaphysics, in particular the principles 
that develop the nature of God, from Ogden's existentialist 
epistemology. What is missing in particular, is the derivation 
of the proportionality factor for analogy. In Thomas ' system, 
for example, the finite/infinite proportion is provided by the 
cosmological argument; in Schleiermacher, whose epistemology is 
closer to Ogden's, it comes from the discovery of a feeling of 
absolute dependence. 
In Ogden, this factor, namely the doctrine that God is 
absolutely relative, is a proposition of the metaphysical system. 
Ogden might, of course, argue that it can be derived from his 
epistemology. My point is only that he has not done so and it 
is not clear how that could be accomplished. 
4. The Same Problem 
Let me, then, summarize where this discussion of Ogden's 
second argument has taken us and what we must now conclude. 
Theology, for Ogden, is initially defined by the tradition that 
results from the revelation that is its derivative source. But 
this immediately pushes us to a more fundamental question. 
What is the criterion by which one determines a true revelation? 
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In particular, why should we conclude that the revelation of 
the possibility of human authentic existence in the person of 
Jesus is, in fact, the truth? Ogden suggests here that the an~ 
swer lies in the concept of IIdecisiveness. 1I A revelation is 
true if it decisively represents the self God is. That is, 
it is a characteristic act of God if it, by analogy, portrays 
true selfhood. 
This answer, however, is unsatisfactory in that it only 
demands a further criterion. How do we know the truth about 
God1s self which allows us to understand an act as characteris-
tically his? The only answer here has to be a criterion of 
metaphysical truth. We have looked at Ogden1s criterion and 
found it lacking in some respects. There is simply no clear 
connection between his existentialist epistemology and his 
process metaphysics. 
In reality, however, the second argument for the 
identity of theology within philosophy fails not only for lack 
of any conclusive truth criterion that could establish the 
identity. Essentially, it fails for the same reason that 
invalidated the first argument. Ogden, by his epistemology, 
has already been forced to deny the possibility of an objective 
criterion for acts of God. As I have already argued, any attempt 
to recognize an historical event as God1s characteristic action 
must be myth. Thus, while it has other serious defects as 
well, Ogden1s second argument fails for the same reason as did 
the first. 
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The underlying problem, then, in Ogden1s system is the 
tension between the concrete God of his process metaphysics 
and the non-objective God demanded by his IIsecularll and 
existentialist epistemology. I see no way of building an 
internally consistent system without giving up one of these two 
tenets. 
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C. Concluding Remarks 
My objective in this dissertation was to synthesize 
Ogden's many isolated statements about theology and philoso-
phy into a logical sequence and then test the consistency of 
the resulting arguments. I did, however, begin by claiming to 
want to make some contribution to the discussion of the relation-
ship of theology and philosophy. Thus, at least a few final 
remarks are in order. 
(a) I have concluded that Ogden's arguments are unsound. 
They also miss the crux of the issue. He supposes that he has 
solved the problem of relating theology and philosophy by 
denying any uniqueness of content for the former. Theology, 
then, is part of philosophy. 
Ogden forgets that, traditionally, Christian theologians 
have not regarded content, the events of Christ's life and 
most notably the resurrection,as identifying a unique disci-
pline. They are usually the first to note the historical 
nature of Christian assertions. Thus, the central items of 
Christian theology belong equally to the disciplines of arch-
eology, history, even linguistics. Certainly its contents 
overlap many other disciplines as well, including the sciences 
and philosophy. 
While it is certainly true that theologians, Thomas, 
for example, have claimed doctrines unknown outside their 
discipline, for example the Trinity, what has traditionally 
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specified its distinctiveness is its source. I noted this 
at the beginning by quoting Thomas, Locke, and Kierkegaard. 
It is here that the argument must focus. Once Ogden gives 
up the source-uniqueness of revelation, he really has no 
choice but to try to dissolve theology into philosophy. 
(b) Probably the most frequent modern and contemporary 
proposal to justify a unique source, and therefore a distinct 
discipline, has been the attempt to isolate some identifying 
type of knowledge. Philosophers and theologians have suggested 
various types of knowing from religious intuition to mystical 
or religious experience to divine encounters. Some have argued 
for unique objects of knowing that distinguish theology such as 
the "feeling of absolute dependence," the "holy," or simply 
the religious aspect of existence. Currently there is a vast 
variety of suggestions based on the notion of a religious" 
"language-game," following some remarks of Wittgenstein. Many 
of these include the view that theology is a type of extremely 
general theoretical knowledge that leads to the formulation of 
world-views. Thus, it is seen as non-empirical, or, better, 
~-empirical, in that it conditions how one perceives the 
world. James Hall has suggested that it is Icategorica1."61 
Theological statements are regarded as the IIfundamental and 
categorizing expressions in terms of which a person views the 
world 'theistically' (i.e., sorts events in terms of a 
theistic model) ."62 All of these suggestions have the serious 
disadvantage of stipulating a unique and non-ordinary type of 
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knowing. 
(c) Until the Age of Reason, and perhaps still today, 
the majority view among Christian theologians was surely 
that the uniqueness of the source of theology stems from its 
divine origin. Aquinas and Locke, for example, are explicit 
on the point that theology is distinguished as a separate science, 
not by its specific content so much as by its character as 
being revealed from God. This revelatory character is held 
to be knowable by ordinary means. Philosophy is man's reasoning 
about existence; theology is the study of God's authoritative 
word on the subject. 
(d) I would argue, then, that even if Ogden were 
successful, and he is not, in showing that the content of 
theology and philosophy coincide, there remain a number of 
possibilities for distinguishing theology by its source. 
Perhaps it is the product of a unique way of knowing or 
experiencing. But it may also be the study of a previously 
given divine revelation. I find Ogden's dismissal of II c l ass ical 
theism ll totally unconvincing, which leaves the viable option of 
an objectively justifiable revelation to man from God, a 
position which I consider not only tenable, but true. It is 
not my intention, however, to argue for that position here. 
My point is only that the factor of source is the crucial 
one, and that Ogden side-steps it. 
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(e) It cannot simply be taken for granted that 
theology deserves to be cited among the academic disciplines. 
If its existence cannot be justified, then it ought to go 
the way of alchemy, astrology, or phrenology. It is surely 
correct that if one can ignore or discard claims to a unique 
source, theology must dissolve into metaphysics. Ogden's 
arguments, however, against the objective action of God in 
history, in creation, redemption~ or revelation, fail by way of 
being internally contradictory. 
NOTES 
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9. Ogden, IITask ll , p. 67. 
10. Ibid., p. 70. 
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12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid., P . 277. 
14. See ibid., p. 278 and Ogden, II T ask II , p. 72. 
15. Ogden, II Po s sib i 1 i ty II , p. 279. 
16. Ogden, 1I0bjectivity", p. 182. 
17 . See Ogden, "How Does God Function in Human Life ll , 
Christianit~ and Crisis, 27, 8 (May 1 5 , 1967), P . 107 , 
and "Theological Briefsll, p. 41. 
18. Ogden, "Promise ll , p. 217. 
1 9 . See 0 g den, II Lor d s hip, lip. 202. 
20. See Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma und M~thos I, p. 47. 
21. Ogden, IIPromise ll , p. 217. 
22. Ibid., p. 218. 
23. See ibid. 
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24. See ibid., p. 219. 
25. See Ogden, "Lordshi pl1, p. 202. 
26. Ogden, IIPromise ll , p. 226. See Ogden's discussions in 
1I0bjectivityll, p. 182. IIFunction li • p. 106, and "Reality", 
~ passim, for the same point. 
27. Ogden, IIRealityll, p. 33. 
28. Ibid., p. 35. A parallel discussion can be found in 
IIFunction ll , p. 106f. 
29. The Philosophy of A.li. Whitehead, ed. P.A. Schlipp 
ffiw York: Tudor, 2nd ed., 1951), p. 698, quoted in 
Ogden, IIRealityll, pp. 36~37. 
30. Ogden, IIRea1ityll, p. 34. 
31. Ogden, IIPunction", p. 106. 
32. Ibid., p. 107. Ogden is quoting ~>Jil1iam James. 
33. Ogden, IIRealityll, p. 38. Here Ogden is drawing from 
Stephen Toulmin, particularly his An Examination .Qf the 
P1ace of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UniverSity Press-,-'950). 
34. Ibid., p. 39. 
35. Ibid. 
36. See the discussion in Ogden, "The Christian Proclamation 
of God toM e n 0 f the Soc a 1 1 ed' At h e is tic Age' II in Is 
God Dead? Concilium, XVI, edt J. Metz (New York: --
Paulist, 1966), pp. 90-91. 
37. Ogden, "Realityll, p. 23. 
38. Ibid. 
39 . I bid., p. 24. See a 1 so 0 g den, !I Fun c t ion II, p. 1 07 . 
40. See his The Logic of Perfection (LaSalle: Open Court, 
1962), p. 110. 
41. Ogden, IIRealityll, p. 24, n. 40. 
42 . 0 g den, II C h r i s t ian Pro c 1 a mat ion!l, p. 93. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid. 
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45. Ogden, "Reality", p. 25. 
46. See Ogden, liThe Strange Witness of Unbelief", in The 
Real ity of God and Other Essays (New York; Harperand 
Row, 1966), p. 129f. 
47. Ibid., pp. 13n-132. 
48. In "God and Philosophy". 
49. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), 
50. Ibid., 8.14 and 9.29. See Ogden, IIGod and Philosophy", 
~69. 
51 . I bid., p. 1 72 . S i mil a r dis c u s s ion s are i nile r; t e rio n I' , 
and "Falsification." 
52. Ogden, "God and Philosophy", p. 171; see also "Objectivity", 
p. 190. 
53. I take this to be the equivalent to Hhitehead's "adequacy." 
54. Ibid., p. 173. 
55. Ogden, "Task", p. 59. 
56. See, e.g. Ogden, "Natural Theology", p, 114, 
57 . See 0 g den, II T ask!l, p p. 58 and 60. 
58. Note the discussion in Ogden, "Understanding of Theology". 
The argument on pl 58 of "Task" easily appears contra"" 
dictory. Note particu1o.rly the sta,t,ement at thE' top of 
the p age, t hat It ex 'I s tent 1 ~ 1 fa, i' t h • .. i so, mode of 
understanding", whereas in the main body of the 
argument it is said to "precede reason" and "seek 
understanding." The key to the distinction lies in the 
word "reflective". Faith is encountered understanding 
preceding reflective understanding. Unfortunately the 
word "reflective" is nowhere clarified and elsewhere in 
his writings Ogden is concerned to argue for the 
reflectiveness of faith taken in the broad sense. 
59. Ibid., p. 58. 
60. Ibid., p. 62. 
61. "Philosophy of religion" is used only in "Task.11 On 
p. 63 it appears to be relatively unimportant while on 
p. 66 it seems to be identical with "philosophical 
theology." 
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62. The argument of the next paragraph is from ibid., p. 61. 
63. Ibid., p. 61. 
64. Ibid., p. 64. 
65. Ibid. 
66. My sources are primarily Ogden, "Theology and Philosophy", 
J 0 urn a 1 0 f R eli g ion, 44, 1 ( Jan., 1 964), p. 5, "T ask" , 
pp. 63-64, "Criterion", and "Falsification", p. 41f. 
67. See Ogden, "Task", p. 63. 
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simply to be the task of philosophy. 
69. See esp. Ogden, "Theology and Philosophy", p. 5 and remarks 
in many other places, e.g. "Challenge", p. 239, and 
1\ The 0 log y and t1 eta p h y sic s ", p p. 1 7 - 1 8 . 
70. See 0 g den, "T ask", p. 63, and "C r i t e rio n I', p. 48. 
71. Ogden, "Criterion", p. 48. 
72. "The Criterion of Metaphysical Truth and the Senses of 
'~1etaphysics"', despite its audacious title, comprises 
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73. For the following see ibid., pp. 47-48. 
74. Ibid., p. 48. 
75. Ogden, "Falsification", p. 41f. 
76. See above, section II, B. 
77. Ogden, "Falsification", p. 41. 
78. Ogden, "Criterion", p. 47. 
79. Ogden, "Falsification", p. 42. 
80. Ogden, "Criterion", p. 47. 
81. See esp. Ogden, "Reality", p. 25, and "Falsification", 
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82 . See the dis c us s ion i n I' The Poi n t 0 f C h r i s to log y", J 0 urn a 1 
of R e 1 i9 ion, 55, 4 (0 ct., 1 975), p. 381. 
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regarding the necessity of metaphysics. 
267 
84. Ogden, "Christo1ogy", pp. 380-381. 
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103. Ogden, 1I0bjectivity", p. 190. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Ogden, "Christologyll, p. 377. 
106. Ibid., p. 378. 
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56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid., p. 15. 
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79. Ibid., p. 11. See also Ogden, liThe ~·1eaning of Christian 
Hope", Union Seminar Quarterly Review, 30, 2 .. 4 
(Winter-Summer, 1973 , p. 154. 
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found in Ogden, "Revelation", p. 284f. 
96. Ogden, "Revelation", p. 287. 
97. Ibid., p. 284. 
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272 
99. See Ogden, "Revelation ll , p. 284 and "Christology 
Reconsidered", p. 119. 
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116. Ogden, "Revelation", p. 52. 
117. See Ogden, "Task", p. 65. 
118. Ibid., p. 63. 
119. This is especially clear in ibid" p. 72. 
120. See the discussion in Ogden, "Revelation", p. 49f. 
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A. Biographical Note 
B. Index to Ogden's Works 
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Biographical Note.- Schubert Ogden was born in Cincinnati, 
Ohio on March 2, 1928. He received his bachelor's degree 
from Ohio Wesleyan University. After a year's graduate study 
in philosophy at Johns Hopkins, as a fellow of the American 
Council of Learned Societies, Ogden entered the University 
of Chicago, from which he was granted the B.D. in 1954 and, 
two years later, the Ph. D. Some of his work there was under 
Charles Hartshorne, shortly before the latter left for Emory 
University, although his dissertation, later published as 
Christ without Myth (1961), was concerned with the philo-
sophical and theological implications of Rudolf Bultmann's 
concept of "demythologizing. 1I 
In 1956 he became an instructor of philosophical theology 
at the Perkins School of Theology of the United Methodist 
Church located on the campus of Southern Methodist University 
in Dallas, Texas, quickly advancing (by 1965) to the rank of 
Professor. During these years he continued to concern himself 
with the relationship of philosophy and theology within the 
context of Bultmann and Heidegger, publishing a number of 
articles, as well as the above-mentioned Christ without Myth. 
He also authored over thirty reviews for the Perkins School 
of Theology Journal, for whom he served as book editor, and 
translated and edited a number of Bultmann's works, which 
appeared as Existence and Faith (1960). 
During these years the influence of Hartshorne increasingly 
found its place in Ogden's thinking and in 1962 he spent a 
year at Marburg University) where Bultmann was professor of 
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New Testament and Theology, as Guggenheim fellow and 
Fulbright scholar, working on the relationship between 
Heideggerian existentialism and the process philosophy of 
Whitehead and Hartshorne. This development culminated in 
the publishing, in 1966, of the essays in The Reality of God. 
In 1969 Ogden became University Professor of Theology at the 
University of Chicago Divinity School, long the bastion of 
process thought. He has been a prolific writer of articles 
in recent years, concentrating primarily on issues of defini-
tion and method within theology and philosophy. Some of 
these have appeared in the Journal of Religion of which he was 
co-editor for 1972/73 and to which he continues to serve as 
consultant. Frequently these essays have been dialogues 
with other theologians and philosophers, among them A. Flew, 
MacKinnon, Lonergan, and Cobb. 
In 1972 Ogden returned to his position as Professor of 
Theology at Perkins School of Theology. He is also the 
director of the graduate program in religion at the parent 
institution, the Southern Methodist University, and an ordained 
minister of the United Methodist Church. For 1978, he served 
as president of the American Academy of Religion. 
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B. Index to Ogden's Works 
The following is a partial index of major topics in 
Ogden's works. It is by no means exhaustive either in 
listings or in headings. It will, nevertheless, serve well 
as an introduction to the more important discussions of 
main issues. It also indicates the passages in Ogden which 
have been the primary sources of this dissertation. A few 
comments are in order. 
AST 
BDHD 
BNQ 
BPD 
BS 
CBL 
01 
CMT 
CNT 
CP 
CPT 
CT 
DD 
DS 
FB 
FT 
GAH 
GP 
HCT 
HDGF 
1. The page numbers frequently indicate only the 
initial page of a lengthy discussion. 
2. When no page number follows the title abbreviation, 
3 . 
the entire work focuses on the topic. 
The following title abbreviations are used: 
"The Authority of Scripture for Theology" (1976) 
"Bultmann's Demythologizing and Hartshorne's Dipolar 
Thei sm" (1964) 
"Bultmann and the 'New Quest'" (1962) 
"Bultmann's Project of Demythologizing and the Problem 
of Theology and Philosophy" (1957) 
"Beyond Supernaturalism" (1963) 
"Colloquy on Bernard Lonergan (3)" (1975) 
Christ without ~ (1961) 
"The Criterion of ~~etaphysical Truth and the Senses 
of Metaphysics" (1975) 
"A Christian Natural Theology?" (1971) 
"The Christian Proclamation of God to Men of the 
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analogy - RG57, GAH 9 
in Bultmann - SRB 16, GAH 6, PTPT 271, TG 386, 390, BDHD 500 
in Hartshorne - GAH 10, TPS, BDHD 509, B 515, RG 56 
Bultmann: analogy see analogy 
and Hartshorne -SRB 17, BDHD 497, 505, BS 15 
and Heidegger - BPD 160, SRB 10, 00 19, GAH 3, LUDG 11 
PRET 73 
inconsistent- BDP 157, 164, DD 23, OR 279 
history - DO 17 
philosophy - BPD 167 
Buri: DO 25, TO 181 
Christ - SRB 14, GAH 8, 15, TP 13 or 269, FB 32, PC 376, CR 117, 
AST 254, CM 
Christianity: truth of - FT 1057, WT 39, R 48 
definition: theology - CT 60, TPT, 721 PPET 66, CBL 36, WT 22 
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philosophy - PC 377, UT 172, !66, TPT 59 
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LUDG 11 
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God - GAH 13, JOG 13, LSP 170, R 46, MCH 153 
Heidegger's doctrine of TG 
Hartshorne's doctrine of: see: Hartshorne 
Hartshorne and Bultmann, Heidegger: see Bultmann 
and Ogden - UT 157, BDHD 493, TG 163 
analogy - GAH 10, TP 5, BDHD 509, BS 15, RG 56 
ontological argument TO 6, R 51, GR 265, RB 36 
philosophy and theology TP 9 
Heidegger: and Bultmann BOP 162, SRB 12, PTPT 272, TG 381 
BDHD 495, UT 157 
doctrine of God TG 
philosophy and theology TG 384, BDHD 503 
and New Testament TG 383 
history of contemporary theology - ST 17, SRB 5, 12, BNQ 209 
PPET 67, CM 12, CNT 111, RG 1 
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religion: definition - TPT 66 
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subjective principle - PPET 77, 81, LSP 657 
theism, classical - GAH 3, 9, LUO 173, TG 387, 392, ST 16 
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and verification - TO 190, R 51, PC 382 
and philosophy - see: philosophy 
in Heidegger - see: Heidegger 
in Hartshorne - see: Hartshorne 
criterior of - ST 15, WT 25: see also definition theology 
method of: see demythologizing 
verification: in theology - see: theology; in metaphysics -
see metaphysics 
verification principle: GP 170, FB 22, TO 187, MT 109 
Whitehead: subjective principle - see: subjective principle 
and Ogden - RG 56, TO 81, 94, PF 224, TG 163, GAH 175 
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